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ABSTRACT
The African National Congress (ANC) is engaged in an armed
conflict with the South African Government for control of South
Africa. ANC combatants are being prosecuted under South African
criminal law as rebels, a process which undermines the normative
value of the criminal law because it is in conflict with popular
support for the ANC. International law provides a humanitarian
alternative to the criminal law. This study investigates the
international legal protections available to combatants in the
conflict.
Lawful combatant status and prisoner of war status would only be
available if the South African armed conflict was classified as
international. It has been argued that the international status
of the ANC, derived from the denial of self-determination to the
South African people, internationalises its war against the South
African Government. Attempts have been made to enforce this
concept. Article 1(4) of Geneva Protocol 1 classifies armed
conflicts involving a movement representing a people with a right
of se If-determination against a .. racist re,gime" as international.
But South Africa did not accede to Protocol 1 and the argument
that it is custom fails because of insufficient international
support. Nevertheless, the developing situation justifies an
examination of the personal conditions required to gain protected-
status. The conditions in Article 4 of Geneva Convention 3 (1949)
ii
are onerous, making it impracticable in South Africa. Protocol
l's updated conditions are more suited to the armed conflict. The
Conventions and Protocol 1 also make available procedural and
substantive protections to combatants and deal with special
issues particular to South Africa.
The South African armed conflict can alternatively be classified
as non-international. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions
applies because South Africa is party to them. Geneva Protocol 2
is not .applicable because South Africa is not a party to it.
Unfortunately, Article 3 only applies general humanitarian
principles and not protected status.
To conclude, because of the inadequate means for enforcing the
classification of the South African armed conflict as
international and the inadequacy of the protections available
under the law of non-international armed conflict, it is urged




I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my supervisor
Chiman Patel, and especially of my co-supervisor Hichael Cowling,
whose expert advice was central to this work.
Financial support provided by the University and by the Human
Sciences Research Council is also gratefully acknowledged.







1.1 THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
1.2 THE STATUS OF COMBATANTS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
1.3 THE STATUS OF COMBATANTS IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
1.4 THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
1.5 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.6 AIM OF STUDY
1.7 A MOTIVATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
. CHAPTER TWQ: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
2.2.1 GENERAL
2.2.2 THE MIDDLE AGES
2.2.3 THE 'ANCIEN REGIME'
2.2.4 THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
2.2.5 THE EMERGENCE OF GUERILLA WARFARE
2.2.6 LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CLASSICAL LAW OF WAR
2.2.7 THE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
v
2.2.8 CIVIL WAR AND TOTAL WAR
2.2.9 THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
2.2.10 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1949
2.2.11 SUMMARY OF TRENDS IN THE LAW OF LAWFUL COMBATANT
STATUS






2.3.5 THE CUSTOM~RY MODES OF REGULATION OF INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT ANALYSED
2.3.6 COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND
GENEVA PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
2.3.7 WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AS A NEW MODE OF INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICT REGULATION
2.4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
SECTION A: CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONfLICT AS
AlLlliJEBliATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
CHAPTER THREE: THE MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF "INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS FOR NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
vi
3.2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
3.2.2 SELF-DETERMINATION AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE
3.2.3 SOUTH AFRICA, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE NORM OF NON-
RACISM
3.2.4 THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS AND THE A.N.C.
3.2.5 THE ANC'S IUS AD BELLUM
3.2.6 THE ANC AND THE IUS IN BELLO
3.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT BY MEANS OF COMMON ARTICLE 2 OF
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.3.2 PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE 2
3.3.3 PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE 2
3.3.4 CONCLUSION
3.4 THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 1(4) OF
GENEVA PROTOCOL 1 OF 1977
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION
3.4.2 THE GENESIS OF ARTICLE 1(4)
3.4.2.1 DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS
3.4.2.2 DEVELOPMENT BY THE ICRC
3.4.2~3 THE GENEVA DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 1974-1977
3.4.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.4.2.3.2 THE EVOLUTION AND ELABORATION OF ARTICLE
vii
1( 4)
3.4.2.3.3 ATTITUDES AT THE CONFERENCE SHAPING
ARTICLE 1(4)
3.4.3 ARTICLE 1(4) - FIELD OF APPLICATION
3.4.4 ARTICLE 96(3) - GENESIS
3.4.5 THE ANC'S 1980 DECLARATION AND ARTICLE 96(3)
3.4.6 CRITICISMS OF ARTICLES 1(4) AND 96(3) AS MODES FOR
INCLUDING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT WITHIN THE
MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS
3.4.6.1 INTRODUCTION
:.3.4.6.2 THE ,JUST WAR/JUS AD BELLUM CRITICISMS
3.4.6.3 THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF WARS OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE 1(4)
3.4.6.4 ARTICLE 1(4) IGNORES THE TRADITIONAL OBJECTIVE
CRITERIA OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS AND SUBSTITUTES
SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA
3.4.6.5 ARTICLE 1(4) IGNORES RECIPROCAL/COROLLARY
OBLIGATIONS
3.4.6.6 ARTICLE 1(4) HAS A BUILT IN NON-APPLICABILITY
CLAUSE
3.4.6.7 SUMMARY OF CRITICISMS, ATTITUDES AND
ALTERNATIVES
3.5 THE INTERNATiONAL CHARACTER OF WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
viii
3.5.1 INTRODUCTION
3.5.2 FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.5.3 RELEVANT SOURCES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF
ARTICLE 1(4) INTO CUSTOM
3.5.4 ARTICLE 1(4) AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.5.4.1 INTRODUCTION
3.5.4.2 AT THE i974-77 CONFERENCE
3.5.4.3 RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION




CHAPTER FOUR: THE PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
.4.2 A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMBATANT STATUS IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.2.1 FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS
4.2.1.1 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARMED FORCES AND
CIVILIANS
4.2.1.2 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NON-
COMBATANTS
4.2.1.3 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL
COMBATANTS
4.2.2 LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH
ix
AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.2.2.1 PROBLEMS WITH GUERRILLA WARFARE
4.2.2.2 THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE QUARTER
4.2.2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION AS A FUNCTIONAL
CRITERION FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS IN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.2.2.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAWFUL COMBATANT AND
P.O.W. STATUS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.2.2.5 CONCLUSION
4.3 PERSONAL CONDITIONS FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS UNDER THE
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
4.3.2 REGULAR COMBATANTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.3.2.1 REGULARS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 4A(1)
4.3.2.2 REGULARS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 4A(3)
4.3.3 IRREGULAR COMBATANTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED
CONFLICT
4.3.3.1 IRREGULARS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 4A(2)
4.3.3.1.1 INTRODUCTION
4.3.3.1.2 COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE?
4.3.3.1.3 THE SIX CONDITIONS ANALYSED
4.3.3.2 LEVEES EN MASSE
4.3.4 LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS AND THE DETAINING POWER'S OWN
NATIONALS UNDER THE 1949 CONVENTIONS
4.3.5 DESERTERS AND DEFECTORS
4.3.6 THE PROCEDURE FOR ADJUDICATION OF STATUS
x
4.3.7 PROTECTIONS FOR UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS
4.3.8 CONCLUSION
4.4 PERSONAL CONDITIONS FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS UNDER GENEVA
PROTOCOL 1 OF 1977
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.4.2 NEW CONDITIONS FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
4.4.3 PROTOCOL 1'5 CONDITIONS FOR PROTECTED STATUS-
ARTICLES 43 AND 44
4.4.4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMBATANTS IN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.4.4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.4.4.2 PERFIDY
4.4.4.3 THE PRACTICE OF APARTHEID AS A GRAVE BREACH AND
A WAR CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 85 OF GENEVA PROTOCOL 1
4.4.4.4 THE USE OF TERROR IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED
CONFLICT




4.4.5 PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE GUARANTEES UNDER PROTOCOL 1
4.4.5.1 ARTICLE 45 - PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS





SECTION B: CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONFLICT AS A NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
CHAPTER FIVE: THE MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION OF COMMON
ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND GENEYA PROTOCOL 2 OF
llL71..
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
5.2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
5.2.2 THE MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 3-
"ARMED CONFLICT NOT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER"
5.2.3 THE BINDING,FORCE OF ARTICLE 3
5.3 GENEVA PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION - THE GENESIS OF PROTOCOL 2
5.3.2 THE MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION OF PROTOCOL 2
5.3.2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 1
5.3.2.2 ARTICLE 1 INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
5.3.3 THE BINDING FORCE OF PROTOCOL 2
5.3.4 PROTOCOL 2'S APPLICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
5.4 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER SIX: TH] PERSONAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION OF COMMON ARTICLE
3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONYENTIONS AND GENEVA PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
6.1 PROTECTIONS FOR COMBATANTS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS GENERALLY




6.2.2 THE GENERAL PROTECTIONS OFFERED COMBATANTS BY
ARTICLE 3
6.2.3 THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 3
6.3 GENEVA PROTOCOL 2'S PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION AND GENERAL
PROTECTIONS
6.3.1 PERSONAL FIELD
6.3.2 PROTOCOL 2'S GENERAL PROTECTIONS
6.3.2.1 NO LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
6.3.2.2 QUARTER
6.3.2.3 DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS
6.3.2.4 ARTICLE 4 - FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES
6.3.2.5 ARTICLE 6 - PENAL PROSECUTION
6.3.2.6 ARTICLE 5 - PRISONERS
6.3.2.7 THE PROHIBITION OF TERRORISM
6.3.3 THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL 2
6.3.4 CONCLUSION




7.2 THE INADEQUACY OF THE APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
7.3 A MORE SUITABLE SOLUTION
7.4 WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH THE EXISTING LAW?
xiii
7.5 THE COSTS OF GRANTING ANC COMBATANTS PROTECTED STATUS
7.6 FORCES OF COMPLIANCE
7.7 THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
7.8 THE GENERAL FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

















Annual Survey of South African Law
British Yearbook of International Law
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on
the Reaffirmation and Development of the
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
(1974-1977)
Comparative and International Law Journal of
South Africa
International and Comparative Law Quarterly
International Review of the Red Cross
Natal University Law Review
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
Revue Droit Penal Militaire et Droit la Guerre
South African Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology
South African Law Journal




1 1 THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Armed conflict is the most anarchic of human conditions.
Societies at war discard many of the mores that restrain human
behaviour in peacetime. Han has, however, introduced rules in an
attempt to confine this anarchy. International law has been used
to curb excessive violence, ease the pain and suffering of those
individuals affected by armed conflict, and preserve human life
and humanitarian values. This law of armed conflict,1 or
humanitarian law, can be defined as the corpus of international
rules, established by treaty. or custom, specifically intended to
apply in armed conflict. 2 It is split into two divisions. (i) The
law est~blished by the Hague Conventions and attached Regulations
of 1899 and 1907 (Hague Law) determines the rights and duties of
the parties to the conflict in the conduct of operations and
limits the choice of doing harm. 3 (ii) The law contained in the
various humanitarian Geneva Conventions (Geneva Law) is intended
to safeguard military personnel who find themselves at the mercy
of the enemy and persons not taking part in hostilities. 4 In
1 Historically termed the law of war, or ius in bello.





simple terms then, Hague Law governs how an armed conflict is
fought while Geneva Law protects the individual victims of armed
conflict.
1 2 THE STATUS OF COMBATANTS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
It is an important principle of the law of armed conflict that in
international armed conflicts (i.e. armed conflicts between
states) combatants are not subject to the criminal law of the
opposing state. The reason why their killing of members of the
other side's armed forces is regarded as blameless is rooted in
Rousssau'a doctrine that the real adversaries are the states the
Qombatanta r~pr~a~nt and not the individual combatants. s States
have, therefore, over time, through international treaties and
custom, established among themselves the rule that combatants who
commit ,belligerent acts during international armed conflicts
cannot be subject to prosecution for those acts provided they
personally satisfy certain conditions. In addition, combatants
who fall into enemy hands also acquire B special status
guaranteeing a certain level of treatment. Thus lawful combatants
become prisoners of war (P.O.W's) on capture. Enforcement of
these protections depends upon the right of a captured combatant
not to be killed immediately, i.e., the right to quarter.
The conditions for lawful combatant status were first set out in
5 J J Rousseau Du Contrat Social du Principes du Droit
Politigue (1762) chp 4.
3
the Hague law because they were linked to the regulation of
methods of warfare, but were later taken up by the law of Geneva
as the key conditions for P.D.W. status. These conditions centred
on the principle that lawful combatants had to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population. This principle of
distinction consists of two aspects: (i) The visibility aspect
requiring that combatants distinguish themselves visibly from the
civilian population and from the opposing side. (ii) The command
link aspect requiring that combatants establish their membership
of armed forces distinct from the civilian population throuih a
chain of command connecting them to a party to the conflict. It
was implicit in the classification of the regular armed forces as
lawful combatants that they were already distinct from the
civilian population through their uniforms and military
organis~tion.e ~Irregulars, such as volunteer corps, acquired
lawful combatant status provided they conformed to the conditions
of: Acting under a responsible command, wearing a fixed and
distinctive sign, carrying arms openly and obeying the laws and
11
customs of war.? If combatants failed to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population they lost the right to participate
in the armed conflict and P.D.W. status. Common Article 2 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions currently applies the law of armed
6 The regular armed forces of states were granted lawful
combatant status through a custom which was later formalised in
Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulations attached to Hague Convention
4 of 1907.
? Article 1 of the Hague Regulations of 1907.
conflict to interstate armed conflictsS while Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War sets out the conditions combatants must observe in order to
qualify for protected status.· The bulk of the Conventions
contain additional rules protecting and providing for both
combatants and civilians during armed conflict. But what of
combatants in conflicts that occur within states?
1.3 THE STATUS OF COMBATANTS IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
The international regulation of internal armed conflicts has
always been problematic because it is a direct interference in
states' internal affairs. Historically, the fate of captured
rebels has varied. In' small scale rebellions they were usually
executed as traitors. In large internal armed conflicts, such as
the American Civil War, execution of the rebels became morally
repugnant and difficult to implement. The possibility of rebel
victory prompted concern about self-preservation. When the rebel
threat became impossible to ignore, various customary legal
regimes, depending for their application on the nature and size
of the engaged forces, were adopted at different historical
junctures to regulate the behaviour of the parties to the
conflict and their relations with other states. Belligerent
recognition, popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
S Supplemented by Article 1(3) of the Geneva Protocol 1 of
1977.
9 This Article is common to the first three Conventions
(13/13/4>, but we will use Article 4 for the sake of convenience.
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regulated the parties' conduct towards each other's combatants
according to the accepted practice in international armed
conflicts. Combatants were granted lawful combatant status and
P.O.W status. By 1949, however, the customary modes had fallen
into disuse. They were replaced by common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which provided general humanitarian
guarantees in conflicts "not of an international character", but
which gave no protection from the incumbent's criminal law or
P.O.W status. Geneva Protocol 2 of 1977 is the most recent legal
development in respect of non-international armed conflicts.
Intended to supplement Article 3 by increasing the latter's
humanitarian protections without conceding any status to the
rebel movement, Protocol 2 has not advanced humanitarian law
because its application is predicated on the occupation of
territo~y and its protections are insubstantial. Lawful combatant
status and P.O.W. status are no longer available in even large
scale non-international armed conflicts.
1.4 THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
After the second world war decolonisation became a major
international issue. The implementation of this process
transformed the international legal order. Article 1(1) of the
United Nations Charter, together with the United Nations (U.N.)
Resolutions which developed it, asserted that colonised peoples
had a right of self-determination that could only be satisfied by
their independence. Host colonial states decolonised peacefully,
6
but there were instances of protracted colonial intransigence. In
these cases national liberation movements were formed in the
colonies to fight for independence in what became known as wars
of national liberation. The legal problen was classifying these
wars of national liberation. The standard classification was that
they were internal or non-international armed conflicts because
they took place within the colonial state's territory. Thus, at
best, Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied and the
combatants of the national liberation movement fell under the
criminal jurisdiction of the colonial power. But the U.N.,
swollen with ex-colonial states, sanctioned these wars of
national liberation. International support for the legal right of
colonised peoples to self-determination lent impetus to the
argument that the national liberation movements representing
these peoples had a legal right to initiate wars enforcing
decolonisation. The majority of U.N. member states regarded these
conflicts as taking place between two international subjects,
viz.: the colonial state and the colonised people as represented
by the national liberation movement. They argued that these
conflicts were international, were subject to the law of armed
conflict rather than the colonial states' criminal law, and that
the combatants of the national liberation movement were entitled
to lawful combatant status and P.D.W. status.
The debate on the redefinition of international armed conflicts
to include wars of national liberation polarised publicists in
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the 1970's. This redefinition was attempted by various means. The
international character of wars of national liberation was
asserted by the U.N. General Assembly in a number of resolutions,
but they have not been accepted as a fans et origo of the law in
this regard. Abi-Saab put forward the most sophisticated legal
argument for the classification of these wars as international
armed conflicts. 1o Paragraph 3 of common Article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions includes as international armed conflicts,
inter alia, conflicts between High Contracting Parties (HCP's)
and "powers" that are not contracting parties. 11 Abi-Saab
interpreted "powers" to include national liberation movements.
But this interpretation did not become authoritative. In
response, the inclusion of wars of national liberation as a
special species of international armed conflict was taken up in
the development of a new Protocol additional to the Conventions.
This inclusion was the subject of an acrimonious dispute at the
1974-1971 Geneva Diplomatic Conference. Supporters of the
national liberation movements contended that these wars were
already international armed conflicts under general international
law and they intended Article 1 of the new Protocol to simply
reinforce this general law. But they added little legal flesh to
their highly charged political arguments. On the other hand, the
la G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of
War" 3 Annales de Etudes Internationales (1972) 93; "Wars of
National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols" 16&
Recueil des CQurs (1979) 353-445.
11 Article 96(2) of Geneya PrQtQcol 1 Qf 1977 uses the term
"parties" in a similar context.
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concept's mainly Western detractors, ranging in opinion from
those who regarded the internationalisation of wars of national
liberation as a dire threat to the law12 to those more amenable
to the idea but who had difficulty with its various
formulations,13 relied heavily on a legalistic approach. Despite
the detractors efforts, Article 1(4) of Geneva Protocol 1 (1977)
classifying wars fought for self-determination against colonial,
alien, or racist regimes as international armed conflicts was
adopted.
This new classification was aimed at attaining lawful combatant
status and P.O.W. status for the combatants of national
liberation movements. The emancipation of these combatants
necessitated the greatest possible" relaxation of the requirement
that th~y visibly distinguish themselves from the civilian
population. The guerrilla warfare practiced in these wars of
national liberation had rendered the visibility aspect of the
principle of distinction impractical. Thus, in Articles 43 and 44
of Protocol 1 the personal conditions for lawful combatant status
requiring combatants to make themselves visible were
substantially reduced from those set out in Article 4 of the 1949
Conventions.
12 For example, D E Graham "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference
on the Laws of War, a Victory for Political Causes and a Return
to the Just War Concept of the Eleventh Century" 32 Washington &
Lee LR (1975) 25.
13 For example, D P Forsythe "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference
on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations" 69 American J1L (1975) 77.
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Unfortunately, because of the politically loaded wording of
Article 1(4), the colonial, alien, and racist states at which it
was directed did not become party to the Protocol. Article 1(4)'s
exponents have therefore begun to assert that these adversary
states are bound by a new rule of customary international law to
its effect. The problem of finding a legally binding means for
classifying wars of national liberation as international armed
conflicts, has, however, yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
1.5 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
South Africa is one of the adversary states targeted in both
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and Article 1(4). Although
South Africa has already been decolonised and is an independent
state, it was argued in the U.N. that the self-determination of
the South African people had not occurred because they have been
subject to legislated racial discrimination by the settler
government through its internal policy of apartheid. 14 Non-
racialism was construed as a right integral to self-
determination. It follows that the key nationalist organisation,
the African National Congress (ANC), frustrated in its efforts to
achieve self-determination peacefully, has legitimately taken up
arms against the South African Government in pursuit of this aim.
Further, it was argued that the ensuing armed conflict is an
international armed conflict and ANC members have a right to
14 Abi-Saab op cit 1979 397.
lawful combatant
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status and P.O.W. status. Article 1(4)'s
reference to "racist regimes" is the outcome of these arguments.
The South African Government's opposition to this concept is
clear. It considers the issue to be domestic and rejects
international law. It regards the ANC's combatants, for all
practical purposes the members of the its armed wing, Umkhonto we
Sizwe,1~ as criminals. It prosecutes them in its criminal courts
for statutory offences such as those set out in the Internal
Security Act16 and for common law crimes such as treason. These
prosecutions frequently result in the death sentence. Thus we
have two competing legal regimes asserting jurisdiction over
combatants in the South African armed conflict.
Although the debate on wars of national liberation generated a
wealth of general academic comment,17 little academic attention
has been paid to the specific South African problem. The work
that has been done is fairly polemical. Asmal has come out
strongly in favour of classifying the conflict as international
and he considers ANC members to have a legal right to protected
status. 1B But his hortatory argument relies heavily on the
"Spear of the Nation".
16 No.74 of 1982.
17 Abi-Saab op cit 1979 provides a useful overview of the
issues - most of the work on the subject is cited in my bibliograph
18 K Asmal liThe Status of the Combatants of the liberation
Movement of South Africa under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Geneva Protocol 1 of 1977 11 UN Centre Against Apartheid: Notes and
Comments (1980); National Liberation Movements: Their Status and
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prescriptive nature of General Assembly Resolutions and tends to
gloss over the substantive legal problems attendant upon such an
approach. Borrowdale has, more circumspectly, investigated both
the transformation of Article 1(4) into custom and recent
developments in the law affecting South Africa including the
ANC's 1980 Declaration that it would observe the general
principles of humanitarian law where possible. 18 Booysen, taking
a conservative position, has applied the law rigidly to affirm
domestic jurisdiction and deny any form of international
regulation of the South African armed conflict. 2o These writers
worked mainly in response to the adoption of Protocol 1 in 1977.
The occurrence of pertinent legal developments and the surge in
the level of violence has recently refocussed attention on the
application of the law of armed conflict in South Africa. Hurray
has noted that although a South West African court has accepted
the tendency to regard the Namibian armed conflict as
international as a mitigating circumstance on sentencing captured
SWAPO combatants, the position of ANC combatants is still unclear
Role in Contemporary International Law Paper delivered to the
11th congress of the International Association of Democratic
Lawyers - Halta (13-17/11/1980).
18 A Borrowdale "The future of the law of War: The Place of
the Additional Protocols in Customary International law" 14 eILSA
(1981) 79; "The Law of War in South Africa: The Growing Debate"
15 eILSA (1982) 31.
20 H Booysen "Terrorists, P.O.W's and South Africa" 1 SAYIL
(1974/5) 32; Volkereg (1980) 136,392.
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in this respect. 21 A South African court has, however, found that
the provisions of Protocol 1 internationalising the South African
armed conflict have not been accepted into customary
international law and that therefore they are not binding in
South Africa. 22 These developments are controversial. Further
research on the relevance of international law to the South
African armed conflict is necessary because of the serious
strains placed on South Africa's municipal law by the criminal
prosecution of individuals viewed as legitimate combatants by the
majority of South Africans and by international society.
1.6 AIM OF STUDY
In response to the need for further investigation, it is the aim
of this study to examine the scope and nature of the full range
of international legal protections potentially available to
combatants in the South African armed conflict. The topic is
schismatic. Lawful combatant status and P.O.W. status apply if
the armed conflict is classified as international while only
general protections apply if the armed conflict is classified as
21. C Murray "The Status of the ANC and SWAPO and
international humanita.rian la.w" 100 S.AL.J. (1983) 402; "The 1977
Geneva Protocols and South Africa" 33 I..C.La (1984) 462. S-Y
Sagarius 1983(1)SA 833(SWA) establishes the relevance of
international law on sentencing in Namibia. S y Hogoeraoe TPD 6
August 1982 unreported, appears to reject the concept as a moral
excuse in South Africa; S y Buthelezi D&CLD 22 Sept unreported,
appears to accept the concept as a moral excuse. Both cases were
commented on in 1 Lawyers for Human Rights Bulletin (1983) 123
and 129.
22 S y Petane 1988(3)SA 51(CPD).
. t t' 1 /1non-1n erna 10na . The two legally possible,
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mutuallY
incompatible classifications, each have two components. As
already noted, lawful combatant status is the function of two
elements, viz.: (i) The material field of application, involving
classifying the armed conflict as international, logically
anterior to (ii) the personal field of application, setting out
the conditions a combatant must personally meet in order to
qualify as lawful. This material - personal taxonomy is also
suitable for an analysis of the application of the protections
available if the armed conflict is classified as non-
international. Therefore, preceded and informed by chapter two's
examination of the historical evolution of the basic precepts of
lawful combatant status and the international regulation of non-
international armed conflicts, the core of my study entails a bi-
polar examination.
The first step in Section A - Classification Of The South African
Armed Conflict As An International Armed Conflict - entails a
discussion, in chapter four, of the material conditions for the
classification of the armed conflict as international. The
theoretical foundations of the internationalisation of wars of
national liberation in general and the South African armed
conflict in particular are examined before the actual means of
application are investigated. Following this discussion, the
argument that "powers" in common Article 2 paragraph 3 of the
1949 Conventions includes organisations such as the ANC is
14
investigated because classifying the South African armed conflict
as an Article 2 conflict would bind South Africa as it is party
to the Conventions. Then the development of Article 1(4) of
Protocol 1 with its reference to "racist regimes" singling out
South Africa as a special kind of international armed conflict is
traced. After an inquiry into the reasons why the South African
Government rejected Article 1(4) and refused to become a party to
Protocol 1, the examination of Article 1(4) devolves into an
investigation of its status as a rule of international custom.
The second step in Section A is the analysis, in chapter five, of
the personal conditions for lawful combatant status and P.D.W.
status beginning with an examination of their theoretical
foundations and focussing on their practicability in the South
African armed conflict. Although the South African Defence Force
(SADF) may generally be characterised as a regular fighting
force, members of its reconnaissance battalions, for instance,
fight a counter-insurgency war using guerilla tactics. ANC
combatants fight as either urban or rural guerrillas. The concern
of this study is, therefore, mainly with how irregular guerrillas
qualify as lawful combatants in terms of Article 4A(2) of Geneva
Convention 3 and Articles 43 and 44 of Protocol 1. Although
examination of these Articles occupies the bulk of chapter five,
an evaluation is made of problems specific to the South African
armed conflict, including the practice of apartheid as a grave
breach of international law, unique categories of combatants such
15
as township combatants, as well as the special position of spies,
and mercenaries and how international law deals with terrorism.
The chapter concludes with an examination of the procedural and
substantive guarantees available to all captured combatants.
The first step in Section B - Classification Qf The South African
Armed Conflict As A Non-International Armed Conflict is the
discussion, in chapter 6, of the material conditions for the
classification of the armed conflict as non-international.
Although this alternative classification leads only to general
protections for combatants and no immunity from prosecution for
taking up arms, it is evaluated because the classification of the
conflict is not settled. Because South Africa is party to the
1949 Conventions, the investigation of common Article 3 is
concerned only with its criteria of application and the means
whereby the parties are bound to apply the Article. The
investigation of Protocol 2 focuses on its high threshold 23 and
South Africa's non-accession, which together make its application
in the South African armed conflict moot at present.
The second step in Section B is the examination, in chapter 7, of
the personal field of application of the general humanitarian
guarantees available to combatants under" the law of non-
international armed conflict and the nature of these guarantees.
23 Article 1.
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The conclusion attempts to sum up the shortcomings of the law and
makes some projections as to the possible adaptations of the law
that will be necessary for its actual application in the
conflict.
1 7 A MOTIVATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
Dugard has advocated a cautious approach in dealing with the
international regulation of the conflict. 24 The author of this
study subscribes to the need for caution. Nevertheless, although
it is conceded that the problems of application are formidable,
it is submitted from the outset that international regulation of
the South African armed conflict will be more beneficial to all
parties involved than its continued regulation by South African
criminal law and that therefore all means for furthering
international regulation should be explored. The rationale behind
this submission is related to an appreciation of the interested
parties
advantage.
different needs beyond their immediate political
The ANC has the most apparent need. If its combatants do not
attain lawful status they will remain criminals under South
African law. Under this law, the taking up of arms, even in a
genuine military situation, such as an attack on an SADF unit,
24 See C Hurray quoting J Dugard in "The Status of the ANC
and SWAPO and international humanitarian law" 100 ~ (1983) 402
at 406.
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will be treated as a purely criminal action. The ANC is aware of
the advantages of the implementation of humanitarian law. It can
only gain in international stature should the conflict come under
international jurisdiction and it complies with the law. The
organisation has declared that it will adhere to humanitarian law
as far as possible. This declaration can be understood to be an
attempt to secure lawful combatant status for its guerrillas.
Achieving this status will remove the taint of suicide from many
of the ANC's activities by removing the threat of prosecution for
the taking up of arms and by guaranteeing P.D.W. status on
capture. In order to win these protections, however, the law
imposes stiff conditions. The ANC will find it difficult to meet
these conditions. Nevertheless, the law should be adapted to the
situation on the ground and the ANC's willingness to comply
should remain t~ overriding consideration.
The Sorith African Government also has an interest in applying
international law in the conflict. Rubin argues, correctly it is
submitted, that the classification of politically motivated
violence as criminal under the municipal law of a nation serves
no purpose. 25 It brings the criminal law into disrepute leading
to a legitimacy crisis that profoundly undermines the municipal
legal system. In the South African context the undermining of the
law is so far advanced by the legal enforcement of racial
25 A P Rubin "Terrorism and the Laws of War" 12 Deover
Journal of law and Policy (1983) 219 at 231.
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domination that it leads one to speculate whether the idea of law
itself is not endangered. The international law of armed conflict
provides a much more suitable framework for dealing with
politically motivated violence in South Africa. It protects
civilians because it tends to direct attacks onto military rather
than civilian targets by providing legal penalties enforcing the
distinction between civilians and the military. It removes
combatants from domestic jurisdiction. It provides a better
adapted technical legal system for prosecuting individual
offenders for any grave breaches of the law that they may commit.
Theoretically, criminal law encounters difficulties when dealing
with politically motivated crime. It loses its deterrent effect.
The sense of retributive justice is not likely to be shared by
political dissidents who reject the legitimacy of a society's
normal restraints when deciding to perpetrate criminal acts. 26
When the vast majority of the members of a society's population
support the aims and ideals of a dissident organisation such as
in South Africa, then the sense of retribution alters to a sense
of outrage that the dissidents should be treated as criminals for
taking up arms to achieve those aims and ideals. Not just the
integrity of the criminal law but that of the whole legal system
is brought into question. Decriminalising ANC guerrillas will
slow the process of debilitation of South African law. The South
African Government may continue to buttress its position with the
26 A P Rubin "Terrorism, 'Grave
Protocols" 74 Proceedings of the






domestic jurisdiction argument, choosing to weather the
consequences of ignoring international opinion rather than show
any farsighted flexibility. Eventually, however, its
intransigence will be overrun by demographic factors; too many
combatants to house in ordinary prisons; too many combatants to
keep on sentencing to long terms of imprisonment or death.
The international community also has an interest in seeing the
international regulation of armed conflict because it will
reinforce international law generally by providini a concrete
example of the successful development and application of
humanitarian law in an age when such examples are rare. In
addition, the operation of the law will help to civilise and
restrain what is fast becoming a disastrous and widespread
conflagration in the subcontinent.
One should not be blind to the fact that making a classification
is a political act. To be rigidly legalistic in this process is
to create the illusion of legal integrity where little exists.
There is no central authority in international law to give a
legally binding judgement on whether the South African armed
conflict is international or non-international. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been called on to play
international umpire but the organisation has become profoundly
reluctant to pass judgement on the classification. of any
conflict. It prefers to take a pragmatic position urging as much
20
humanitarian activity as possible. The parties to the South
African armed conflict are left to act as both claimant and judge
and no party can pass a definitive judgement on the other's
claim. The result is a divergence of views as to what law
applies. The parties
... are more interested in using legal argument in the
political-legal process of making and implementing policy
than in the academic-legal process of attaching a label to a
factual situation. 27
The value the parties attach to international regulation of the
armed conflict depends on whether it is to their direct political
advantage. But although the application of humanitarian law has
always been tenuous because it requires the participation of all
sides to a conflict and not all parties have the political will
to apply the law, the law has been successfully applied in
extremely difficult situations. Moreover, the object of the law's
application is not the political advantage of the participants,
but the general increase in the humanitarian conduct of the
conflict. This great humanitarian principle provides the best
reason for the examination of the legal position of combatants in
the South African armed conflict.
27 D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics - The leRe (1977) 137.
He points to the example of Portugal before the 1974 coup where
the official position was that the liberation movements in the
colonies were rebels and criminals, whilst after the coup they






This chapter explores the history of two important areas of
international law that become enmeshed in the mooted
international regulation of the South African armed conflict,
viz.: lawful combatant status and the international regulation of
internal armed conflict. Lawful combatant status is linked to
inter-state armed conflict while the law of intra-state armed
conflict, although it provides general protections, does not
generally admit of this status. Whether the transfer of lawful
combatant status from its' traditional jurisdiction to the
formally internal South African armed conflict is either a
radical new legal departure or fits smoothly into the law's
evolution, is important to our concern with South Africa. But it
must be noted that the law of lawful combatant status and the law
of internal armed conflict grew up independently and therefore in
this chapter they are treated in separate sections concentrating
on the general themes of their development.
2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
2 2 1 GENERAL
The modern law of lawful combatant status evolved through a
historical process. This section briefly examines its roots in
22
order to throw light on how historical practice has influenced
the qualifications for lawful combatant status in South Africa
today.
2 2 2 THE MIDDLE AGES
Although historically combatants have enjoyed a special status in
many different locales, the roots of the modern concept of lawful
combatant status can be traced back to the Middle Ages in Europe.
In medieval Europe, until the Christian church introduced some
restraint in war, a belligerent's entire population was at an
enemy's mercy.1 The church rejected 'private wars' fought for
private ends but sanctioned 'public wars' fought for public and
just purposes. 2 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a 'just
and public war' became an open and public war' requiring the
sovereign's avowal and open and public signs of war-making. 3
Those who followed the profession of arms were governed by the
'law of arms'. This law strictly limited those who had the right
to go to war to the military classes. Ordinary serfs doing battle
for their liege lords were unprotected. 4 Acts done outside the
'law of arms and 'public and open wars were considered
brigandage and murder. The fundamental legal principle
1 G Schwarzenberger "Terrorists, Hijackers Guerilleros and
Mercenaries" 21 Current Legal Problems (1968) 257 at 271.
2 G Draper "Combatant Status: An Historical Perspective" 11
RDPHDG (1972) 135 at 136.
3 Draper op cit 137.
4 Draper ibid.
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established in this period was that the right to bear arms and to
participate in acts of warfare was limited to a particular class
of mens who could be characterised in modern terms as lawful
combatants.
2.2.3 THE 'ANCIEN REGIME'
The birth of the ius in bello proper is found in the ancien
regime when the burgeoning bourgeoisie began to influence the law
but a strong feudalism, although in decline, was still in place.
Early pUblicists such as Hugo De Groot and Emmerich De Vattel,
focused their efforts on the ius in bello. e Grotius 7 pointed out,
as Gentili B had done before him, that pirates and brigands do not
lawfully wage war. Belli," Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel all
recognised the principle that lawful combatants had a juridical
status granting them immunity from criminal prosecution for those
warlike acts which did not violate the laws and customs of war
but that might otherwise have been crimes under national law.
However, the early publicists still held to the idea that war
existed between states and between the citizens of states. Every
citizen, man, woman or child could be killed or enslaved. The
S E Rosenblad
Conflict (1979) 77.
International Humanitarian Law of Armed
6 These early publicists classified the medieval 'law of
arms as part of the ius gentium, a facet of the ius naturale,
aligned with and derived from eternal law and, ultimately, from"
the divine law of revelation.
7 De Jure Belli ac Paci (1623-1624) Book 1, Chapters 4 & 5.
B De Jure Belli (1598).
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fate of civilians was absolutely in the hands of the conqueror.
Although the formulations of the law made during this period were
not always systematic, they served as fertile ground for further
development.
2.2 4 THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE FRENCH REYOLUTION
The eighteenth century climate of rationalism and sensibility was
the seed bed of the humanitarian bias of the law of war. In
Contrat Social,s Rousseau set out two revol'utionary ideas.
Firstly:
War is not a relation between man and man, but a relation
between state and state in which individuals are enemies
only incidentally~ not as men or even as citizens but as
soldiers.
Secondly:
Th~ object of war being the destruction of the enemy state,
one has the right to kill its defenders only when they have
weapons in their hands; but immediately they have put them
down and surrender, thus ceasing to be enemies or agents of
the enemy, they once more become ordinary men and one no
longer has any right to their life. Sometimes one can
extinguish a state without killing a single member of it,
moreover war confirms no right other than that which is
necessary for its purpose. 10
From this famous doctrine it followed that: (i) military
operations ought to be conducted exclusively by combatants in
uniform and (ii) the unarmed civilian was to be spared at all
S J J Rousseau Du Contrat Social du PrinciDes du Droit
Politigue (1762) chp 4.
10 Quoted by G Draper "The Geneva Conventions of 1949" 114
Recueil des Cours (1965) 59 at 65.
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times as much as possible. 11 These two considerations gave birth
to the central principle of the law of combatant status, the
principle of distinction. 12
Until the eighteenth century, members of standing armies were
usually mercenaries. The French Revolution of 1789 led to the
enlargement and democratisation of armies but did not result in
any drastic changes in the traditional distinction between
combatants and civilians. 13 In 1793 when the French conscription
armies entered into battle, the law of war still denied lawful
participation in warfare to all but the armed forces. Later
additions were seen, to owe their status to concession. 14
Irregular armed forces had to be authorised by their sovereign
and thus legitimised by their own national law, were assimilated
to the regular armed forces. For instance, the volunteers and
militia of revolutionary France were normally incorporated into
the French armed forces and seem to have worn uniforms or at
least a distinctive sign to distinguish themselves from
civilians. 15 An eighteenth century innovation included the
treatment of captured members of the regular armed forces as
11 Rosenblad op cit 10.
12 The derivation and realisation of this principle did not
take place during Rousseau's lifetime so much as in the
nineteenth century codification of the law.
13 G Best Humanity in Warfare (1980) 76-77.
14 Draper 11 RDPMDG (1972) 139.
15 A Rosas The Legal Status' of Prisoners of War (1976) 294.
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prisoners of war. The linking of lawful combatant status and
P.O.W status would mature during the codification period. In
addition, during the eighteenth century the entire civilian
population ceased to be regarded as legitimate objects of attack.
2.2.5 THE EMERGENCE OF GUERILLA WARFARE
The Napoleonic wars were the breeding ground for a new form of
warfare, guerilla warfare, which deserves special mention because
of its widespread use in twentieth century wars of national
liberation. Guerilla warfare originated in the Spanish national
resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula (1809
to 1813),16 when small groups of patriots either continued to
fight as the remnant of their defeated army or intersected the
lines of advance or retreat of the invading French forces. In
- humanitarian terms the advent of guerilla warfare was a disaster.
Draper notes that these guerrillas had little or no military
discipline, frequently wore no uniform, disregarded the safety of
their prisoners if they took any at all, and their hostile acts
could often not be distinguished from brigandage or murder. 17
Anathema to the professional military class, guerrillas were
extremely effective in military terms. It was difficult to fight
an enemy who disappeared into and reappeared out of the civilian
population. The law's treatment of guerrillas was heavily
influenced by the major belligerent states of the period, who,
18 Best op cit 77.
17 Draper 11 RDPHDG (1972) 139-140.
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unlike countries invaded by Napoleon that saw merit in the
'patriots war', did not welcome new classes of participants.
Guerrillas usually received short shrift at the hands of their
captors. 18 States confronted with such resistance normally
refused to treat captives as P.O.W.s unless they belonged to
organised units fighting openly and under direct authorisation.
The law left strictly 'amateur' combatants at the mercy of their
captors. The contemporary legal consensus was summarised by
Wheaton:
In modern warfare partisans and guerrillas are regarded as
outlaws, and may be punished by a belligerent as robbers and
marauders. 1S
2.2.8 LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CLASSICAL LAW OF WAR
The conventional foundations of the law of war were laid in the
second half of the nineteenth century.20 During this development,
the law regulating the right to go to war - the ius ad bellum-
was separated from the law regulating the armed conflict - the
ius in bello. Henri Dunant's experience of the battle of
Solferino (1859)21 led to his founding the Red Cross in 1863 and
ultimately to the adoption of the first Geneva Convention in
18 Draper 11 RDPMDG (1972) 139.
lS Elements of International Law (1836).
20 Best op cit 129.
21 Recorded in Souvenirs de Solferino (1862).
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1864. 22 This purely humanitarian convention did not attempt to
regulate lawful combatant status.
The codification of the customary law of war really began in 1863
with Lieber's Code of Land Warfare,23 an instruction issued to
the Federal armies in the U.S. Civil War. The code recognised the
principle of distinction in Article 22. Article 57, reiterating
the principle of lawful combatant status, stated:
So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and
takes a state's soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a
belligerent, his killing wounding or other warlike acts are
not individual crimes or offenses.
The code also instituted the protection of P.D.W.S.24 It regarded
partisans as P.D.W.s as long as they wore the uniforms of the
army and belonged to the army, being detached solely for the
purposes, of operating in enemy territory.25 However, men, or
squads of men, who commit hostilities ... without commission,
without being part and portion of the organised hostile army, and
without sharing continuously in the war" were not "public
22 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field. The convention guaranteed the
principle of the neutralization of the wounded and of all
personnel whose duties were to aid them. Medical equipment was
protected by a·distinctive sign.
23 United States Army General Order No 100 "Instructions for
the Goyernment of Armies of the United States in the Field"
24/4/1863.
24 Article 49.
25 Article 81 Section 4. Lieber had in the main condemned
them in his earlier work Guerilla Parties considered with
reference to the Laws and Usages of War (1862).
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enemies" and were not entitled to P.O.W. treatment "but [were]
treated summarily as highway robbers and pirates."26 Similarly,
"scouts" in disguise,27 "armed prowlers" who cOllmitted acts of
sabotage behind enemy lines,28 and "war rebels" who rose in arms
in occupied territory,29 were not considered as P.O.W.s if
caught, and received the death sentence.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the categories of
lawful combatants shrunk under the influence of the great land
powers. Warfare was regarded by states such as Prussia as the
exclusive privilege of regular armed forces. Irregulars were
beyond the pale; they' did not obey the customary conditions for
qualification as lawful combatants. The Franco-Prussian war
(1870-1871) had a strong impact on the legal status of
irregulars. The Prussians highlighted the requirement of public
authorisation for irregulars when they summarily executed large
numbers of Francs-Tireurs, armed French resistance fighters not
in uniform and not carrying written authorisation from the French
Government. 30 Draper notes that Harx and Engels, who were in
active correspondence during the Franco-Prussian war, set out





30 Rosenblad op cit 34.
homeland without public authorisation
30
in response to these
events. They saw the conduct of guerilla fighters as the essence
of these 'peoples' wars' .31
The two different viewpoints on the status of irregulars came
into conflict at the Brussels Conference on Proposed Rules for
Military Warfare held in 1874, which produced an abortive
Declaration and draft Code based largely on the Lieber Code. 32
The 'militarist' countries with large standing armies, focusing
on levees en masse - large scale spontaneous uprisings against an
invader by the population of unoccupied territory - argued that
lawful combatant status attached to organised armed forces and
urged that mass levees should meet the requirements of regular
forces. The 'patriotic' smaller countries, because of their
relatively small organised armed forces, were reluctant to limit
in any way the right of inhabitants in unoccupied territory to
rise up and defend their country.33 The uneasy compromise
contained in the Declaration, recognised as lawful combatants
members of the following groups:
(1) The regular army, including militias constituting or forming
31 Draper 11 RDPMDG (1972) 141. I P Trainin echoed these
ideas before the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference in "Questions
of Guerilla Warfare in the Law of War" 46 American JIL (1946) 534.
32 L Nurick and W.Barret "Legality of Guerilla Forces under
the Laws of War" 40 American JIL (1946) 563 at 565.
33 Draper loc cit.
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part of that army.34
(2) Militias and volunteer groups fulfilling four conditions:
(a) Commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
(b) Having a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance.
(c) Carrying arms openly.
(d) Conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.3~
(3) The population of an unoccupied territory who, on the
approach of the enemy, take up arms to resist the invading
troops, without having had time to organise themselves, provided
they respect the laws and customs of war (leyees en masse).36
The compromise did not regulate controversial areas such as
abandonment of the necessity of express and written authority for
irregular forces 37 or the issue of resistance fighters in
occupied territory. But the four conditions for lawful combatant
status for irregulars, articulating the principle of visible
distinction, were set down for the first time. Coupled with the
organisational link to a belligerent state, they remained the




37 Schwarzenberger op cit 271, notes that retrospective and
tacit authorisation was becoming the norm.
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Unfortunately, the treaty was never ratified and never became a
legally binding instrument, but the Institute of International
Law studied it and produced the OxfQrd Manual Qf the Law and
CustQms Qf War (1880). The Manual set out, without much
modification of the Brussels fQrmulation, the qualification of
regular army members as lawful combatants, the conditions for
lawful combatant status for irregulars, and the requirements for
a levee en masse. 38 It made it clear that no protection was
afforded to irregulars operating outside the confines set up by
these conditions. Together with the Brussels Declaration, the
Manual formed the basis of the later Hague Regulations. 38
2.2.7 THE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
The two Hague peace conferences, convened in 1899 and 1907,
produced the first two successful international conventions on
the law of war. The first conference simply revised the Brussels
Declaration. The rules it agreed upon are contained in the
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention 2 with respect to the
Laws and CustQms Qf War on Land. The Regulations indicate that
members of the following groups are lawful combatants entitled to
P.O.W. status on capture: (1) Regular armies including attached
militia and volunteer corps. (2) Militia and volunteer corps
whose members fulfill the four conditions of distinction from the
38 Article 2.






The Regulations recognised militia and volunteer corps on the
assumption that they function as auxiliaries of the regular
forces and not in detachment from them. Importantly, irregulars
admitted to lawful combatant status no longer required the
sovereign's command or authorisation. They had instead to meet
certain minimal conditions of organisation. In Schwarzenberger's
terms, "the test of legitimation" was rejected and "the test of
requisite organisation" was adopted. 41 In a modified form this
test applies today.' Irregulars must, however, still intend to
serve a state or other party to a conflict which actually exists.
There was no agreement at the conference on legalising further
categories of combatants. The problem of armed resistance in
occupied territory went unresolved. The famous De Maartens clause
was introduced at the conference to cover all unprotected
categories of combatants. It read:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the
High Contracting Parties think it is right to declare that
in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they
result from the usages established between civilised
nations, from the laws of humanity, and"the requirements of
the public conscience; They declare that it is in this sense
40 Groups (1) and (2) in Article 1 and group (3) in Article
2.
41 Op cit 271. See also Nurick and Barret op cit 567-568.
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especially that Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulations adopted
must be understood.
The De Maartens clause played a stop-gap role and has been
periodically revived as a catch-all to cover categories of
combatants not specifically governed by international law, but it
has been insufficient for this purpose. 42
At the 1907 conference, the one noticeable difference was the
increase in the number of participating states, up to 44 from 26
in 1899. The wider geographical distribution of participants is
an important trend that would later have a profound effect on the
law. However, at the turn of the century the metropolitan nations
still took the lead in legal formulation. The only significant
change to the 1907 Regulations43 from the 1899 version was the
addition of the condition of carrying arms openly to the
condition of respecting the laws and customs of war in the case
of levees en masse. The De Maartens clause was again used to
shore up the uneasy compromise contained in Articles 1, 2 and 3.
It is clear that through the turn of the century the central
theme of the debate about limiting the right to participate in
combat was the badgering of the larger states by the smaller ones
into granting concessions in respect of irregulars and the
42 F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts: The
Diplomatic Conference 1974-1977 8 ~ (1977) 107.
43 Annexed to Hague Convention 4.
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consequent slow and uneasy expansion of the categories of lawful
combatants. This expansion continues today.
Experiences in World War 1 led to the adoption in 1929 of the
Third Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War. Lawful
combatant status and P.O.W. status were linked in Article 1 of
the Convention, which referred specifically to Articles 1, 2 and
3 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and applied the Convention to all
persons mentioned therein and, in addition, to armed forces
captured in maritime and aerial warfare.
2.2.8 CIVIL WAR AND TOTAL WAR
In the first half of the twentieth century two developments in
warfare occurred that had a strong impact on the law. One was the
increase in the number of large scale civil wars such as the
Russian (1918-1920) and Spanish (1936-1939) civil wars, which
were fought with scant regard for humanitarian law. The other was
the movement toward total war first evidenced in World War 1 but
reaching its logical conclusion in World War 2. 44 In World War 2
the distinction between civilians and military was ablated by
military necessity.45 This led to an increase in the percentage
of civilian deaths in the total mortality rate from 5% in World
44 Best op cit 220, notes the war was total in 3 ways:
(1) Total killing means. (2) Total population in the armed
forces. (3) Superheated collective nationalism on a vast scale.
45 Nurick and Barret op cit 32.
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War 1 to 48% in World War 2. 48 The war also involved a whole
range of forces fighting in many different ways.47 It saw a vast
increase in guerilla warfare although no provision had been made
in the law for guerrillas who operated in occupied territory. The
official German position was that the Hague Regulations did not
protect guerrillas in occupied territories even if they adhered
to the conditions laid down for militias and volunteer corps in
Article 1. The International Military Tribunal (I.H.T.) sitting
at Nuremberg, discussed the legality of the resistance in German
occupied territory and seems to have assumed that partisans
should have been treated as P.O.W.s if they obeyed the four
conditions set out in· the Hague Regulations. The I.H.T. did
decide in 1946 that the Regulations had become declaratory of
customary international law by 1939 and thus were binding on
states irrespective of treaty obligations. 48
2 2.9 THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The end of the Second World War ushered in a new international
tableau with a steadily increasing number of state participants
48 Rosenblad op cit 57.
47 An unusual problem was the continued fighting of troops
after their country had officially capitulated. For example, De
Gaulle's Free French were not technically lawful combatants as
they were fighting for a state that no longer existed. Germany
did confer P.D.W. status on them when they were captured.
However, Italians who fought against the Germans from 1943 onward
were not accorded such status.
48 War Crimes Reports vol 15 at 72. The I.M.T. for the Far
East expressed an identical view in 1948.
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freed from colonialism by the physical and moral exhaustion of
Europe. Established in 1945, the U.N. was only later to have an
influence on the law of armed conflict. The law was not yet free
of the dominant metropolitan bias when the 1949 Geneva
Conventions were adopted. They were mainly the result of efforts
to put humanitarian law back together again after the debacle of
World War 2. The 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference adopted four
Conventions, viz:
(1) First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field;
(2) Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded. Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea;
(3) Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War;
(4) Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in time of war.
The major problem confronted in Geneva in 1949 was the legal
status of guerrillas operating in occupied territory. It was
debated whether they should be governed by the new law and, if
so, on what conditions. Trainin, with the hindsight of Soviet
experience, argued vehemently for the enlaraement of the
categories of lawful combatants. 48 He asserted that the concept-
48 I P Trainin "Questions of Guerilla Warfare in
International Law" 46 American JIL (1946) 534 at 538 and 541.
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that lawful combatants must be authorised by a state, a notion
relied upon heavily by states opposing resistance movements,
ignored the democratic principle of the people's initiative. He
noted that if the legal right to fight flowed only from state
authority, when that authority lapsed, for example in occupied
territory, so did the right to fight and the people were deprived
of their right to protect themselves and their country. The
people then had no real international substance, they were merely
"participating spectators."so This thesis that 'peoples' were
subjects of international law with a ius ad helIum and
concomitant lawful combatant status was to gain credence later,
but the 1949 Conference maintained traditional patterns by
accommodating organised resistance in occupied territory within
the Hague structures with some modification. Two new categories
of lawful combatants were added to regular armed forces, militia
and volunteer corps, and levees en masse. They were:
[a] Members of other militia and members of other volunteer
corps including those of organised resistance movements,
belonging to a party to the conflict, and operating in or
outside their own territory even if that territory is
occupied,
provided they complied with the four requirements of the Hague
Regulations. 51
[b] "Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or authority not recognised by a detaining
50 Ibid.
51 Article 4A(2) of Geneva Convention 3.
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power." 52
Reaction to the inclusion of resistance movements as a category
of lawful combatants varied. It was argued that the law lent too
much protection to resistance fighters and irreparably blurred
the distinction between combatants and civilians thus increasing
the likelihood of all civilians being treated as potential
combatants. 53 But experience ,since 1949 has shown that obeying
the conditions laid down for guerrillas puts a burden on them
that is often too heavy to bear leading ultimately to non-
adherence to the Conventions.
Up until 1949 the law had concerned itself with international
armed conflicts. That the law covered interstate conflicts was a
fact implicit in the Brussels and Hague Conventions made explicit
in common Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions. The greatest
innovation of the 1949 Conventions was the extension by means of
common Article 3 of limited protections to victims of non-
international armed conflict. Article 3 was a response to the
bloody civil conflicts of the previous fifty years and the denial
to the ICRC of access to the victims of these conflicts. It-is a
mini-convention banning certain fundamental inhumanities.
Combatants remain criminals under national law for taking up arms
and are not given any special treatment upon capture. Yet Article
52 Article 4A(3) of Geneva Convention 3, ego The Free French
under De Gaulle.
53 Best op cit 296.
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3 was still a major inroad on state sovereignty and despite its
low substantive weight its adherence record has not been good.
Draper sums up the implicit premises of the law as reflected in
the 1949 Conventions and Hague Regulations in three propositions:
(1) The rights of war devolved exclusively upon the armed
forces and those who, by analogy and concession, could be
assimilated to such armed forces;
(2) The duties of war debarred military activities against
civilians as such;
(3) One of the rights of war was that members of armed
forces and those uplifted by analogy and concession to that
status were entitled to P.D.W. status on capture. 54 ,
I would add a fourth premise not even raised by Draper and not in
issue in 1949, viz: The rights of war operated exclusively in
international armed conflicts, i.e., interstate conflicts. 55
2.2 10 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1949
It remains brieflY to advert to the development of the law since
1949; briefly because this area is the focus of the bulk of this
study. The post-1949 departures in the law of armed conflict were
the outcome of the vast increase in the number of participating
states in the international legal arena. The new states brought
with them a whole new set of cultural, religious and ideological
54 11 RDPMDG (1972) 143.
55 This premise is threatened by the application of the
rights of war in belligerencies, but I would argue that
belligerency had lapsed into desuetude by 1949 (see below chapter
3). The premise also comes in for criticism by those supporting
the right of national liberation movements to the rights of war
under the 1949 Conventions, but in 1949 it is clear that such a
situation was not yet envisaged.
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values. Best points out that
... this great legion of newcomers marched almost without
exception under the banner of national liberation from out
of the ruins of the old empires, bringing with it much
feeling to the disadvantage of their imperial former rulers;
resentment against racial slights and discrimination, the
pride and boldness acquired, often in armed struggle for
independence, and a readiness to ascribe the 'backwardness'
or 'underdevelopment' of their countries to imperialist/
colonialist exploitation. 56
Burgeoning third world nationalism, the ideological predilection
of Marxism for struggle and the belligerency not only of armies
but of whole peoples, all gave impetus to wars of national
liberation. The claim of lawful combatant status for national
liberation fighters emphasised the inadequacy of common Article
3. The impracticability of the traditional conditions of
visibility to the guerilla tactics used in these wars, the
blurring of the principle of distinction by the increase in the
number of technically civilian participants in combat, the
advance of non-discriminatory military technologies which
outstripped humanitarian protections, all resulted in increased
civilian mortality-rates in post-war conflicts. 57 In consequence,
there arose a strong movement to reexamine and develop the law
that culminated in the adoption of additional Protocol 1 in 1977.
The redefinition in Article 1(4) of international armed conflicts
to include wars of national liberation expanded the class of
legitimate combatants to include members of national liberation
movements and the necessary loosening of the personal obligations
56 Op cit 287.
57 Rosenblad op cit 55.
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was made in Articles 43 and 44.
2 2 11 SUMMARY OF TRENDS IN THE LAW OF LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
Attention must be drawn to the continuity of the general
principles of lawful combatant status. The underlying assumption
that extends throughout the history of the law, the assumption
that only privileged classes of combatants have a right to make
war and not be punished for doing so, has relied for its
maintenance on the principle of distinction with its central
premise that lawful combatants must distinguish themselves from
civilians. The dialectic between these two interrelated ideas and
the changing nature of warfare has meant that as the classes of
combatants admitted to lawful combatant status have expanded, so
the criteria for distinction have contracted. The expansion of
the classes of authorised combatants to include those involved in
the South African armed conflict and the contraction of the
obligations on them to make this authorisation factually possible
seems to fit in with the general pattern of the law. But how
compatible with the history of the law of internal armed conflict
is the transfer of this concept to the formally internal South
African armed conflict?
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2 3 THE EYOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICTS
2 3 1 GENERAL
What are internal armed confliots? Internal armed conflict is
used here as a synonym for the old term 'civil war'. Vattel
defined a civil war as "every war between members of the same
political society."58 Falk's more recent definition takes into
account conflicts that are primarily internal but which have
international aspects, viz.:
A war is usefully classified as internal when violence takes
place primarily within a single political entity, regardless
of foreign support for the contending factions.~B
The contention that the conflict must take place within a single
territory60 is unrealistic given the incidence of conflicts where
fighting crosses international boundaries because of the
insurgent's lack of bases within a country. An armed conflict is
internal if it is essentially between members of the same
political entity even though it exhibits international tendencies
such as border crossings. Two categories encompass all
conceivable internal armed conflicts: (a) A conflict between two
parties for the ultimate control of the whole territory of a
58 E de Vattel The Law of Nations or the Principles of
Natural Law Book 3 Chp XVII.
S8 R Falk "International Law and the U.S. Role in the Vietnam
War" in R Falk (ed) The Vietnam War and International Law vol 2
(1969) 362.
60 J C Stassen "Intervention in Internal Wars" 3 SAYIL (1977)
65 at 66.
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state; (b) A conflict in which one of the parties tries to secede
a part of the existing political entity's territory in order to
establish a new state. 81
How has international law dealt with these conflicts in the past?
The eurocentric international legal order, in place since the
colonial period, was based on a society of sovereign states with
no distinction as to political or social ideology or form of
government. Every state was free to institute the government of
its choice provided that it was effective and the rights of other
states were not impaired. Within its domestic jurisdiction that
government had freedom of action. Outside intervention was a
negation of national sovereignty. Any attempt to interfere in an
internal armed conflict was irreconcilable with this general
principle of international law. But other states did intervene
and their intervention was regulated by international law. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries certain customary modes of
classifying internal armed conflicts were developed allowing
different levels of humanitarian regulation and varying
protections for combatants. My review of these modes in this
section is chronological because
certain historical periods and
usefulness declined.
61 Stassen op cit 67.
certain modes were specific to
they were superceded as their
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2.3.2 REBELLION
Customarily, rebellion fell completely outside international
jurisdiction and is thus not strictly at point here. But
classifying rebellions demarcates the lowest threshold of
international jurisdiction in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. A rebellion was a sporadic challenge to the legitimate
government by a faction within a state intent upon seizing
power. 62 It was quickly suppressed by the normal procedures of
internal security, for example by the national police. 83 If the
rebels were contained by national law then the rebellion remained
a purely internal affair. 84 No international protection was
accorded to participants in the rebellion. They were treated as
ordinary criminals. s5 Other states were expected to maintain
normal relations with the incumbent government and could render
it assistance, but were forbidden by international law to assist
the rebels or to make their territory available for use as bases.
2.3.3 BELLIGERENT RECOGNITION
In internal armed conflicts of a great magnitude of violence and
covering extensive territory, belligerent recognition was granted
62 R P Dhokalia "Civil Wars and International Law" 11 Indian
Journal of International Law (1971) 219 at 224; Stassen op cit
68.
63 R Falk "Introduction" The International Law of Civil War
(1971) 11.
84 Dhokalia loc cit.
85 Dhokalia Op cit 225; Falk loc cit; Stassen loc cit.
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to rebels by the de jure government or by third states. The
requisite objective proportions were laid down during the U.5.
War of Independence. BB Oppenheim sets out the standard criteria
thus:
The principles governing recognition of belligerency are
essentially the same as those relating to the recognition of
states and governments. Certain conditions of fact, not
stigmatised as unlawful by international law - the law of
Nations does not treat civil war as illegal - create for
other states the right and duty to grant recognition of
belligerency. These conditions of fact are: the existence of
a civil war accompanied by a state of general hostilities;
occupation and a measure of orderly administration of a
substantial part of the national territory by insurgents;
the observance of the rules of warfare on the part of the
insurgent forces acting under a responsible authority; the
practical necessity for third states to define their
attitude to the civil war. 87
A state of affairs satisfying these criteria involved the full
scale use of the army by the incumbents and the raising of an
army by the rebels. There was no unanimity as to whether a
belligerency had to be recognised if the conditions were
satisfied. Oppenheim commented that refusal to recognise
belligerent status under these conditions "must be deemed
contrary to some principle and precedent",S8 but he acknowledged
that many writers considered recognition to be an "act of
66 L C Petrowski in R.Falk (ed) The Vietnam War and
International Law vol 2 (1969) 477.
67 International Law 7th ed. Lauterpacht (1952) 249.
e8 Op cit 250.
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unfettered political discretion."ss The correct position was
probably that states were not under a duty to recognise but could
not recognise when the objective conditions were not satisfied. 7o
One of the principle defects of belligerent recognition was that
it was subject to political acceptance.
Recognition, once extended, formalised the internal armed
conflict in international law. Both parties became pro tanto
international subjects. 71 The belligerent was not transformed
into a state, but the parties were attributed belligerent rights
and duties identical to those existing between sovereign states
engaged in an international armed conflict. Prior to recognition,
foreign states had a legal right to aid the incumbent government
in crushing the revolt and were under a complimentary obligation
not to aid the rebels. After recognition, foreign states had to
assume the obligations of impartiality and non-participation and
the belligerents acquired such rights as blockade against foreign
states. 72
69 Ibid note 2. For Oppenheim - Lauterpacht recognition of
governments was based on the doctrine of effectiveness. Thus if a
belligerent was effective it had to be recognised. The modern
trend has been to favour the doctrine of legitimacy - only if
belligerents are legitimate are they recognised; and they are
recognised even if they are not effective.
70 H Akehurst A Modern Introduction to International Law
4 ed (1982) 263.




Kilgore "Law of War - Geneva Convention Signatories
Applicability of Law of War to Internal Armed
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
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Belligerent recognition transformed an internal armed conflict
into an international armed conflict for the purposes of the iaa
in bello. In consequence, lawful combatant status was conferred
on members of the belligerent party.73 It was conferred in an
unlimited geographical area. Captured rebels were accorded P.O.W
status. Guerrillas were also accorded these protections. 74 In
this regard one of the conditions laid down for belligerent
recognition was the observance of the law of war. Rebel
guerrillas found it hard to meet this condition, but the then
current orthodoxy was that the rebels' lack of resources in
territory, organisation and control, which debarred them from
employing lawful combatants, was the ground for their not being
considered belligerents.
The underlying assumptions of the doctrine of belligerency are
evident. It was founded on a 'nation's rights' attitude to
international law. 75 One of these rights was sovereignty over
internal affairs. Only when the rebels had become so objectively
(1978) 941 at 942.
73 A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976)
notes, at 281, that the international obligation on the
incumbents to refrain from prosecuting rebels for participation,
may not have applied to rebel leaders."
74 G Schwarzenberger "Terrorists, Hijackers, Guerilleros and
Mercenaries" 21 Current Legal Problems (1971) 275.
75 J E Bond The Rules of Riot (1974) 51 points out that
belligerency was really based on the doctrine of the sovereign
equality of states rather than on the demands of humanity.
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strong that third states were forced to deal with them as da
facto international subjects did they achieve the status of
belligerents.
The doctrine of belligerent recognition could not function
effectively in the twentieth century. Oglesby points out that
belligerent recognition arose out of and was suited to the
balance of power in the early nineteenth century.76 The emergence
of new centres of mercantile capitalism in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries caused some shift in the locus of political
power from the 'old' to the new world, which led to civil
conflicts such as the, U.S. War of Independence. These conflicts
involved the splitting away of colonies from the metropole, but
they were located within the ranks of the 'civilised' world and
belligerent recognition was not used in the more remote areas of
the empire. The balance of power in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was not suitable for belligerent recognition
because it granted too much legal status in a period increasingly
subjective in its approach to international legal personality.
Governments defined their relationships with rebels in accordance
with their political preferences
accordingly.
and then granted status
Is there still a law of belligerent recognition? The evidence is
76 R R Oglesby Internal War and the Search for Normative
Order (1971) viii.
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in the negative. Recognition of belligerency has not been
practiced this century.77 Belligerent recognition lost its last
vestiges of relevance with the codification of the law of
internal armed conflicts and the setting out of new conditions of
application. Oglesby argues convincingly that the customs on
which it was founded have fallen into disuse and so the doctrine
has fallen into desuetude and is no longer law. 7B Belligerent
recognition was historically specific to the early nineteenth
century and has little relevance to the late twentieth.
2 3 4 INSURGENCY
Where a rebel group enjoyed only partial success, though there
was good reason to believe the conflict would endure, other
states granted the forces opposing the govern-ment insurgent
status. 78 An insurgency was a more sustained and substantial
conflict than a rebellion but less intense and extensive than a
belligerency. Only police were used in suppressing an insurgency
and the conflict, unlike a belligerency, was confined to land.
Lauterpacht cautions, however, that
77 A Cassese The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict vol
2 (1980) 26. D Schindler "The different types of Armed Conflicts
according to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols" 163 Recueil
des Cours (1979) 117 at 146 notes that it is arguable that the
Algerian and Biafran blockades were implicit instances of
belligerent recognition. But the few substantive legal rights
granted in these conflicts were probably done in terms of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or through a
unilateral declaration by one of the parties to the ICRC.
78 Op cit 110-114.
78 Stassen op cit 68.
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... any attempt to lay down the conditions of recognition of
insurgency lends itself to misunderstanding. Recognition of
insurgency creates a factual relation in the meaning that
legal rights and duties as between insurgents and outside
states exist only insofar as they are expressly concluded
and agreed upon for reasons of convenience, or humanity, or
of economic interest. Bo
Foreign states, in order to protect their interests in territory
controlled by the insurgents, acknowledged the factual situation
arising from the partial success of the insurgents. B1 Insurgency
did not confer a formal status but was
... essentially a condition of civil revolt in a country in
which foreign states while unwilling to treat the rebellious
faction as mere lawbreakers, agree(d) to put their relations
with the insurgents on a regular, though on an ad hoc
basis. B2
There was no obligation on the recognising state to remain
neutral. It could assist the existing government, but if it
materially assisted the insurgents, it was guilty of illegally
intervening.
With regard to the international legal protection afforded
insurgent combatants,
... the view has been taken that the recognition of
insurgency constitutes an expression of a belief by a
foreign power that the insurgents should not be executed as
rebels if captured by the legitimate government. B3
It seems that recognised insurgents, including guerrillas, were
BO H Lauterpacht Recognition in International law (1947) 276
-277.
B1 Dhokalia op cit 225.
B2 Lauterpacht op cit 275.
B3 Fenwick International Law (1948) 147.
52
regarded as lawful combatants and not as common criminals,84 but
only within the territory of the state involved. 85 In practice,
however, the rights of lawful participation in combat were
specific rights granted by the recognising states. No general
rights could be adduced from insurgent status. The insurgents
only secured a limited personality vis a vis the recognising
state. BB
Insurgency, like belligerency, was historically specific.
Insurgency appeared after the U.S. Civil War and slowly
supplanted belligerency because it limited and restricted the
legal status of rebelling factions in internal conflicts. At that
historical juncture some limitation on international jurisdiction
was demanded by the prevailing balance of power. Imperial
sovereignty discouraged intervention for any reason in domestic,
especially colonial, affairs. Insurgency provided a more discreet
regulation of external intervention in internal conflicts because
it conferred fewer non-general substantive rights.
Insurgency and belligerency are therefore not two
alternative sets of rules to be applied at will by affected
states, but rather two successive norms of law, insurgency
succeeding belligerency as a standard more serviceable to
the international community.S?
84 Dhokalia op cit 225.
B5 Schwarzenberger op cit 275-276.
8S R Higgins "Internal War and International Law" in R Falk
& G Black (eds) The Future of the International Legal Order vol 3
(1971) 88.
87 Oglesby loc cit.
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Insurgency was at its most useful in the early twentieth century
during the height of imperial dominion. Oglesby notes that since
then insurgency has declined in importance, but it may still be
available as law and unlike belligerency has not fallen into
desuetude. ee
2 3.5 THE CUSTOMARY MODES OF REGULATION OF INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT ANALYSED
The underlying assumption of the customary norms was the sanctity
of the incumbent government's sovereignty. The international
system was biased against revolutionary challenge because the
governments of member states had a mutual interest in security of
tenure. es The incumbent's sovereignty was exhibited through
territorial control. Thus it was logical that the application of
the customary modes to an internal armed conflict should turn on
the geo-military scale of the conflict, i.e., an objective
assessment of the intensity of military involvement and the
extent of territory affected. so To acquire international
recognition, a rebel group had to achieve a high geo-military
profile, usually through the capture and control of territory.
Increasing gradations of violence brought into operation
increasing international regulation. Thus lawful combatant status
and P.O.W. status was only conferred on participants in a
ee Op cit 122.
es Falk op cit 14.
so D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics - The ICRC (1977) 123.
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belligerency when a belligerent's impact on international society
could no longer be ignored and, by extension, its attainment of a
certain international status was secure. But recognition was also
dependent on the political willingness of recognising states, a
willingness that varied individually and which changed as the
international system changed. While rebellions remained outside
international jurisdiction, belligerent recognition developed,
then declined, and was succeeded by insurgent recognition in
response to the needs of an international society concerned with
restricting the international status of rebel groups. Both of
these norms declined in the twentieth century because neither was
suited to the new system. In an ideologically cleft international
society, the concern for correlating status with facts
disappeared. Recognition became openly political. Incumbent and
challenger were labelled according to the political preference of
the third state. International society turned to treaty law in
order to straddle the cleavages in modern society and to replace
the unsuitable and ineffective customary modes of regulation.
2.3.6 COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND GENEVA
PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
As noted above,81 common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions82 was the first
81 Section 2.2.9 .
international treaty provision
82 It has been claimed that Conventions apply in toto to
certain internal armed conflicts objectively indistinguishable
from international armed conflicts. At the 1949 Diplomatic-
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regulating 'armed conflicts not of an international character'.
The authors of Article 3 seemed to have believed that they were
describing a belligerency.B3 What exactly they intended and how
the Article has been interpreted will be dealt with in chapter 6.
It is enough to point out here that Article 3 created a new
regime of internal armed conflict regulation distinct from the
customary modes.
International concern since 1949 with wars of national liberation
has resulted in a lack of interest in purely domestic conflicts.
The only advance in the regulation of these conflicts was the
adoption of Geneva Protocol 2 in 1977. Protocol 2 was intended to
boost the regulation of 'non-international armed conflicts'.
However, its authors appear have predicated Protocol 2's
application at a high a geo-military level and therefore it will
probably prove ineffectual.
2 3.7 WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AS A NEW MODE OF INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT REGULATION
As noted,84 the term 'war of national liberation' has been used
Conference the contemplated criteria for this proposition
incorporated elements of belligerency such as territorial
control. But the criteria went further and were distinctive from
belligerency. They were never, however, adopted in treaty form.
83 Final Record of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference vol 2B
(1949) 121ff.
84 Sections 1.4 and 1.5 above.
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to describe, inter alia, a war to accomplish the separation of a
colony from governance by a colonial power. ss The South African
armed conflict is regarded as a species of these anti-colonial
conflicts. Customarily these wars were treated as internal
conflicts because they fell within the domestic jurisdiction of
the colonial state. They were governed by that power's municipal
law. Any dealings by other states with the rebels constituted an
intervention in its domestic affairs. se After the Second World
War there was increased international concern with wars of
decolonisation. This concern culminated in Article 1(4) of Geneva-
Protocol 1 of 1977. It assumed that "peoples fighting [for self-
determination] against, colonial domination, alien occupation and
against racist regimes" were international subjects and thus
having changed the meaning of 'international' in the traditional
definition of 'international armed conflict', included wars of
national liberation, such as the South African armed conflict, in
this definition.
85 E B Firmage "The War of National Liberation and the Third
World" in J N Moore (ed) Law and CiVil War in the Modern World
(1974) 304 notes at 309, that it has also been used to describe
wars in defence of a homeland, and wars to liberate a people from
capitalism.
86 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols" 165 Recueil desCours (1979) 353 at
367 notes the relatively recent origin of this traditional view
in the late colonial era. He cites, inter alia, the active role
played by France in the American War of Independence prior to
establishment of the traditional view. He points out that the
growth of positivist doctrines in international and national law,
for example the laying down of state sovereignty as the grundnorm
of international law, led to this 'traditional' approach.
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The internationalisation of wars of national liberation appears
to be a major departure from the traditional customary modes of
internal conflict regulation. It could be argued that Article
1(4) conflicts fall within the logic of the traditional approach
in the sense of an obligatory recognition of belligerency. It is
true that wars of national liberation, like belligerencies, are
specially sanctioned exceptions to the norm of non-intervention.
But as Schindler points out,B7 there are clear differences:
(1) The laws of war apply automatically in wars of national
liberation; no recognition of belligerency by the incumbent
government or by third states is necessary.
(2) The traditional objective conditions of belligerent
recognition (particularly the acquisition of a certain part
of national territory) are no longer important; the claim to
be recognised is exclusively based on the right of self-
determination.
(3) Foreign states are no longer obliged to observe the laws
of neutrality; on the contrary, according to General
Assembly r~solutions and declarations their duty is to
promote the realisation of self determination.
(4) No formal state of war comes into existence in wars of
national liberation; unlike formal belligerent status - with
rights of blockade etc.
Belligerent recognition's reliance on geo-military factors for
classification of an internal armed conflict as international was
discarded by the international community in Article 1(4) in
favour of a classification based solely on an appreciation of the
bearers of rights in international law. BB Inter-state armed
B7 D Schindler "State of War, Belligerency, Armed Conflict"
in A Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian law of Armed Conflict vol
1 (1979) 6.
BB Abi-Saab op cit 411, notes the objective basis of
belligerent recognition, and points out that belligerents could
only speak for themselves once they had imposed themselves
sufficiently to gain international attention. By contrast
national liberation movements represent not only themselves but ~
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conflicts have always been international without reference to
geo-military factors. As the range of international subjects have
increased, so the definition of 'international' in international
armed conflict has widened. The legal classification of
international armed conflict has been enlarged to include
conflicts between colonial powers and peoples represented by
national liberation movements. Thus to go to international war
the parties need no longer be states; to be a 'people', a nascent
state, a pro tanto subject of international law is enough. As in
all international armed conflicts, " ... neither duration nor
territorial extent nor the size of the force involved is a
decisive factor." 8S The objective proportions of these wars of
national liberation play no role in their definition as an
international armed conflict. Therefore, geo-military based
argumenis that the law of international armed conflict does not
apply in the South African armed conflict because the armed
conflict is of too low an intensity and would not have been
governed by belligerent recognition, must fail. Any incident of
violence between the incumbent and the national liberation
movement, no matter how small, is enough to activate the law of
international armed conflict.
people. Founded on the principle of self-determination, their
international status is granted them by· the rest of the
international community, and extends far beyond what a
belligerent could only do for itself.
88 J S Pictet Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War
Victims (1975) 50. Pictet's comment is made in respect of common
Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions, but is equally apposite to
wars of national liberation./i
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2.4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Do the international regulation of internal armed conflicts and
the acquisition of lawful combatant status dovetail smoothly in
respect of the South African armed conflict? Generally, lawful
combatant status has been conferred. automatically only in
international armed conflicts, i.e., conflicts between states.
The only exception to this rule has been recognition of
belligerency and the South African armed conflict cannot be
equated to a belligerency. Clearly, the law of internal armed
conflict cannot be used to apply lawful combatant status in the
South African armed conflict. The operation of lawful combatant
status in the South African armed conflict can, however, find
some precedent in the law of international armed conflict. The
expansion of the classes of legitimate combatants in
international armed conflicts prior to 1974 had been moving
towards the sanctioning of civilian patriots who take up arms to
fight for national freedom even though their governments had
already been defeated, e.g.: resistance movements. The law had
also relaxed the conditions imposed on individual combatants to
facilitate this expansion of protection. Thus the argument that
the South African armed conflict takes place between two
international subjects, viz.: the State and the people, at least
partly falls into the developing pattern of the conferral of
lawful combatant status on new categories of patriotic combatants
even though it takes place within a single state. This thesis
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depends for its success, however, on the classification of the
ANC as representative of an evolving international legal subject
moving toward full international status and not as a legal
aberration whose very existence is a negation of, or an exception
to, an international society of sovereign states. The theoretical
cogency of the recognition of the international status of
national liberation movements and the consequences of this
recognition for the law of armed conflict are matters to which we
now must turn.
SECTION A: CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT AS
AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
CHAPTER THREE-
THE MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
3 1 INTRODUCTION
The application of the law of international armed conflict in the
South African armed conflict can be attempted through paragraph 3
of Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or through a norm of
customary international law based on Article 1(4) of Protocol 1,
but it depends initially on the assertion that the armed conflict
takes place between two international subjects. The South African
state is firmly established as an international subject. The
international status. of the ANC is, however, more tenuous.
Therefore, before we examine whether the South African armed
conflict falls within the material field of application of the
law of international armed conflict, we must first examine the
theoretical foundations of international status' for national
liberat~on movements generally and the ANC specifically.
3.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS FOR NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
3 2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION
The claimed international status of national liberation movements
must be seen in the context of the historical evolution of the
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international legal order. Modern conceptions of the development
of the international system through the pre-colonial, colonial,
and post-colonial periods, have shaped and directed this claim.
Professor Abi-Saab provides typical analysis of the
international legal order's development: 1
(a) Before colonialism the metropolitan countries regarded
African, Asian and South American political entities as part of
the international community and as international subjects. 2
(b) During the colonial period the egalitarian international
legal order was transformed into a hierarchical relationship
between the metropolitan nations and their new colonies and the
colonies lost their international status. 3
(c) The post-colonial period saw the decolonisation process
linked with the reemergence of decolonised communities as new
international subjects. These emergent political communities
gained international status based on the principle- of self-
determination often before they had wrested physical control from
the colonial state.
In the nineteenth century the law was infused with the sanctity
of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Colonies were regarded
1 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols" 165 Recueil des' CQurs (1979) 353 at
366-7.
2 Abi-Saab op cit 366; see also his note 1.
3 Only entities recognised by metropolitan states could be
regarded as subjects of international law - hence the popularity
of the constitutive theory of recognition during this period.
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legally as part of the metropole and colonial affairs were
regarded as domestic affairs. Any international interference in
the colonies constituted illegal intervention. Decolonisation
threatened the existing international legal order in a number of
ways. The assistance of Inter Governmental Organisations (IGOs),
such as the U.N., in the struggles of colonial peoples for self-
determination began to change the international system. The
decolonisation process was marked by a sustained attack on
colonial sovereignty. Large imperial sovereign states were broken
up into new sovereign states. In the colonial context sovereignty
was reduced to its foundation, the self-determination of peoples.
Hobbes viewed sovereignty as indivisible and unlimited because
the people had delegated all their rights and power to the
sovereign state. 4 The colonial empires were divided up on the
basis that the colonial peoples had not willingly delegated all
their rights and power to the colonial sovereign. Popular consent
was asserted as the foundation of sovereignty. International
society became a non-hierarchical structure of constituent
subjects whose outer limit of identity was the state. State
sovereignty in a horizontal legal structure implied the sovereign
equality of states, a principle that was firmly established as
the grundnorm of international law by Article 2(1) of the U.N.
Charter.
When the process of decolonisation met with colonial resistance,
4 Thomas Hobbes Leyiathan (1651) chp 20.
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national liberation movements formed to fight the colonial powers
on behalf of the colonised people. These wars of national
liberation did not fit into the traditional formulation of
international armed conflict because one of the parties, the
national liberation movement, was not a state, whilst the other
party was. 5 Self-determination was the key to international
status for national liberation movements. Before·it could be
shown that they had a legal right to go to war and the wars that
they engaged in were international armed conflicts, legal weight
had to be achieved for self-determination and its application to
a limited number of situations had to be clarified.
3 2 2 SELF-DETERMINATION AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE
Self-determination consists in Brownlie's terms of the "right of
collective national groups (peoples) to choose for themselves a
form of political organisation and their relation to other
groups."S This traditional definition accords with what Cassese
calls "external self-determination", or
... the ability of a people or a minority to choose freely in
the field of international relations, opting for
independence or union with other states. 7
"Internal self-determination", on the other hand, is the idea
5 K Asmal National Liberation Movements: Their Status and
Role in Contemporary International Law (1980) 21.
575.
6 I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (1973)
7 A Cassese "Political Self-Determination - Old Conceptions




... a people in a sovereign state can elect and keep the
government of its choice or ,that an ethnic, racial,
religious or other minority within a sovereign state has the
right not to be oppressed by central government. s
Self-determination's roots as a political principle lie in the
nationalist doctrines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Woodrow Wilson and Lenin both supported self-determination as a
right, Lenin claiming it for " ... every liberation movement in the
colonies." s The principle of "equal rights and self-
determination" was enshrined in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N.
Charter.
The status of self-determination as a legal principle has long
been co~troversial. To the colonial powers it was only a moral
standard. The Third World and Socialist blocs sought to invest it
with legal weight and thus establish a legal right of self-
determination for all peoples imposing an obligation on colonial
powers to grant that right. The latter group understood self-
determination largely as being liberation from colonialism, the
prototypical example of external self-determination. 10 The Third
Worlds monopolisation of the U.N. General Assembly saw the
articulation of their conception of self-determination in a
e Cassese ibid.
e I V Lenin Selected Works (1943) Vol 5 270; Vol 10 203.
10 Cassese op cit 141.
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wealth of resolutions, the seminal step being the DeclaratiQn Qn
the Granting Qf Independence tQ CQlQnial CQuntries and PeQples. 11
Asmal cites its key features as:
(a) The acceptance of the right of self-determination for
dependent territories seeking independence from colonial
powers whilst ignoring fissiparous and secessionist
tendencies within states; (b) The acknowledgement that self-
determination supplemented the principle of equality and
applied to all non-self-governing and mandated
territories. 12
Articles 1 and 3 of the two 1966 Human Rights Covenants 13
recQgnised self-determination as a human right. Article 1 upheld
both the right to external and internal self-determination. But
internal self-determination, "the rights of peoples to freely
determine their political status" was vague, imprecise and
evasive. The most significant development in the genesis of self-
determination as a legal principle was the DeclaratiQn Qn
Principles Qf InternatiQnal law CQncerning Friendly RelatiQns and
CQQperatiQn amQng States in AccQrdance with the Charter Qf the
United NatiQns. 14 Although paragraph 1 of the declaratiQn granted
the right of self-determination to all peoples, the right was
limited by the identification of external self-determination with
decolonisation. The paragraph read:
11 G.A. ResolutiQn 1514 (XV) 1960.
12 Asmal op cit 6.
13 The InternatiQnal CQvenant Qn Civil and PQlitical Rights;
The InternatiQnal CQvenant on ECQnQmic Social aod Cultural
Rights; General Assembly 1966.
14 G.A. Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted in 1970 by
consensus. The Western powers, eg., the UK/USA/France had voted
against Resolution 1514.
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The territory of a colony or other non self governing
territory has, under the charter, a status separate and
distinct from the territory of a state administering it and
such separate and distinct status under the charter shall
exist until the people of the colony or non self governing
territory have exercised their right of self determination
in accordance with the charter and particularly its purposes
and principles.
By 1970, Abi-Saab argues, it was clear that (external) self-
determination wa~ universally accepted as a legal principle.1~
A number of criticisms have been made of this proposition.
(a) The U.N. Charter defines self-determination as a principle
not a right. But, as Abi-Saab recognises, the distinction is
irrelevant. What is important is that self-determination is a
legal concept carrying rights and obligations. 16
(b) The General Assembly resolutions that developed self-
determination are recommendatory only and thus cannot be binding
in themselves or serve as the sole source of evidence of a
customary principle like self-determination. Prakash-Sinha notes:
i) They are not the only evidence of customary international law;
ii) States do not regard the vote in the General Assembly as
legally binding; iii) State practice outside the U.N. doesn't
support the theory that states see self-determination as legally
15 Gp cit 370. Among those who agree R Higgins
"International Law and Civil Conflict" in E Luard !.he.
International Regulation of Civil Wars (1978) 180; E HcWhinney
United Nations Law Making (1984) 170; E Rosenblad International
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979) 33; U G Umozurike
Selfdetermination in International Law (1972) 274.
16 Gp cit 378-9.
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binding.~7 But General Assembly resolutions are not relied on as
the sole evidence of the legal weight of self-determination. The
U.N. Charter is the source document.~a In addition, it is
submitted that states do not always regard their vote in the
General Asse~bly as non-binding. Different resolutions, depending
on their wording, receive different attention, different measures
of support and, consequently, different legal value. Abi-Saab
points to the consensus on the 'Friendly .Relations' declaration.
He argues, after Brownlie, that such resolutions are an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter.~e Finally, Abi-Saab
also refers to the general decolonisation by colonial states as
evidence of state practice, a fact which runs counter to Prakash-
Sinha's last assertion. Decolonisation is, in fact, almost
complete.
On this basis it is submitted that although not all the
provisions in the various declarations and resolutions are law
~7 S Prakash-Sinha 14 Indian International Law Journal
(1974) 332 at 345; See also H Booysen 1 SAYIL (1975) 20, and J C
Stassen 3 SAYIL (1977) 65 at 83.
18 Asmal op cit 1980 6, goes one step further and asserts
that the Charter just gave expression to an already existing ~
cogens principle of international law. His conclusion is
supported by SWAPO - see J Dugard "SWAPO The ius ad bellum and
the ius in bello" 93 ~ (1976) 144. Self-determination was
urged as an example of ius cogens in the trayaux preparatoires
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but on
Portugal's insistence was not included in the draft of what
eventually became Article 53 - ius cogens. See H G Espiell "Self-
determination and Jus Cogens" in A Cassese (ed) UN Law /
Fundamental Rights (1979) 167.
~8 Gp cit 379.
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because their vagueness and ambiguity does conceal substantial
differences in the nature of self-determination, it is difficult
to refute the basic premise that external self-determination is a
legal principle. Its legal status has gained acceptance in the
West and was affirmed by the ICJ in the Western Sahara Case. 20
The vagueness of the principle causes problems. Higgins asks
"what is this 'self' to whom it applies?"21. It is submitted that
U.N. practice,. although ad hoc, identifies the recipients of the
right of external self-determination. Prakash-Sinha analyses the
U.N. position as follows:
(1) Although almost continuously contended as a right of all
peoples, self-determination has in fact only applied to
colonial peoples. Trust and non-selfgoverning territories
used to be the old basis for self-determination but were
replaced under U.N. practice by the territorial
identification of colonial areas at the end of World War 2.
The territorial division which was made arbitrarily by the
colonial powers in the past and which had no regard to the
ethnic, cultural, and social factors of the population is
taken as the basis of deciding when self-determination
should apply.
(2) In identifying a colonial people reference is made to
the majority of the population within a generally accepted
political unit and not to minorities, racial, religious or
other.
(3) Self-determination is fulfilled by independence. 22
He sums up:
Essentially the realisation of self-determination within the
U.N. has meant the decolonisation of peoples and territories
20 1975 ICJ Reports 12.
21. Loc cit.
22 G I A D Draper "Humanitarian Law and Human Rights" (1979)
Acta Juridica 193 at 203 remarks "Self-determination is by
definition a once and for all exercise."
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known to be of the colonial type at the end of World war 2.
This has largely been accomplished. 23
A more universal right of external self-determination and the
right of internal self-determination are viewed as dangerous
principles by the arbitrarily nationalised third world and
socialist blocs. For this reason self-determination as a legal
right has not evolved much further than the parameters of
external self-determination set out by Sinha. 24 As a legal
principle it applies only to 'peoples' who have not achieved
independence from colonial powers. With the possible exception of
South Africa and Israel, the principle does not apply to the
territories of established sovereign and independent states. 25
Newly emerged states, following the practice of the established
states, have built walls of sovereignty along their own borders
regardle~s of the demands of internal minorities. 28 But this
sovereignty is fully compatible with external self-determination.
Sovereignty, an attribute of statehood, is overridden in the
23 Gp cit 347,360.
24 This is despite the fact that its logical evolution
appears to be in the direction of some sort of legitimacy litmus
test for all existing states, i.e., internal self-determination.
But if self-determination is based solely on notions of
nationalism, the world wide attainment of national self-
determination would by definition bring it to an end.
25 T Fleiner Geister and
Humanitarian Law: A Challenge
~ (1985) 267 at 285.
H A Heyer "New Developments in
to the Concept of Sovereignty" 34
26 They rely on the 'Friendly Relations' declaration caveat
that "nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing any action which would dismember or impair, totally
or in part the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent states."
colonial context by external self-determination,
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a right
pertaining to 'peoples'; or as Eide puts it, " ... sovereignty is
not complete unless full satisfaction is given to the principle
of self-determination. "27 Once that 'people' achieves statehood,
sovereignty reasserts itself.
27 A Eide "Sovereign Equality versus Global Military
Structure - Two Competing Approaches to World Order" in A Cassese
(ed) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict vol.! (1979) 21
at 26.
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3 2 3 SOUTH AFRICA, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE NORM OF NON-RACISM
Israel and South Africa, two technically sovereign states, are
singled out as exceptions to the general rule that self-
determination applies only in the colonial context, Why? The
issue of Palestinian self-determination is beyond the scope of
this study, It is enough to note that many of the arguments
applying to South Africa have been transferred to the Israeli
context and vice versa,
South Africa has been under a broad legal assault since it
instituted its official policy of racial-discrimination in 1948,
More U.N, resolutions. have been passed on apartheid than on any
other international situation, In 1965, interest was first shown
in linking the issues of racial equality and decolonisation in
the International Convention 00 the Elimination of all forms of
Racial Discrimination,28 Article 1 of the two 1966 Human Rights
Covenants linked self-determination to non-discrimination. A
situation of two competing norms of international law emerged,
viz,: the sanctity of South African sovereignty versus the most
fundamental norm of international morality, non-racism,28 The
'Friendly Relations' declaration prohibited action against
sovereign states, but only in cases where states conducted
themselves
28 G,A, Resolution 21068 (XX),
28 R F Taubenfield and H J Taubenfield Race. Peace and Law in
Southern Africa (1968) 7,
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... in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples ... [and have] a government
representative of the whole people belonging to a territory
without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Cassese notes that the conditions for the fulfillment of internal
self-determination were specified here for the first time .. 3o
International intervention was, by implication, permissible where
those conditions were not met. The declaration did not attempt
to impose democracy. In practice, the right of internal self-
determination was only available to peoples living under a
government not representative of the whole people without
distinction as to race. South Africa was the case in point. Only
South Africa, international society agreed, was not
representative under the limited definition of internal self-
determination. International action against ·South Africa
prolifer~ted. 1973 saw the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid;31 the
General Assembly labelled South Africa a threat to international
peace and security; the Security Council took Chapter VII Charter
action against a member state forbidding the export of arms and
military material to South Africa. 32 The action culminated in the
30 A Cassese "Political Self-Determination - Old Conceptions
and New Developments" in A Cassese (ed) UN Law/ Fundamental
Rights (1977) 137 at 264.
31 G.A. Resolution 3068 (XXVIII). It imposes individual
criminal responsibility.
32 The Security Council, acting in terms of Chapter 7 of the
U.N. Charter, entitled "Action with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression", determined
South Africa's internal policies to be a potential threat to
international peace and security (i.t.o. Article 39), and then
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General Assembly's declaration that " ... the racist regime of
South Africa is illegitimate and has no right to represent the
people of South Africa." 33
The justification for this conclusion is that although it
ostensibly meets the Montevideo criteria for statehood in that it
has a permanent population, a defined terri~ory, a government,
and the capacity to enter into international relations with other
states,34 South Africa is an example of internal colonialism.3~
The core (White South Africa) has colonised the periphery (Black
South Africa, especially the homelands). Coloniser and colonised
live in the same territory. The homeland and migrant labour
systems support this thesis. The withdrawal of the metropolitan
power, the United Kingdom, should have realised South African
self-determination, but it did not. Legal authority was
transferred to the South African Government, a settler regime
that denied the majority of the population a political voice
through denial of access to government thus maintaining the
took non-military enforcement measures to contain this threat
(i.t.o. Article 41), by instituting a mandatory ban on arm's
sales to South Africa (UN Monthly Chronicle Dec 1977 16).
33 G.A. Resolution 3411E (XXX) 1975. Subsequent to this the
South African Government, anticipating rejection of its
credentials at the U.N., did not take its place in the General
Assembly.
34 Article 1 of the Monteyideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States 1933.
35 K Asmal National Liberation Moyements: Their Status and
Role in Contemporary International Law (1980) 11.
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colonial relationship.3B Although, from a sociological point of
view this analysis may not accord perfectly with reality because
the core and periphery exist within a single physical entity and
are difficult to distinguish unlike the true colonial situation
with the physical separation of the colony from the metropole, it
has been used in the South African context to assimilate the norm
of racial equality to that of se+f-determination. South Africa is
the first instance where the denial of individual human rights
has been recognised as being directly connected to the denial of
the collective political rights of peoples. The denial of
collective human rights in South Africa is a matter of internal
self-determination. S ?
The South African Government has never challenged the principle
of self-determination, but it disputes that apartheid violates
the principle. The difference between the official South African
view and the international view is that the latter sees self-
determination in collective terms within extant territorial
demarcations, while the former sees it in terms of ethnic
'separate development'. Booysen, in support of the South African
Government's policy, argues that self-determination of peoples
SB Asmal op cit 12.
3? Cassese op cit 148ff, notes that although South Africa is
the only instance where internal self-determination has achieved
the status of a legal right, as a political concept with
subsidiary legal weight it has developed through the Helsinki
Declaration (1973) and the Aliiers Declaration on the Rights of
Peoples (1976) to be much more radical, universal, anti-
authoritarian and democratic/ libertarian.
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means " ... that every ethnical and cultural group must be given
the opportunity of developing according to their own
traditions."3B Taking this thesis to its logical conclusion, it
would seem that only South Africa has fully implemented self-
determination. 38 The rebuttal of this argument is that self-
determination applies to a nation state as a unit - in South
Africa's case that means integration not balkanisation.
South Africa has more durable defences at its disposal than its
interpretation of self-determination. These defences are mostly
associated with the recognition of the Republic of South Africa
as a full, independent" sovereign subject of international law.
It relies on Western veto of Security Council resolutions
labelling apartheid a threat to international peace and security
and it asserts that General 4ssembly resolutions directed at
apartheid are recommendatory only.4o Nevertheless, South Africa
must give the General Assembly's recommendations due
consideration in good faith. 41 It has consistently been accused
of bad faith at the U.N. for flouting international demands to
end apartheid. Its answer is that the recommendations are hit by
38 H Booysen 1 SAYIL (1975) 19; See also Yolkereg (1980) 392.
38 As Stassen, op cit 83, argues.
40 These resolutions find their constitutional basis in
Articles 10-14 of the Charter. Their annual repetition lends them
no extra weight - see C J R Dugard I'The Legal Effect of United
nations Resolutions on Apartheid" 88 ~ (1966) 48.
41 Laid down as a general principle by Lauterpacht J in the
Voting Procedures Case 1955 ICJ Reports 67 & 118-119.
Article 2(7) of the
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U.N. Charter and fall outside U.N.
jurisdiction. Apartheid, it maintains, falls entirely within its
'domain reserve'. However, as Patel notes, Article 2(7) cannot be
used in conflict with the basic principles and purposes of the
Charter, especially in regard to violations of fundamental human
rights. 42 Moreover, domestic jurisdiction is not that fixed.
International law has evolved sufficiently to include
discriminatory legislation within a state as a matter fit for
international concern. U.N. organs have the right as a matter of
international practice to determine their own jurisdiction unless
specified to the contrary in the Charter and can include
apartheid within that ,jurisdiction. 43 These organisations have
found that South Africa has acted in bad faith and sanctions have
been, and will continue to be, applied.
Perhaps the greatest penetration of South Africa's domain reserve
defence is the assertion that racial non-discrimination is a ~
cogens rule. Citing the dissenting judgments of Tanaka J in the
SWA Case44 and Amoun J in the Barcelona Traction Case,45 where
the learned judge gave protection from racial discrimination as
42 C N Patel ilLegal Aspects of State Expulsion from the UN-
South Africa a Case in Point" 3 Natal University L8 (1982/3) no's
1&2 197 at 206.
43 Expenses case 1962 ICJ Reports 168; Dugard op cit 1966
53-4; Patel op cit 207.
44 (2nd Phase) 1966 ICJ Reports 298.
45 (2nd Phase) 1970 ICJ Reports 32.
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an example of ius cQiens, and the fact that the ICJ held South
Africa to be in breach of the norm of non-discrimination in the
Namibia Opinion,4B Patel states that " ... it would be futile to
argue that apartheid falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state." 47 A peremptory norm of racial non-discrimination would
limit South Africa's sovereignty. In fact it would limit all
sovereignty. The problem with this thesis is that Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention Qn the Law Qf Treaties requires that such a
norm be " ... accepted and recognised by the international
community of states as a whole ... ", an exceedingly difficult test
to pass even considering the extensive support for a norm of non-
discrimination. 4B Many states are more concerned with the
sanctity of their own domain. reserves than. establishing
conclusively the peremptory nature of non-discrimination. Because
of the difficulty of achieving this general acceptance, the
international community has relied on specific condemnation of
apartheid rather than on a universal norm to legitimise its
intervention in South Africa's affairs. Nevertheless, because
racial non-discrimination has been linked with self-
determination in regard to South Africa, the country's internal
situation has become of international concern and international
law has spawned further rights and obligations in its regard.
46 1971 ICJ Reports 16-17.
47 Gp cit 206.
48 The test applies expressly to treaty law, but it is
probably valid for all purposes.
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3.2.4 THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOyEMENTS
AND THE ANC
The ANC has been the recipient of some of these new rights. The
ANC, like national liberation movements generally, is a non-state
subjects of international law. 48 States have not been the only
actors in post-war international society.50 The right of self-
determination has conferred international status on 'peoples'.
Through a norm of non-discrimination linked to self-
determination the South African people have also had
international status conferred on them. 51 These 'peoples' are
collective national entities in statu nasciendi - on th~ir way to
becoming states. National liberation movements representing these
'peoples' derive their international status from the 'peoples"
international status. 52 However, the bodies remain logically
distinct: (a) A people, (b) represented by a national liberation
movement, (c) which has an armed wing that actually engages in
military action.
48 A difficult categorisation to accommodate theoretically-
see generally R Higgins The Deyelopment of International Law by
the Political Organs of the U N (1963) 106.
50 International rights appear to have been conferred on
individuals, for instance in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in common Article 7 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
51 In this regard, the PAC representative at the 1974
diplomatic conference said Africans' of South Africa were
"nations" with a "separate and independent national existence
recognised by the international community." CDDH/1/SR6 33.
52 Asmal op cit 8, calls them legally prescribed instruments
for the vindication of self-determination.
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For a national liberation movement to acquire international
status international recognition is essential. In order to
receive it, a national liberation movement must be a viable
entity with accompanying political institutions. Thus we have an
\
empirical test for legal personality; the movement must meet
certain factual criteria. Interim iegal personality has been
recognised in a number of cases by the U.N. and the O.A.U ..
Provisions in General Assembly resolutions that activities
involving liberation movements should be undertaken in
consultation with the O.A.U. has in practice allowed that
organisation to conclusively designate the legitimate liberation
.movements. It tends to ensure that only anti-colonial and anti-
racist naiional liberation movements are sanctioned and that
insurrections against O.A.U. members are not. 53 The recognised
national liberation movements initially included FRELIMO, the
MPLA, the liberation movement of Guinea Bissau. Later SWAPO,
ZANU, ZAPU, and the PLO were recognised. 54 While the U.N. has a
53 P J Travers "The Legal Effect of United Nations Action in
Support of the PLO and the National Liberation Movements of
Africa" 17 Haryard International LJ (1976) 561 at 569.
54 Through, eg., G.A. Resolution 2787 (XXVI). See also the
more moderate Security Council resolutions, eg., Resolution 282
(1970) & 311 (1972). Both the PLO and SWAPO have been granted
full observer status by the General Assembly. ECOSOC and other
U.N. organs have also recognised and assisted national liberation
movements - see Travers op cit 572 to 575.
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special committee OO liaising with liberation movements, the
O.A.U. has gone much further and has a liberation committee which
aids them .directly. These liberation movements have been
recognised by many states, These states permit the movements
representation in their territory and provide large amounts of
aid.
The ANC has participated in debates in various U.N. bodies and
has been recognised by the General Assembly.56 The Assembly
affirmed the
... legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of
South Africa and their liberation movements, by all possible
means, for the seizure of power by the people and the
exercise of their inalienable right of self-determination;
and further recognised the national liberation movement of South
Africa as the lO ••• authentic representatives of the overwhelming
majority of the South African people." The ANC is regarded as the
legitimate representative of an emergent non-racial South African
state and as a belligerent entity that has an international right
to struggle.
3 2.5 THE ANC'S IUS AD BELLUM
Do national liberation movements have a ius ad helIum? The
declaration of the 1964 Conference of non-aligned countries
55 The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
56 G.A. Resolution 3411 (XXX) 1975. Vote 101/15/16.
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stated:
Colonised people may legitimately resort to arms to secure
the full exercise of their right to self-determination and
independence if the colonial powers persist in opposing
their national aspirations.
The Friendly Relations Declaration, in addition to expressly
recognising a duty, to refrain from denial of self-
determination,S7 also sanctions resistance to the incumbents by
stating that support for a 'people' in such a situation of denial
is permissible. s8 The General Assembly Definition of Aggression,
57 Is there a ius contra bellum on the incumbent regime?
Although Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter forbids the use of
force in "international relations", and the term can, on a broad
interpretation, be taken to include relations between national
liberation movements and states, such an interpretat~on denies
reality. N Ronzitti "Resort to Force in Wars of Liberation" in A
Cassese (ed) Current Problems of International Law (1975) 319-
347, argues that the iuS contra bellum is a corollary of self-
determination because a state that is obliged to conform to self-
determi~ation must also be debarred from any act, including the
use of force, which impinges on that principle. He asserts that
this rule is part of custom, based on the consensus in the U.N ..
It prohibits South Africa's repressive use of force. Ronzitti
notes that South Africa has not unequivocally and steadfastly
dissociated itself from self-determination. It just disputes that
apartheid flagrantly violates this principle. He therefore argues
that South Africa is bound by the ius contra helIum and it is
incumbent on other U.N. members to enforce the rule against South
Africa. Ronzitti's argument is debatable. South Africa may not
object to self-determination, but it definitely objects to
Ronzitti's interpretation of it, and to his explanation of the
legal basis for a corollary ius contra helIum. South Africa, like
all colonial or neo-colonial states, has not been slow to use
force in order to combat liberation movements. State practice has
rejected any ius contra bellum. The debate will, in any event,
remain academic until the war is over.
58 G.A. Resolution 2629 (XXV). It states:
... in their actions against, and resistance
forcible action in pursuit of the exercise
right to self-determination, such peoples are
to seek and receive support in accordance






prohibiting aggressive acts between states, provides expressly
under Article 7 that nothing in the definition can prejudice the
right of self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples
under
... colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination nor the right of those people to struggle to that
end and receive support. 58
The right to revolt, congruent to non-satisfaction of self-
determination, finds its legal basis mainly in these resolutions.
Western writers have noted that the Friendly Relations
Declaration makes no mention of the use of force to achieve self-
determination. 8o The international use of force is permissible
only in the instances envisaged in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
- in self-defen~e or under Security Council authorisation. In all
other cases, the blanket prohibition of Article 2(4) applies. A
number of theories have been put forward to avoid this
prohibition in the case of wars of national liberation: 81
(a) The use of force to attain self-determination is a case of
Article 51 sanctioned self-defence because force is used to deny
58 Annexed to G.A. Resolution 3314 1974.
80 D E Graham "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Laws of
War, a Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the Just War
Concept of the Eleventh Century" 32 Washington & Lee L8 (1975) 25
at 40. See also C J R Dugard "The O.A.U. and Colonialism: An
Inquiry into Self-Determination as a Justification for the use of
Force for the Eradication of Colonialism" 16 ~ (1967) 168-170.
81 See generally "Wars of' National Liberation"" in the
Encyclopedia of International law vol.4 344.
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self-determination. The counter argument is that colonialism or
racism does not in itself always involve armed attack or an
imminent use of force. The consistent use of force by the
incumbent may bring Article 51 into play. But the ius ad helIum
of the national liberation movements is clearly not identical to
the right to self-defence under Article 51.
(b) Colonialism is itself an aggression ab initio since colonial
regimes were installed in the past by force. This argument
disregards the legitimacy in the past of territorial acquisition
by force and the non-retroactivity of norms of customary
international law. Furthermore, Article 51 requires immediate
action in self-defence and thus no right of self-defence can
exist for an attack that occurred long ago.
(c) A strongly supported argument is that the use of force is a
sui generis right emanating from the strong condemnation of
colonialism and racism by the international community. The right
to revolt in these circumstances is regarded as a valid exception
to the Article 2(4) prohibition. 62 Although there is not a
complete consensus on the validity of this exception, it-does -
accord with the reality of international support for the national
liberation movement's military actions.
(d) Ronzitti argues that because national liberation movements
are not, in his opinion, subjects of international law but rather
62- K Asmal National Liberation Moyements: Their Status and
Role in Contemporary International Law (1980) 17; G Abi-Saab
"Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol" 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 371-2.
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are only beneficiaries of the right of self-determination, they
cannot be hit by Article 2(4).83 However, such a position
undermines the whole concept of wars of national liberation being
international, between two distinct subjects of the law, and, for
that reason, is untenable. 54
It is interesting that in non-international armed conflicts
international law does not regulate the right to revolt. It is my
submission that the right of national liberation movements to
revolt finds its roots partly in this non-regulation of revolt in
strictly internal situations and partly in the sui generis nature
of wars of national liberation. In any event, the debate about
the use of force at international level is rendered inappropriate
by contradictory state practice. States violate Article 2(4) to
the extent where its normative value has become questionable.
National liberation movements cannot be condemned for violations
that are at best theoretical. The ANC went to war in 1960 and the
reality of the situation demands a response from the ius in bello
not inextricably linked to the controversy surrounding the
legality of the ANC's ius ad bellum.
83 Gp cit 350-1.
54 Moreover, if the people that the national liberation
movement represents is the true international subject, ·and the
movement is only the beneficiary of the right of self-
determination, then logically the people's right to use force
would also be hit by Article 2(4)'s prohibition.
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3.2.6. THE ANC AND THE IUS IN BELLO
Recognising this fact of war, we are now confronted with the
central assertion that, wars of national liber~tion are
international armed conflicts and, therefore,
... national liberation movements and their members
combatting colonialism, racialism and alien rule are
entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, especially those relating to the protection of
civilians and P.O.W~s.... 65
The war of national liberation's aim - self-determination and the
elimination of racialism distinguishes it from a non-
international armed conflict. This purposive criterion defines a
narrow field of conflicts. South Africa is singled out as one
such conflict. The South African Government, it is argued, must
recognise the international nature of the conflict and grant ANC
combatants lawful status. But the basis for the application of
this thesis as black letter law binding on South Africa is highly
problematic. The material application of the law looks in the
final analysis to a customary norm for its legal enforcement but,
as we shall see, the formation of such a norm is militated
against by absence of widespread support for it. 6s We must
first, however, turn to the treaty law, which, although more
useful as a source of the content of the rules of international
armed conflict, can be interpreted to provide the means for the
application of the law.
65 Asmal op cit 8; See also Abi-Saab op cit 371-2.
6S C Hurray "The 1977 Geneva Protocols and South Africa" 33
~ (1984) 462 at 465.
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3,3 THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT BY MEANS OF COMMON ARTICLE 2 OF
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949
3 3 1 INTRODUCTION
With the international status of national liberation movements,
including the ANC, established, their supporters looked for ways
to turn the application of the law of armed conflict in wars of
national liberation, claimed initially in General Assembly
resolutions, into a concrete rule binding the incumbent regimes,
Resort was first had to the mechanisms available for the
application of the law in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the most obvious means for applying the law because they have
been ratified by more states than any other treatY,S7 including
South Africa, which acceded to the Conventions in March 1952,88
The Convention's material field of application was apparently
limited to interstate wars by the criteria laid down in common
Article 2. Apart from one small exception, it set out that
international armed conflicts exist only between High Contracting
Parties (HCPs), i.e., states. The Article has, however, been the
subject of a controversial interpretation aimed at the inclusion
of wars of national liberation within in its scope.
67 165 in 1986, 256 ~ (1987).
ea The Conventions have not yet been legislated into South
African law.
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3 3 2 PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE 2
The first paragraph of Article 2 sets out that
... the present convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognised by one of them.
An armed oonflict ia~ in these terms~ any opposition between two
or more High Contracting Parties (HCPs) generally agreed to
include states only involving the use of armed forces. Two
situations are' envisaged, viz.: "Cases of declared war", i.e.,
the classical war situation, and "any other armed conflict which
may arise", a catchall phrase for every situation that is a de
facto armed conflict without being a declared war. ea In both
situations the laws operation is limited to states only, thus the
paragraph does not provide any means for the application of the
Conventions in wars of national liberation.
The second paragraph of Article 2 applies the Conventions in
... all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
. 68 The catchalls operation is illustrated in the case Public
Prosecutor y Oi Hee Koi [1968] AC 853-4. The major issue in the
matter was the applicability of Geneva Convention 3 (P.D.W.) in
the 'military confrontation' between Malaysia and Indonesia
(1963-66). The Privy Council held:
... the trials of the accused were conducted on the
assumption which their lordships did not call into question,
that there was an armed conflict between Malaysia and
Indonesia bringing the Convention into operation. Article 2
applies the Convention not only in cases of declared war but
to 'any other armed conflict which may arise between two of
more of the High Contracting Parties even if a state of war
is not recognised by one of them.' The existence of such a
state of armed conflict was something of which the courts in
Malaysia could properly take judicial notice of or if in
doubt on which they could obtain a statement from the executive
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of an High Contracting Party even if the said occupation
meets with no resistance.
A reaction to German occupation of Europe in World War 2, this
provision is of no application in wars of national liberation
because it envisages occupation of a state by another state party
to the convention.
3 3.3 PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE 2
The third paragraph of Article 2 provides the first possible
avenue for the application of the Conventions in wars of national
liberation. It reads:
Although one of the powers in a conflict may not be a party
to the present, convention, the powers who are parties
thereto shall remain bound in their mutual relations. They
shall furthermore be bound by the convention in relation to
the said power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.
Can a national liberation movement be classified as a "power"?
More specifically, can the ANC, by accepting and applying the
provisions of the Conventions, bind the South African Government
to apply the Conventions to the conflict between them? In a
controversial article published in 1972, Abi-Saab argues that
national liberation movements can be classed as "powers" because
of their international status. 70 "Powers" had originally been
included in paragraph 3 to cover states that were not HCP's, but
which became involved in armed conflicts with HCP·s. Abi-Saab
seeks to change the acceptance of this "power" - "state" equation
70 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of
War" 3 Anoales de Etudes Ioteroatiooales (1972) 93.
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as the only valid interpretation of "power". He argues that the
international status of national liberation movements has been
established, as noted, through their representation of peoples
with a right of self-determination. He argues that these national
liberation movements have a right to go to war to achieve self-
determination and he subscribes to the view that the full ius in
bello applies in wars of national liberation. He contends,
therefore, that they are "powers" in terms of paragraph 3 and
that they can invoke the Geneva Conventions.
Western commentators dispute Abi-Saab's contentions.7~ They
adhere to the narrow definition of power, well illustrated in the
Israeli case, Military Prosecutor V Omar Muhamed Kassem and
Others. 72 One of the issues in the case was whether the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a constituent of
the PLO, was such a "power". The court held that it was
... clear that the convention applies
states and not between states and
states and do not represent states. 73
to relations between
bodies which are not
7~ R R Baxter Riyista di dirotti Internaziooale (1974) 193 at
195-6; H Booysen "Terrorists, P.O.W's and SA" 1 SAYlL (1974/5)
32; L J Chimango "The relevance of humanitarian international law
to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa - the case of
Mozambique in retrospect" 8 elLSA (1975) 287 at 304; Draper op
cit 16; C J R Dugard 93 ~ 144 at 153; Graham op cit 47.
72 [1971J 42 lLR 470.
73 This interpretation appears to be supported by the wording
of paragraph 3, viz.: "parties who are powers thereto", seeming
to imply that "powers" are states. But as the procedure for
accession also uses "powers", the implication is negated.
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Abi-Saab takes issue with the narrow definition of "power".74 His
main arguments are:
(1) It is generally agreed that in the case of recognition of
belligerency the whole ius in bello, including the Conventions,
applies to the conflict. 75 But such recognition does not
transform the belligerent community into a state. Thus if the
Conventions were open to states only, the consent of the
established government or third party state in the form of
recognition of belligerency would not be able to change this
situation. He argues that because belligerent recognition entails
the application of the Conventions, there is no legal objection
to the accession of national liberation movements to the
Conventions, but only the political objections of colonial
governments and South Africa.
74 Gp cit 1972 104.
75 Do the Conventions apply in toto in a belligerency?
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht Internatiooal Law 211-212 answer ln the
positive. G I A D Draper "Humanitarian Law and International
Armed Conflicts" 13 Georgia JIL (1983) 267-268 disagrees. He
argues that such an assertion does not fit in with the scheme of
international and non-international armed conflicts in the
Conventions. With respect to paragraph 3 of Article 2, he asserts
that such a belligerent authority does not equal a power,
preferring the definition that power only means states, and that
belligerencies are governed by Article 3 only. But it is
historical fact that belligerencies accorded far more substantive
legal rights, including the right to lawful combatant status,
than the limited cover provided by the conventional law of non-
international armed conflict. However, it is probable that
belligerency had already fallen into desuetude before the
Conventions were adopted, which makes the whole debate academic.
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Cassese attacks Abi-Saab's reasoning. 78 He recognises that the
recognition of belligerency did not transform the belligerent
entity into a state, but then he notes that the institution of
belligerency is obsolete and Abi-Saab's analogy without basis. 77
(2) In 1960 the Provisional Government of Algeria (GPRA)
not·ified the Swiss Government as depository of its accession to
the Conventions. The Swiss Government circulated it to other
parties to the Conventions in terms of common Article 59/ 58/
138/ 156.
But Cassese notes that. the GPRA's accession took place at the end
of the conflict when France was about to withdraw and, in
addition, Switzerland and France objected to the accession. 78
Switzerland's reservation was made, however, as a party to the
Conventions and not in its capacity as repository. Abi-Saab
disagrees that these reservations can prevent the accession of
national liberation movements. 78 As the general rules about
76 Abi-Saab introduced this concept at the 1974 Diplomatic
Conference as an Egyptian delegate. Cassese, an Italian delegate,
criticised Abi-Saab CDDH/1/SR3 at 11. See A Cassese (ed) The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1980) vol 2 25.
77 Op cit 27.
78 Op cit 26.
Reconsideration of the
Armed Conflict (1971) 51.
See
Law
also D Bindschedler-Robert "A
of Armed Conflicts" in The Law Of
78 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol" 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 400ff.
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reservations do not applY,80 he turns to the Conventions and
notes: (a) They are multi-lateral treaties requiring only written
notification of accession to the depositoryj81 (b) Common Article
13/13/4A deals indirectly with the application of the Conventions
to conflicts between parties not recognising each other. Article
4A(3) sanctions " ... members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or authority not recognised by the
detaining power." Abi-Saab argues that such an authority can
easily include national liberation movements. He notes the ICRC
Commentary's position:
It is not expressly stated that the government or authority
must, as a minimum requirement, be recognised by third
states, but this ~ondition is consistent with the spirit of
the provision ... it is also necessary that this authority,
which is not recognised by the adversary, shall either
consider itself as representing one of the high contracting
parties, or declare that it accepts the obligations
stipulated in the Convention and wishes to apply them. 82
General international recognition of a national liberation
movement meets the first non-mandatory requirement set out in the
Commentary. But to bring about the full application of the
Conventions the liberation movement must express its consent to
be bound by them. Abi-Saab prefers the less formal procedure in-
paragraph 3 of Article 2 than actual full accession. 83 Paragraph
80 They only apply to reservations made by states at the
adoption of a treaty. See Abi-Saab op cit 1979 note 66.
81 Common Article 59/58/138/156.
82 Commentary 3 63.
83 Abi-Saab op cit 1979 403, notes that the prOVISIons in
the Conventions for full accession, Articles 60/59/139/155, also
use the word "power", and thus national liberation movements can
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3 requires acceptance and application of the Conventions in order
to bind the other party. Abi-Saab feels that a unilateral
declaration of acceptance by the liberation movement would
suffice, regardless of the acceptance or opposition of the other
parties to the Conventions. 84 He considers the ANC's 1980
Declaration as satisfying the requirements of Article 2 paragraph
3, . thus bringing the Conventions into operation in the South
African armed conflict. 85 South Africa's rejection of such a view
is, he argues, in violation of the Conventions. Although his
argument is cogent, ABi-Saab's interpretation of Article 4A(3)
conflicts with the intention of the Article's authors to use it
as a means of applying, the law in situations where the government
of a state party to the Conventions has surrendered, but certain
elements, of its armed forces continue to fight, eg., the position
of the De Gaulle's Free French after the Vichy Government signed
the armistice with Germany in 1940.
(3) A wider interpretation is more compatible with the
humanitarian objects and purpose of the conventions which, if to
be fully realised, command universal application.
also apparently accede to the Conventions. He considers, however,
the Article 2 paragraph 3 procedure to be more expedient for
practical reasons.
84 Ibid. The ICRC Commentary points out that no explicit
declaration is necessary - Commentary 3 26.
85 Gp cit 1979 404. But it appears the declaration was made
in response to Article 96(3) of Geneva Protocol 1. More about the
declaration below.
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Cassese argues that this key contention is not strong because it
ignores the. intention of the framers in drawing up the
Conventions. He notes that it is evident from the preparatory
works that the socialist proposals to extend the Conventions to
cover colonial and civil wars were rejected by the majority of
states at the 1949 Conference. sa He concludes that to extend the
Conventions to wars of national liberation would run counter to
the purpose pursued by the authors of the Conventions.
Schindler's retort is that I' •.• the 1949 conception of colonial
wars as Article 3 conflicts cannot be decisive in this
respect."S? Interpreting "power" in terms of Article 31 of the
Vieona Conyention, Schindler points out that the conception in
the minds of the authors of the treaty is not relevant to its
later interpretation, the important thing being the ordinary
meaning of "power" in the context and light of its object and
purpose. This meaning he avers, does not clearly exclude a
liberation movement.
Cassese replies that the question of whether such a later
interpretation can override an interpretation based on the
8S They rejected the ICRC draft Article 2(4)
result was common Article 3.
the end
8? D Schindler "Different Types of Armed Conflicts According
to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols" 163 Recueil des Cours
(1979) 117 at 135.
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trayaux preparatoires is a question of construction not settled
by the Vienna Conyention. ee However, the ICJ in the Namibia
Opinioo 1970 advised that changes must be taken into
consideration in interpreting a treaty. The concept embodied in
"power" in the Convention is not static. The Conventions are
large multi-lateral treaties that have acquired their own life,
independent of the will of the parties at the moment of their
conclusion. They lend themselves to progressive generic
interpretations and the concepts they contain cannot be limited
to historically fixed, culturally relative interpretations. The
1949 conception of "power" as state is a narrow Western
interpretation open to,modification over time.
Cassese raises the further point that this narrow Western view
also pervades the substantive provisions of the Conventions
making it difficult for non-state "powers" to apply them and thus
militates against a revised interpretation. es He notes that the
Conventions, especially Convention 3, are based on two legal
concepts, 'nationality' and 'foreign territory', which cannot be
applied to wars of national liberation. It follows from these
basic notions embodied in the Conventions that the framers did
not intend to apply them to wars of national liberation. Cassese
asserts that to hold otherwise would be to stretch the
ee A Cassese The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict




Schindler's reply to this tack is that the colonial territories'
separation from the state administering it meets these elementary
requirements of territoriality.so On this basis Baxter allows
that the process of Portuguese decolonisation could have been an
Article 2 paragraph 3 situation because it involved two "power"
conflicts.8~ But in his opinion the conflict in South Africa is
" ... essentially a one power rather than a two power situation",s2
disallowing the laws' application through paragraph 3. This
opinion can be analysed by examining certain Articles of the
Conventions and gauging the possibilities of ANC compliance with
them. 83 Article 19 of Convention 3 reads:
Prisoners shall be evacuated, as soon as possible- after
cap~ure, to camps situated in an area far enough from the
combat zone for them to be out of danger.
The only feasible ANC method of compliance with this provision
would be to transport prisoners over the borders into sanctuaries
in the frontline states. Article 19, an important requirement
even in the context of guerilla warfare, appears unfunctional in
the South African armed conflict at present given that the main
90 Op cit 136.
81 R R Baxter "Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics" 16
Haryard LJ (1975) 1 at 14.
82 Ibid. He considered the PLO/Israeli situation to fit
adequately if not comfortably into paragraph 3.
83 Obviously an article by article analysis is not possible
here.
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ANC bases are in Angola. But it may become operable in the future
with increased ANC activities in states like Zimbabwe. Another
problem is posed by Article 102, which presupposes a national
court and legal system for a detaining power - something that the
ANC does not possess and therefore will find the procedural
safeguards required by the Article difficult to carry out. But
that is not to presume that such a system cannot be instituted.
Similar problems of application are encountered with Convention 4
(Civilians), where, for example, Article 4 provides that the
Convention does not apply to nationals of the detaining power. In
the true colonial situation the separate territory of the colony
could be used to justify the classification of the coloniser's
presence as occupation and the local inhabitants as "protected
persons" under the Convention. But in the South African situation
lack of territorial separation and the fact that the occupants
are also local inhabitants makes such a solution impractical. In
total only 14 articles of Convention 4 (Articles 12-36) also
protect a state's own population. Faced with these practical
difficulties, it can only be urged that problematic provisions
should be complied with to the extent possible, recognising that
similar difficulties in compliance occur in all wars and that
many of the problems arise with the methods of implementation and
not with the essence of the rules. 84 But analysis of the
84 The sentiment of the authors of liThe Geneva Convention
and the treatment of P.O.W.s in Vietnam" Note from the Haryard
Law Reyiew reprinted in R Falk (ed) The Vietnam War and
International Law vol 3 (1969) 398 at 402.
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Convention's articles does tend to support Baxter's opinion that
Article 2 paragraph 3 does not encompass the South African
situation.
Abi-Saab, taking a different approach, attacks the traditional
conception of territorial control as the only functional means
for implying the degree of effectiveness· necessary for the
acquisition of legal status. S5 He argues that because it is
rooted in the assumptions of conventional warfare it disregards
the unconventional guerilla warfare typical of wars of national
liberation. He claims that effectiveness can also be based on the
control and allegiance of populations. He maintains" moreover,
that even formal territorial control is no longer a cut and dried
concept. Experience shows that territorial control over the same
area can rotate (eg. government by day, rebels by night). He
argues that in such situations effectiveness, if rigidly
construed, cannot serve as a criterion for determining the legal
status of either party because of its relative and ever changing
~haracter. He urges the adoption of a more flexible
interpretation of effectiveness in the case of national
liberation movements taking into consideration not only the
elements which they succeed in controlling, but also the elements
that they deny control of to the incumbent. He concludes that
national liberation movements, whilst not in complete control of
85 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of
War" 3 Annales de Etudes Internationales (1972) 97.
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territory, by undermining their opponent's control and because of
the allegiance of the population
... master a degree of effectiveness sufficient for them to
be objectively considered as a belligerent community at the
international level. ss
In relation to South Africa, Booysen stated bluntly in 1975 that
even this low profile objective situation was not present. S ?
Since then the objective military situation has changed, as is
clear from Appendix A. Instead of sporadic bombings and sabotage,
we are now in a nation wide State of Emergency, brought about not
by guerilla warfare, but by large scale urban unrest and the
ANC's policy of making the townships ungovernable. Government
control of the territory in the townships appears to fluctuate in
effectiveness and the allegiance of the population has been
lost.a8 But the ANC's control is also debatable. It is unclear
whether the ANC can be labelled an effective belligerent even in
Abi-Saab's adapted terms. Analysis of the situation is fraught
with difficulties, not the least of which is the information
blackout.
S6 Ibid.
a? H Booysen "Terrorists, P.O.W's and South Africa" 1
SAYIL (1975) 31.
a8 There are even hints of 'liberated zones see J
Friederickse South Africa: A Different Kind of War (1986) 175.
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3.3.4 CONCLUSIONBB
Although supported by the Afro-Asian-Socialist blocs, Abi-Saab's
contentions are controversial in the West and Cassese maintains
that they are not decisive. 100 The difference is really between a
strict and a liberal interpretation of the same provisions. The
alternative views are based on different competing policy
considerations. Western lawyers value - the integrity of a clear,
limited definition of international armed conflict in Article 2,
without the added controversy that arguments like Abi-Saab's must
bring to an already difficult area of law. Advocates of the
inclusion of wars of national liberation within the definition of
international armed conflict are motivated to play up the
international nature of wars of national liberation as well as
spur on the application of humanitarian law in these conflicts.
Article 2 provides a useful method for doing this because the
colonial states and South Africa are parties to the Conventions.
Nonethe~ess, it is plain that consensus has not been achieved.
Western state practice does not recognise non-states as "powers".
88 I have been careful not to discuss Article 2 paragraph 3
in connection with Article 96(2) of Geneva Protocol 1 of 1977. In
essence Article 96(2) reiterates Article 2 paragraph 3 in the
context of Protocol 1, but uses the term "party" instead of
"power." However, South Africa is not a party to Protocol 1 and
no cogent arguments have been put forward that Article 96(2) has
a special interpretation relating to wars of national liberation
that is a rule of custom, attention having ·rather been focussed
on Article 96(3) as a solution to the problems associated with
Article 2 paragraph 3.
100 A Cassese "A Tentative Appraisel of the Old and the New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict" in The New Humanitarian Law
of Armed Conflict (1979) 504.
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It is submitted that although a liberal interpretation is
tenable, its tenuousness makes it an unreliable method for
applying the Conventions in the South African situation,
something the ANC appears to have recognised by not referring
directly to it in its 1980 Declaration. This unreliability is
also pointed to by the introduction of Article 1(4) in Protocol 1
of 1977. The effort put into the formulation of Article 1(4) by
the backers of the liberal interpretation of Article 2 paragraph
3 tends to indicate a lack of faith in the effectiveness of the
liberal interpretation.
However, the controversy surrounding Article 1(4) and the fact
that certain parties to the Conventions have not become parties
to Protocol 1 has led to the argument that Article 1(4) is the
correct and consensual interpretation of Article 2 paragraph 3 of
the 1949 Conventions. Article 1(4) does encapsulate the limited
material field of application of wars of national liberation. If
"powers" is interpreted in the light of Article 1(4), the ANC
would definitely be included as such a "power" and South Africa
would be bound to apply the full international law of armed
conflict because it is a party to the 1949 Conventions. Paragraph
3 does not labour under the burden of Article 1(4)'s wording
because there is no reference to pejorative terms like "racist
regime", unacceptable to the South African Government. But the
fact that Article 1(4)'s wording drove off the target states from
becoming party to Protocol 1 must also make it extremely
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difficult for them to concede that Article 1(4) is a binding
interpretation of paragraph 3. It is therefore not surprising
that South Africa gives no credence to that interpretation.
From the perspective of lawful combatant status, the principle
defect of using Article 2 as the means for instituting these
protections is that it only brings the rules contained in Article
4 of Geneva Convention 3 into operation to define the personal
field of application, rules which as we shall see, ANC combatants
would find extremely difficult to obey. Article 1(4) must stand
alone as a rule of law in order to bring into operation the
personal conditions for lawful combatant status contained in
Articles 43 and 44 of Protocol 1, which do not set down such
rigid conditions of visible distinction from civilians as Article
4 and therefore would be easier for ANC members to obey.
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3.4 THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 1(4) OF
GENEVA PROTOCOL 1 OF 1977
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the 1970's, the advocates of the international status of
national liberation movements focussed their attention on
bringing humanitarian law into line with what they regarded as
general international law. The result of their efforts, Article
1(4) of Protocol 1, extends the material field 01 application of
international armed conflicts to include certain wars 01 national
liberation. An examination of the Article's history and
criticisms is required to indicate the limitations of this
extension and whether it clearly includes the South African armed
conflict as an international armed conflict. Examination of the
Article's background also points to the crucial issue relative to
the application of the law in South Africa by means of Article
1(4), viz.: its political acceptability as a rule of law.
3.4.2 THE GENESIS OF ARTICLE 1(4)
3.4.2.1 DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS
The development of humanitarian law to include wars of national
liberation as international armed conflicts and thus legalise
liberation movement combatants began in the U.N. General
Assembly. The groups supporting this idea, convinced that it was
... expresse(d) its
persecution of . the
arbitrary laws and the
were taken prisoner
liberation "and, ... (c)




legally correct and politically necessary, wanted it expressly
stated in treaty form. The initiative was launched at the (U.N.)
Teheran Conference on Human Rights held in 1968, which considered
that persons struggling against "minority racist or colonial
regimes" should, if detained, be treated as P.O.W's or political
prisoners under international law. 101 In the same year, the
General. Assembly declared that it
... further confirms the decision of the Teheran Conference
to recognise the right of freedom fighters in Southern
Africa and in the Colonial Territories, when captured to be
treated as P.O.W's under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 102
The General Assembly also
grave concern over the relentless
opponents of apartheid under the
treatment of freedom fighters who
during the legitimate struggle for
declar€(d) that such freedom fighters
prisoners of war under international
Geneva Convention relative to the
of War of 12 August 1949. 103
In 1970 the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to
give particular attention to these problems. 104 The Secretary
General's Reports, published in 1971, highlighted the initiative
in the U.N .. 105 The key resolution in respect of Article 1(4) is
~O~ Resolution 23 - 'Human Rights in Armed Conflicts'.
~02 Resolution 2446 (XXIII).
103 Section 8 of Resolution 2396 (XXIII).
~04 Resolution 2597 (XXIV).
. 10~ Report of the Secretary General on Respect for Human
Rlghts ln Armed Conflicts U.N.GA A/7720 20/11/1969; U.N.GA A/8052
18/9/1970; U.N.GA A/8370 2/9/1971.
.,
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General Assembly Resolution 3103,108 which stated that:
1. The struggles of people ... under racist governments for
the implementation of their right to self-determination and
independence is legitimate and in full accordance with the
principles of international law ...
3. The armed conflicts involving the struggles of peoples
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes are
to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status
envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and other international instruments is to apply
to the persons engaged in armed struggle against colonial
and alien domination and racist regimes.
4. The combatants struggling against colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes captured as prisoners are to
be accorded the status of P.D.W. and their treatment should
be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva
Convention relative to the treatment of P.D.W's ...
6. The violation of the legal status of combatants
struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes in the course of an armed conflict entails full
responsibility in, accordance with the norms of international
law.
The final product of the 1974-1977 Geneva Diplomatic Conference
largely.embodied this Resolution.
Rosas notes a few interesting points about this particular set of
resolutions;107
(a) They were usually adopted 70-100 votes fori few againstl 10
to 20 abstentions.
(b) Of the mostly Western states that abstained, many expressed
reservations to those paragraphs that implied or stated that the
Geneva Conventions were applicable in toto to the conflicts in
question.
108 (XXVIII).
107 A Rosas The Leial Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 265-6.
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(c) The resolutions were ambiguous in that (i) some referred to
the principles of the Geneva Convention 3 while others called for
the application of the Conventions in toto; (ii) some of the
resolutions called for the humane treatment of prisoners as well,
a contradictory notion in that it primarily belongs to the
context of internal armed conflicts; (iii) most of the
resolutions referred only to Convention 3, some to Convention 4,
but none to Conventions 1 and 2.
I can add four further points:
(d) The tone of many of the resolutions was peremptory, implying
that they carried legal weight. Their legal weight is, however,
controversial. The general rule is that they are recommendatory
and need only be considered bona fide and seriously. But they may
carry weight as subsidiary legal rules depending on the amount of
support they engendered.
(e) The resolutions often appear to be based on the conviction
that they were interpretations rather than modifications' of the
1949 Conventions, which leads back to the discussion of Article 2
paragraph 3.
(f) The resolutions paid considerable attention to lawful
combatant status and P.D.W. status. The reason is obvious. The
acquisition of these protections meant both added status for
national liberation movements and the protection of their
fighters - the two key objectives of the whole development of the
law in this respect.
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(g) A separate sub-set of these resolutions has been aimed
specifically at South Africa loe making the same claims as the
general resolutions. Reiterated consistently over the years, the
South African Government has, as consistently, ignored them.
3,4,2,2 DEYELOPMENT BY THE ICRC
Parallel to the development in the U.N., but taking a more
cautious approach, the ICRC was also intent upon revising the
law, The ICRC had unsuccessfully proposed broadening the material
field of application of humanitarian law to include wars of
national liberation before the 1949 Geneva Conference. loe In 1965
the Twentieth Conference of the Red Cross requested the ICRC to
draft proposals updating the laws of war, The, ICRC presented a
substantial report on the subject to the Twenty First Red Cross
Conference held in Istanbul in 1969. The report assumed that wars
of national liberation were non-international armed conflicts and
that General Assembly resolutions adopted in 1968 did not express
the law as it stood,ll0 At the conference, a proposal that
national liberation movement combatants should be treated as
P.O.W's in accordance with Convention 3 was withdrawn in favour
of a resolution asking that combatants in non-international armed
108 For example, G,A, Resolution 2396 (XXIII),
108 The ICRC proposed extending the application of the
Conventions to all non-international armed conflicts, citing as
examples civil wars, colonial conflicts, religious wars etc.
110 ICRC Protectioo of Victims Qf NQn-International Armed
CQnflicts (1969) 9,
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conflict who conformed to Article 4 of Convention 3 receive a
treatment similar to that provided in the Convention for P.D.W·s.
In 1971 the ICRC convened the first of two Conferences of
Government Experts (1971/1972) on the development of the law. 111
At these conferences the ICRC/West concentrated on technical
changes to the law within traditional assumptions ignoring the
political movement in the U.N. to change these assumptions. In
its report to the 1971 session the rCRC reiterated its view that
wars of national liberation were non-international armed
conflicts. This view encountered opposition. Some experts
supported the internationalisation of these conflicts,112 but a
draft declaration to that effect was rejected at the 1972
conference. 113 The rCRC's solution was a compromise:
In cases of armed struggle where people exercise the right
to self-determination as guaranteed by the li.N. Charter and
the· Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
in accordance with the Charter' of the li.N.; members of
organised movements who comply with the aforementioned
conditions shall be treated as P.D.W·s for as long as they
are detained. 114
A number of comments can be made:-
(a) The issue of the international character of wars of national
111 The ICRC sent a general invitation to all parties in the
United Nations, and 77 states sent delegations.
112 ICRC Report on the 1971 Conference of Government Experts
52-56; ICRC Commentary 00 the Draft Additional Protocols (1973) 6.
113 ICRC Report 00 the 1972 Conference of Goyernment Experts
vol 2 25.
114 Footnote to Article 42 of Draft Protocol 1.
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liberation was completely avoided.
(b) The proposal was limited to the question of P.O.W's, which is
understandable given the content of G.A. resolutions.
(c) P.O.W treatment, not status, was conferred.
(d) The proposal appeared to sanction all wars of national
liberation against non-representative governments and not only
those fought against colonial· and racist regimes.11~
Western dominance of the two conferences influenced the adoption
of a traditional approach to wars of national liberation in the
draft Protocol,118 an approach to the South African Government's
advantage because under it the Government did not have to pay
attention to the law of international armed conflict. Forsythe
maintains that the ICRC's association with the old definition of
colonial wars as non-international armed conflicts disadvantaged
the ICRC on the global stage.-117 The ICRC/Western position was
overly legalistic despite the efforts made by Norway prior to the
1974 Conference to change it. As a result it was bypassed by the
political steamroller of third world voting power.
115 This option was unsuccessfully proposed at the 1974
diplomatic conference.
116 D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics (1977) 124.
117 Gp cit 125. Witness the reluctance of the ICRC to commit
itself on the legal issues today. It takes a far more pragmatic
approach.
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3.4.2 3 THE GENEYA DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 1974-1977
3.4.2.3 1 INTRODUCTION
The Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law was convened in 1974 in Geneva and
completed the drafting of two Protocols in 1977 with the
ceremonial signing of the Final Act by 102 states and 3 national
liberation movements. Both Protocols entered into force on
December 7 1978. All in all, 124 states, 50 NGO's and 11 national
liberation movements participated in one or all of the four
sessions, representing, as was not the case in 1949, most of
international society, South Africa attended the first session
only. National liberation movements we~e invited to participate
fully because of their involvement in the movement for the
internationalisation of wars of national liberation, but were not
given voting· powers.~~a The ANC attended the first three
sessions, the PAC the first, second, and fourth.1~a It is
interesting to note that of the 11 national liberation movements
invited only four still exist as national liberation movements,
viz.: the ANC, PAC, PLO, SWAPO. The rest have been transformed
into either the governments or opposition parties of independent
states. The intense debate over the participation of the national
~~a Conference Resolution 3(1). For a detailed look at the
controversy surrounding their participation see Abi-Saab op cit
1979 403-405.
~~8 F R Ribeiro "International Humanitarian Law: Advancing
Steadily Backwards" 97 SAL.J. (1980) 42 at 43.
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liberation movements was a prelude to the bitter wrangle that
emerged around the definition of international armed conflict in
draft Article 1 of Protocol 1.
3 4 2 3 2 THE EVOLUTION AND ELABORATION OF ARTICLE 1(4)
At the 1974 Conference the U.N. approach to wars of national
liberation collided with tha ICRC/Western approach. The Third
World 'group of 77', supported by the less enthusiastic Socialist
bloc,120 carried over their solidarity and voting strength from
the U.N. and took control of the development of Article 1. These
two allied groups submitted two alternative proposals with a view
to including wars of national liberation as international armed
conflicts. CDDH/1/5 initiated by the Socialist bloc purported to
add the following paragraph to Article 1:
The' international armed conflicts referred to in Article 2
common to the Conventions also include conflicts where
people fight against colonial and alien domination and
racist regimes.
CDDH/1/11 proposed by the Third World had a greater impact:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraphs
include armed struggles waged by peoples in exercise of
their right of selfdetermination as enshrined in the Charter
of the U.N. and defined by the declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.
The Western powers took umbrage with these proposals and almost
120 D Ciobanu "The Attitude of the Socialist Countries" in A
Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979)
vol 1 399, states at ~OO-402 that the alignment of forces was not
strictly east/west. The third world/socialist blocs failed to act
in concert on most issues - Article 1 being an exception. In most
instances group policy was overridden by national interest.
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left the Conference in 1974. The Western counter proposal
CDDH/1/12, stated that wars of national liberation would be
covered by the De Maartens clause as applied to Protocol 1. It
did not satisfy the proponents of the other two proposals, who,
in response, amalgamated their proposals in CDDH/1/41, viz.:
. The situation referred to in preceding paragraphs include
armed conflicts where people fight against colonial and
alien domination and against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of selfdetermination, as enshrined in the
U.N. Charter and defined by the Declaration of Principles of
international Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.
The amalgam refers to self-determination as in CDDH/1/11, but
restricts it to the situations mentioned specifically in
CDDH/1/5. The· South -American amendment CDDH/1/71 j changing
"colonial and alien domination" to "colonial domination and alien
occupation", was voted on and passed in committee 70/21/13. 121
The Afro/Asian/Socialist countries voted for it, South America
split on the issue and the majority of the Western and other
group, including South Africa, voted against it. Western
supporters of CDDH/1/11 abstained. The ANC supported it. No vote
was taken at the 1974 plenary.
At the 1975 session an unofficial working party of active
sponsors and major Western detractors examined the modifications
to the Protocol necessitated by draft Article 1. Other than the
inclusion of a provision
121 CDDH/l/SR13 at 10.
for the acceptance by national
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liberation movements of the Protocols and Conventions, 122 only
cosmetic touches were recommended. Hatters remained thus until
the end of the fourth session in 1977. The West had by this time
modified its position to accommodate the majority view. Although
the US delegation urged consensus, Israel forced the Article to
the vote. 123 The result was 87/1/11 in favour of adoption of the
Article. 124 Israel voted against it and the major Western powers
abstained while those that had previously abstained voted for it.
Article 1 reads:
1.[Repeat of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions]
2.[De Haartens clause]
3.This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of
the 12 August 1949 for the protection of War Victims, shall
apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to
these Conventions~
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph
include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on the Principles of
International law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.
Sections 3 and 4 are expressly interrelated by reference in
section 4 to the situations covered in section 3. This definition
of their relationship does not exclude the types of conflicts
covered by section 4 being already covered by section 3. In fact,
122 Article 96(3) - see below.
123 An Israeli motion for a separate vote on paragraph 4 was
defeated.
124 CDDH/1/SR36 at 58.
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section 4 is worded as if it were giving an interpretation of
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.
3.4.2 3 3 ATTITUDES AT THE CONFERENCE SHAPING ARTICLE 1(4)
The legal rationale for Article 1(4) was provided by certain
third world delegates after the fact of its coming into being. 125
They placed strong emphasis on general international law derived
from U.N. actions. 126 The Western response was to emphasise the
political function of the U.N. as opposed to the ICRC's role as
the sole initiator of genuine humanitarian law. 127 The pattern,
symptomatic of much recent international legal development, was
plain; a strong political force faced an entrenched legal
position; the result a lack of fundamental deep rooted
126
consensus. The Western states may have changed tactics by 1977,
but they made clear their negative attitude to Article 1(4) on
signature and by non-ratification. Socialist states, on the other
hand, supported the Third World, but favoured a much stricter
125 D P Forsythe "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on
Humanitarian Law: Some Observations" 69 American JIL (1975) 77,
notes at 82 that little legal justification was given. He points
out that most third world delegates did not realise the full
impact of their stand. It appeared some delegates did not know
the difference between draft treaties and G.A. resolutions. Abi-
Saab tried to give the argument some legal foundations (see
CDDH/l/SR4 at 3-4), but his untrained colleagues continued to
take a non- legal approach.
CDDH/1/SR2 at 10 - Egyptian delegates reasoning.
127 CDDH/1/SR2 at 49 - French response. But as Abi-Saab op
cit 1979 378 points out, there is no hierarchy in international
law - the ICRC does not dominate, nor does the U.N. - rather the
law is based on the unity of these organs.
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formulation. Cassese argues that they and not the Western group,
which had nothing to do with it, were instrumental in narrowing
the material field of application of Article 1(4) because they
feared its application in their own territories.~2e Many third
world states probably had the same attitude.
~2e A Cassese The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Cooflict
(1980) vol 2 at 17. But Lysaght at 18 argues that Western states
influenced the Third World/ Socialist bloc into a narrow
formulation through pointing out the possibility of wars of
secession etc., left open by the vague Friendly Relations
declaration.
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3.4 3 ARTICLE 1(4) - FIELD OF APPLICATION
To illustrate that the South African armed conflict falls within
the field of application of Article 1(4), the Article's
parameters must be defined. Article 1(4) has been criticised for
having a vague field of application because the terms used to
define its field are imprecise. 128 But a close examination of its
wording in the context of general international law belies its
apparent vagueness. Article 1(4) gives specific examples of the
kinds of incumbent states opposed by the national liberation
movements representing peoples with a right to self-
determination, thus establishing a justiciable standard for
determining its field of application. Article 1(4) consists of a
number of elements, each of which must be dealt with in turn.
What is meant in Article 1(4) by "armed conflicts?" The term is
used in a number of contexts. 130 The general definition in the
Geneva Conventions is that a single incident involving the armed
forces of two or more high contracting parties is an armed
conflict, without the necessity of a declaration of war. In
Geneva Protocol 2's Article 1, a high threshold is given to the
term. Internal disturbances, tensions, riots and sporadic acts of
violence are excluded. Protocol 2's Article 1 also requires that
the insurgents exercise control over a part of the territory of a
129 H Booysen Volkereg (1980) 136.
130 See M' Bothe, K Partsch, W Solf New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflicts (1982) 46.
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state in order to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations. Are such lower levels of violence
.1.0 .~cluded from the definition in Article 1(4)? Must the
national liberation movement control territory? In this regard,
Australia stated in explanation of its vote on Article 1(4):
In supporting Article 1 as a whole, Australia understands
that Protocol 1 will apply to armed conflicts which have a
high level of intensity.131
The United Kingdom declared on signature of the Protocol that it
considered that the level of intensity of the conflict "could not
be less than that required for the application of Protocol 2 to
internal conflicts." The fact that under Article 96(3) the
national liberation movement assumes the same rights and
obligations as the HCP's, supports this opinion. But Article 1(4)
has no explicit threshold. The General Assembly, in its
resolutions since 1960, has demanded the application of the 1949
Conventions to wars of national liberation without the condition
of a certain intensity or of control of territory. It is the
nature of the parties to the conflict and not the geo-military
scale of the conflict, which is the objective factor in Article
1(4). Schindler notes that
... it seems to depend not so much on the intensity of the
armed conflict but rather the quality of the authority
representing the liberation movement whether Protocol 1 is
applicable. 132
131 CDDH/1/SR6 at 60.
132 D Schindler "Different Kinds of Armed Conflicts
According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols" 163 Recueil
des Cours (1979) 117 at 140.
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In spite of the fact that Article 1(4) assumes that any violence
between the ANC and Government forces makes the conflict an armed
conflict, the attachment to geo-military thresholds in non-
international armed conflicts and their similarity to the
objective situation in the South African armed conflict, makes
the setting up and reaching of a geo-military threshold a major
issue. This issue requires investigation. In addition, Articles
43 and 44 make it plain that combatants of national liberation
movements must meet requirements of organisation, discipline and
adherence to the law beyond the objective capacity of criminals.
This implies a fairly sophisticated level of combat. Has this
level been reached? South Africa has been labelled a situation of
tension rather than an outright armed conflict.~33 Booysen
accuses the V.N. of legitimising the attack on South Africa
before a. full scale attack has taken place.~34 In 1975, applying
belligerency criteria, especially territorial control, he
concluded that " ... no armed conflict, whether of an internal or
an international character exists in South Africa."~35 However,
hostilities have since escalated to a such a degree that it is
now objectively impossible to regard the situation merely as
tense. While he was Minister of Police, Louis Le Grange said, "As
~33 A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 276.
~34 H Booysen Volkereg (1980) 392.
~35 H Booysen "Terrorists, Prisoners of War and South
Africa" 1 SAYIL (1975) 45.
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far as we are concerned it is war, plain and simple."1.38 In
Appendix A, I have made a brief survey of statistics that show
that Booysen's evaluation of the conflict would be incorrect
today. A high increase in the incidence, intensity, tactical and
technical sophistication of the violence has given the South
African situation the character of a low intensity armed
conflict. It does not yet measur~ up to other wars of national
liberation, such as Algeria's (100 000 casualties over 7 years),
nor is it congruent with the bush wars in the Portuguese colonies
and Zimbabwe. But the conflict has moved into the rural areas of
the Northern Transvaal, Natal and the Homelands as well as being
fought covertly in Angol~, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It
has also seen an increasing incidence of urban bombings,
sabotag~, and the use of terr~r, coupled with large scale
township. unrest. The violence has the potential to escalate. It
must be remembered that the scale of violence in Zimbabwe only
reached a high level in the final four years of the conflict. The
situation in South Africa appears to be in a state of transition
to such a level. It can therefore be argued that the South
African conflict is an armed conflict requiring international
legal regulation.
I have already discussed the meaning of "peoples" under self-
determination.1.37 It is enough to note here that the class of
1.36 1984 SurVey SAIRR 4.
1.37 3.2.2 above.
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community authorised to enjoy the Protocol under Article 1(4) is
limited by the definition of peoples in general international law
and by reference to the rest of the Article. The national
liberation movement is the "authority representing a people."138
It must have a truly representative character. 138 How is this
proved? National liberation movements are seldom in a position to
do so. In the South African context analysts agonise over the
representative nature of the ANC. The incumbent's denial of
political process and freedom is largely responsible for this
uncertainty. 140 However, certain indices of a national liberation
movement's representative character are available. Abi-Saab
argues that a degree of continued effectiveness creates a
presumption of representativeness. 141 Because the ANC has a 70
year history, 26 years of which have involved armed struggle, it
would appear to be effective and therefore representative of the
South African people. This presumption is reinforced by the
opinion of the international community that the ANC is the
legitimate representative of the South African people. But the
best reason to so sanction the ANC is its majoritarian support
among the South African population, the magnitude of which cannot
yet be accurately gauged.
138 Article 96(3).
138 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols" 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 412.
140 Abi-Saab ibid.
141 Gp cit 1979 413.
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Article 1(4) recognises only peoples "who have the right of self-
determination". The right of self-determination is defined by
explicit reference to the U.N. Charter and the ·Friendly
Relations' declaration. There was a broad consensus at the
Conference that the right of self-determination was of narrow
scope and that a broad interpretation was not viable. 142
Subsequent state practice supports this consensus. 143 Ethnic and
minority groups that may technically be governed by the principle
of self-determination under the Charter do not have the right of
self-determination envisaged for certain types of territory by
the Declaration. The former can aspire to self-determination
within a state but must respect its territorial integrity. The
latter have the principle and in addition the ~ight to, in
effect, secede from metropolitan states. Generally this right of
external self-determination only applies to territorially
distinct entities. The exception, as already noted, is the South
African situation.
The already limited field of Article 1(4) is narrowed even
further by the necessity of the national liberation movement
142 Bothe et al. op cit 48 note that no reference is made to
the 1966 Covenants which referred to the right of self-
determination in Article 1, because the Covenants were not in
force, and more importantly, they did not distinguish between
different types of self-determination.
143 For instance a British spokesman pointed out that Article
1(4) did not apply to the IRA - Hansard HC Debates vol 941 col
237 14/12/1977.
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being in contest with one of three specified adversaries. On a
literal reading of Article 1 (4) , the denial of self-
determination is confined to the three cases mentioned. Some
authors argue that the enumeration of specific cases is
illustrative not exhaustive. 144 However, it appears that the
narrow expression given to self-determination in Article 1(4) was
fixed in the .eyes of its sponsors. Is Article 1(4) limited to
conflicts which exhibit all three conditions at the same time?
The text is ambiguous. If all three conditions had to be complied
with, Article 1(4) would not apply to South Africa as South
Africa does not display all three conditions. The correct
interpretation, based on the framers' intentions, is that each
condition is separate, General' Assembly resolutions singled out
racist regimes, i.e., South Africa, as a form of oppression
distinct- from alien occupation and colonial domination and this
conception was
situations are:
carried over to the Conference. The three
(a) "Col.onial domination": The administration of a colonial power
is the classic opponent of those who seek self-determination. 145
Salt-water colonialism involving territorially distinct entities
is envisaged here. 146
(b) "Alien occupation": Such occupation implies direct physical
144 Abi-Saab op cit 1979 397-8.
145 Bothe et al. op cit 50.
146 A review of Third World statements in Committee 1 shows
that Article 1(4) was directed largely at Portuguese colonialism.
See CDDH/1/SR5; CDDH/1/SR6; CDDH/1/SR13.
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presence, but the category does not refer to military occupation
in interstate wars. 147 Abi-Saab uses the theory of internal-
colonialism to conceptualise alien occupation. 148 He argues that
the definition of classic colonial domination was expanded by the
U.N. to include other forms of colonisation denying self-
determination, designated alien domination and racist regimes.
Both are 'colonies of settlement', the telescoping of the
colonial power and colony into the same territory. Colonies of
settlement are the only cases where internal self-determination
has achieved the status of an international legal right. In
theory, cases of alien domination are the true colonies of
settlement;148 racist regimes being a special case.
(c)"Racist regimes": These are a species of 'colonies of
147.Already covered by Article 2 paragraph 2 of the 1940
Conventions.
148 Op cit 1979 394-5.
148 Rosas op cit 272, notes that the drafters had in mind
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and South Africa's
occupation of Namibia. The Namibian conflict is international
given Namibia's international status. It could also be classed as
a racial conflict because of the racist policies implemented
there. On a broader interpretation it could even involve colonial
domination. The Israeli situation is more problematic. It may
also be a racial conflict given the 1975 G.A. pronouncement that
zionism is racism. But the occupation of the West Bank appears to
be full belligerent occupation under Article 2 paragraph 2 of the
1949 Conventions. The position as regards the original territory
of Palestine is contentious, but is outside our scope here.
Schindler op cit 138, argues that alien occupation is limited
only by the cases where occupation in terms of Article 2
paragraph 2 of the Geneva Conventions is not clear cut. Alien
occupation would then apply to all other cases of foreign
occupation. However, it appears that Article 1(4)'s framers
envisaged that only Namibia and Israel were covered by the term.
Alien occupation has not been invoked outside these situations.
125
settlement' where race is the sole criterion of domination. In
this case a regime excludes a part of the population from
political participation in its electoral laws. What of states
where no free elections are held or there is a qualified vote?
Neither Article 1(4) nor the 'Friendly Relations' declaration
seeks to enforce democracy internationally. Article 1(4) only
gives legal weight to internal self-determination in the case
where a state is governed by a racially exclusive government.
Racist regime was introduced into Article 1(4) in order to cover
the struggle for self-determination in South Africa.~5o
In practice, due to, the dearth of examples of colonial
domination, we are left with alien occupation and racist regimes
as the operative terms in Article 1(4), which, "because of the
framer's restrictive intentions, can really only be applied to
South Africa and Israel.~5~
3 4 4 ARTICLE 96(3) - GENESIS
One of the major criticisms of Article 1(4) was that it was
discriminatory, giving national liberation movements rights, but
~50 A close reading of the Conference records reveals that
the South African situation was largely glossed over, and few
state spokesmen were willing to confront the issue openly.
~5~ Bothe et al. op cit 51 point out that the 'Friendly
Relations' declaration was not so restrictive as Article 1(4). A
Cassese in "A Tentative Appraisal of the Old and New Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict" in the New Humanitarian Law Qf Armed
cQnflict VQl.1 (1979) 461 at 469 argues that humanitarianism
would have been better served by a classification based only on
the intensity of the conflict.
126
not imposing obligations on them. As noted, the unofficial
working group that examined the consequences of the proposed
Article 1(4), recommended that it be made explicit that national
liberation movements would bind themselves, in one form or
another, to the Conventions and Protocol. An amendment to this
effect, adding an extra paragraph to Article 84, was put forward
by bi-partisan sponsors. The amendment, which became the new
Article 96(3), was adopted in committee 152 and, forced to the
vote in plenary by Israel, was adopted by an even larger majority
than Article 1, viz.: 93/1(Israel)/2. Article 96(3) reads:
The authority representing a people engaged against a High
Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred
to in Article 1, . paragraph 4, may undertake to.apply the
Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict
by means' of a unilateral declaration addressed to the
depository. Such declaration shall, upon its receipt by the
depository have in relation to that conflict the following
effects:
Ca) the Convention and the Protocol are brought into force
for the said authority as a party to the conflict with
immediate effect;
(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and
obligations as those which have been assumed by a High
Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; and
(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding on
all Parties to the conflict.
3 4 5 THE ANC'S 1980 DECLARATION AND ARTICLE 96(3)
On the 20th of October 1980, Oliver Tambo, General Secretary of
the ANC, handed the President of the ICRC






Africa hereby declares that it intends to
guided by the general principles of
~52 Vote 50/0/14.
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international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflicts.
Wherever practically possible, the ANC of South Africa will
endeavour to respect the rules of the four Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the victims of armed
conflicts and the 1977 additional Protocol 1 relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflicts. 153
Can the ANC make an Article 96(3) declaration? Article 96(3)
requires only that it be an " ... authority representing a people
engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of
the type referred to .in Article 1, paragraph 4". The Article
specifies no further conditions for a national liberation
movement to qualify to make a declaration. The depositary power
need not make a determination of the capacity of the national
liberation movement. It may be that national liberation movements
should be recognised by the appropriate regional
intergovernmental ~rganisation in order to be authorised to issue
a declaration. Such a requirement is in accordance with U.N.
practice and the practice of the Diplomatic Conference. 154 But
IGO approval is politically motivated. Regional organisations
such as the OAU will only recognise national liberation movements
whose adversaries are not OAU members. 155 Moreover, such a
criterion of recognition does not appear explicitly in Article
153 220 ~ (1982) 20.
154 A Turkish proposal, CDDH/1/42, that Article 1 explicitly
apply to recognised national liberation movements only, was
rejected.
155 Abi-Saab op cit 1979 408 raises the example of the
Eritrean Liberation Movement.
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96(3), nor can it be read into the language as it stands. The
problem is partly resolved by recalling the link between Article
96(3) and Article 1(4) and recognising that only national
liberation movements facing the narrow scope of adversaries
listed in Article 1(4) can make an Article 96(3) declaration.~o6
In the light of the above, it is submitted that it is
uncontroversial that the ANC has locus standi in terms of Article
96(3). It nas been recognised by the OAU and the U.N., it
attended the Conference and is involved in an Article 1(4)
conflict.~57
Is, as Ribeiro argues,' a unilateral declaration enough to make
the Protocols and Conventions binding on all parties to the
~56 Paragraph H of the U.K. declaration on signature of the
1977 Protocols states:
In relation to paragraph 3 of Article 96, that only a
declaration made by an authority which genuinely fulfills
the criteria of paragraph 4 of· Article 1 can have the
effects stated in paragraph 3 of Article 96, ~nd that in the
light of the negotiating history it is to be regarded as
necessary also that the authority concerned be recognised as
such by the appropriate regional intergovernmental
organisation.
It seems that recognition is partly constitutive of a national
liberation movement's locus standi.
~57 Several national liberation movements claiming to fight
for the same 'people' creates further problems. They can join
umbrella 'front' organisations, or the most representative one
may be recognised, or all may be recognised. As long as they
struggle for self-determination in terms of Article 1(4) they
meet the conditions to make an Article 96(3) declaration. Thus
the ANC and PAC both technically qualify as national liberation
movements, although the PAC has diminished in substance in recent
years. But if national liberation movements fight each other as
in Angola, then the conflict is not regulated by Protocol 1.
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conflict?158 Ribeiro is incorrect because, as Murray notes,
... the terms of the treaty become binding on the parties to
a conflict only when the declaration in terms of Article 96
is either preceded or followed by a ratification of the
Protocol by the Party against which the liberation movement
is operating. 158
The adversary state must become a High Contracting Party for the
Article 96(3) declaration to bring the law into operation, which
partly explains why the ANC's 1980 Declaration is not an Article
96(3) declaration. 16o The ANC's declaration would only constitute
an Article 96(3) declaration if South Africa was party to
Protocol 1 and it is not. Moreover, the Declaration was not made
in terms of Article 96(3) because it was not addressed to, or
deposited with, the Swiss Federal Council, the depositary
referred to in the Article. In addition, the ANC has not
undertaken to apply the Conventions and Protocols unconditionally
and in their totality.
What is the effect of the ANC's declaration in the light of the
fact that South Africa is not party to the Protocol? Borrowdale
submits that such a declaration will bring into being a situation
analogous to that envisaged in Article 2 paragraph 3 ,of the
Conventions and Article 96(2) of the Protocol, which provide that
parties to the treaties are bound by it in relation to each non-
158 Op cit 1980 64.
158 C Hurray liThe Status of the ANC and SWAPO and
international humanitarian law" 100 ~ (1983) 402 at 406.
160 See A Borrowdale liThe Law of War in South Africa: The
growing debate" 15 elLSA (1982) 31 at 42; Hurray op cit 405.
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party if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.~8~ The onus to adhere then shifts to South Africa. If it
does not adhere, then the ANC can simply ignore its declaration
or continue to bind itself for humanitarian or propaganda
purposes.~82 But as he points out, it is neither realistic nor
reasonable to expect one sided adherence. The ANC must have been
seeking some form of response from the South African Government
when it made its declaration. The Government, however, obviously
feels that it is under no legal obligation at present. It has yet
to respond to the ANC's declaration, which has had little
practical impact.
~a~ Ibid.
182 Borrowdale op cit (1982) 43.
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3.4 6 CRITICISMS OF ARTICLES 1(4) AND 96(3) AS HODES FOR
INCLUDING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARHED CONFLICT WITHIN THE MATERIAL
FIELD OF APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
3.4.6.1 INTRODUCTION
The formation of humanitarian law has always been a political
process. Protocol 1 was no exception. The Western dominance of
law making up until 1949, with its emphasis on the technical
aspects of conventional warfare, was replaced in 1974 by the
preeminence of the Third World, intent upon dealing with its own
problems of unconventional warfare and resolving its own
political issues. Article 1(4) was simply the solution to one of
the more pressing problems of decolonisation. Was it the best
solution? The expanding number of players on the international
stage made that essential element of effective humanitarian law,
consensus, extremely elusive.~63 Article 1(4)'s formation
involved the clash of polarised viewpoints. The stepped-up
intrusion of real politick into the development process in the
1970's, saw the majority using its voting power to weaken the
international position of South Africa.~64 Humanitarian law
became just another area of struggle against South Africa.~65 The
~63 Borrowdale op cit 1982 44.
~64 D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics (1979) 127-8.
~85 Forsythe ibid, cites as an example the Indian delegation,
which spent most of the 1974 session of the Conference trying to
make a law that would burden South Africa and Israel, and thus
hamper their efforts in dealing with the national liberation
movements struggling against them, and then spent most of the
political compromise that resolved previous
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disputes in
humanitarian law was, in respect of Article 1(4), largely absent
between 1974 and 1977. Certainly no common ground was reached
between the adversary states, Israel and South Africa, and the
national liberation movements and their sponsors. Without that
common ground, the law's application became improbable. Article
1(4)'s background, prompts one to ask whether there is a
sufficiently broad consensus that it is the law to override the
South African Government's objection to the concept?168 This
question should be borne in mind while we examine the specific
criticisms of Articles 1(4) and 96(3).
3 4 6.2 THE JUST WAR/ JUS AD BELLUM CRITICISMS
The 'just war' doctrine presupposes that recourse to war is
permissible where the cause is just. It originated in early
Christian thinking. 167 Revived sporadically over the years,18e
the doctrine was linked to wars of national liberation in the
1975 session fighting Protocol 2 governing non-international
armed conflicts, of possible application to India in the case of
internal violence. He emphasizes that this was the prevalent
attitude in the Third World.
166 After Borrowdale op cit 1982 44.
167 G I A D Draper The Christian and War (1962) 19 notes that
it has its origins in the Christian tradition founded by St
Augustine and developed in the middle ages. "It broke down in the
sixteenth century, but was revived by marxists to apply to anti-
colonial/ imperial struggles, even though it had proved
incompatible with civilized standards of warfare.
168 Kellog-Briand Pact 1929; 1950's Algerian war.
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U.N .. 168 Western analysts accuse the Third World of reviving the
doctrine in Article 1(4) and of introducing the ius ad hellum
intothe ....i w.u~s_ ....i.....nL-----Ib""'"e_l...l~o . Some internal wars were to be
international because of the target regime, while others, not
fought for a just cause, remained non-international. In fact, two
different criticisms are made of Article 1(4) under this head:
(a) Article 1,(4) justifies a unilateral resort to force in order
to achieve self-determination, contrary to the provisions of the
U.N. Charter. 17o But there is no provision in Article 1(4)
legalising the resort to arms. It may be present by implication
from the preparatory w0rk of the Conference, but it is not in the
express language. 171 Article 1(4) only refers to the right of
self-determination in general international law through reference
to extrinsic documents. Graham argues that reference to these
documents gives the misleading impression that they sanction a
ius ad bellum. 172 He puts the cart before the horse. The argument
about the ius ad hellum takes place within general international
168 U.N. G.A. Resolutions 2396 (XXIII); 2446 (XXIII); 2806
(XXIV); 2649 (XXV); 2787 (XXVI); 2955 (XXVIII); 3070 (XXVII);
3246 (XXIX); all use the term 'legitimate' i.r.o. wars of
national liberation and at times also use 'just'.
170 D E Graham "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Laws of
War, a Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the Just War
Doctrine of the Eleventh Century" 32 Washington & Lee LR (1975)
43.
171 J E Bond "Amended Article 1 of Draft Protocol 1 to the
'1949 Geneva conventions: the Coming of Age of the Guerilla" 32
Washington & Lee LR (1975) 65 at 76.
172 Gp cit 40.
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law and finds no explicit basis in Article 1(4). To be more
specific, with respect to South Africa, Article 1(4) does not
confer a ius ad bellum on the ANC.
(b) Article 1(4) implies discrimination against the unjust side
and better treatment for the just, thus clashing with the
elementary premise of humanitarian law, the equality of the
parties. This partiality is believed to occur in a number of
ways,~73 viz.: i) Guerrillas fighting for a just cause must not
be held to the same standards of conduct expected of states and
their uniformed combatants. ii) Therefore, guerillas should be
able to use what means 'are necessa~y to attain their desired ends
unrestricted by the law. iii) The restrictions embodied in
traditional legal concepts have been largely formulated by the
regimes opposing the national liberation movements and thus may
be amended and rejected at will. These points are an expansion of
the extreme North Vietnamese position that the opponents of
national liberation movements had no legal rights. More moderate
proponents of Article 1(4) did not support this claim. They were
seeking to increase, not decrease, the number of protected
combatants. They conceived the 'just war' doctrine as restricting
the right of incumbent regimes to do with national liberation
movement combatants as they liked rather than permitting the
combatants of national liberation movements to do as they
173 Graham op cit 40-41.
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pleased.174 The inclusion of a provision in the preamble to
Protocol 1, prohibiting the denial of protections accorded by the
Conventions and Protocol, emphasised their commitment. The aim of
applying the law in the South African armed conflict was to
emancipate ANC combatants from South African criminal
jurisdiction, not to free them of all legal fetters or to
discriminate against the South African Government forces.
Article 1(4) may encourage the escalation of a war of national
liberation because increased protection for combatants may
encourage greater participation and because it may promote third
party intervention on the "just side". But the latter fear is
contradicted by state practice in wars of national liberation not
regulated by Article 1(4) - states do not intervene directly, but
only provide logistical support,175 while the former fear has
never been confirmed because Article 1(4) has not been applied.
Escalation of the conflict in South Africa has more to do with
the intransigence of the Government than with Article 1(4).
3 4 6 3 THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF WARS O~ NATIONAL LIBERATION AS
DEFINED BY ARTICLE 1(4)
Article 1(4) was designed with specific conflicts in mind. Thus
174 S D Bailey Prohibitions and Restraints on War (1972) 84.
175 For example, Mozambique and Zambia did not join the
Patriotic Front in its attack on Rhodesia.
Western Countries" in
of Armed CQnflict (1979)
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it will have a limited effective duration. 178 Cassese criticises
the West for allowing Article 1(4) to incorporate a dated
formula. He argues that it should have included all wars of self-
determination conducted by oppressed peoples. 177 The Australian
solution was to interpret the formula as a number of examples and
not as a closed list. 178 The majority of states, however,
favoured the narrow interpretation because it meant that no vital
interest of theirs was effected. Lysaght notes:
Colonial disengagement almost complete, they were unlikely
to be involved in wars of self-determination as ... South
Africa and Israel were the last frontiers. 179
States that had emerged through a process of external self-
determination would not let the law be used against them. The
many authoritarian regi~es among Article 1(4)'s backers would
have rejected any incorporation of the right of internal self-
determination in situations other than racist regimes. Despite
Article 1(4)'s temporary nature, the South African armed conflict
176 E Rosenblad International Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict (1979) 37, points out that ProtocQl 1 is retrospective,
just as the Hague and Geneva ConventiQns were. It pays no
attention to essential new trends, for example frequent use of
guerilla warfare in non-international cQnflicts. He submits that
it should have included all armed conflicts of an international
character. But most Humanitarian Conventions are an inadequate
respQnse to previQusly experienced problems.
177 A Cassese "A Tentative Reappraisel of the Old and the
New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict" in The New Humanitarian
Law Qf Armed Conflict vol.1 (1979) 468.
1.78 CDDH/1/SR22.
1.79 C Lysaght "The attitude of the
Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian Law
VQl 1 349 at 354.
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still demands humanitarian attention.
3 4 6 4 ARTICLE 1(4) IGNORES THE TRADITIONAL OBJECTIyE CRITERIA
OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMEP
CONFLICTS AND SUBSTITUTES SUBJECTIYE CRITERIA
Three basic criticisms of Article 1(4) have been made under this
general head. 180
(i) Article 1(4) sets no geo-military threshold for application.
Kalshoven registers that Article 1(4) fails to provide any
indication of the level at which a 'struggle' assumes the
character of an armed conflict. 181 As· noted, the U.K. used
Article 1 of Protocol 2, which sets a high objective threshold
for application of Protocol 2, to set a geo-military threshold in
Article 1. 182 E.Luard (MP) stated that this "implies a high level
180 F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed Conflicts: The
first session of the Diplomatic Conference 20 February - 29 March
1974" 5 ~ (1974) 3 at 32.
181 Ibid.
~82 Its declaration on signature of the Final Act of the
Conference reads:
"(a) in relation to Article 1, that the term 'armed
conflict' of itself and in its context implies a level of
intensity of military operations which must be present
before the Conventions and the Protocol· are to apply to any
given situation, and that this level cannot be less than
that required for the application of Protocol 2, by virtue
of Article 1 of that Protocol, to internal conflicts."
Annex to the U.K. Declaration on signature of the 1977 Protocols
- paragraph (a).
of intensity of military operations."~B3 The
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British
interpretation of Article 1(4) has been criticised for attempting
to change the proper meaning of the Article because no such level
of intensity is actually expressed in Article 1(4). Draper
replies that although the Protocol is silent on the point, the
effective functioning of the instrument demands a minimum level
.
of intensity and Article 96(3) requires such an intensity by
necessary implication.~84 Draper ignores the fact that geo-
military capacity as a qualification for application is alien to
interstate wars. Even very low intensity conflicts between states
are international. Nevertheless, Article 1(4)'s exclusion of any
conflict intensity prompts some doubts as to the practicability
of Protocol 1. From the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference,
it appears that the national liberation movements and their
supporters sought to convince sceptics that they did have a high
objective war making capacity. In the discussion of the meaning
of "armed conflict" in Article 1(4),~85 it was noted that it can
be argued that the South African armed conflict has reached an
intensity requiring international regulation.
(ii) Article 1(4)'s complete rejection of geo-military criteria
makes it uniquely contradictory of international law. This
~83 Haosard H/e Debates vol 941 col 237 14/12/1977.
~84 G Draper





of the Geneva Conventions
of 1978" 164 Recueil des
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criticism contrasts Article 1(4) with the customary distinction
between international and non-international armed conflicts made
on the basis of geo-military scale. Only when an internal
conflict reached a certain intensity did it become international
for the purposes of the application of humanitarian law. Thus, a
war of national liberation was internal " if viewed
objectively".18S But the desuetude of the customary modes
heralded the demise of geo-military considerations in the
internationalisation of internal armed conflicts and they were
finally abandoned at the 1974 Diplomatic Conference. Article 1(4)
is not unique in ignoring these considerations. The law always
ignores objective factors when it assumes that all conflicts
between states always have the capacity to become large scale.
The only criterion for the classification of interstate conflicts
as international is that they take place between distinct
international subjects. 187 Article 1(4) assumes, like Article 2
of the 1949 Conventions, that .any act of violence, no matter how
small, between the official armed forces of international
subjects, usually states but in this case states and national
liberation movements, constitutes international armed conflict.
1.86 CDDH/1/SR3 at 37 - Italian delegate.
1.87 A far more radical approach than Article 1(4) was the
proposition by certain Western states that the distinction
between international and non-international armed conflicts be
eliminated entirely and replaced by purely objective criteria
related to different standards of protection. Norway urged such
an abolition but, failing that, supported Article 1(4) because it
constituted the largest possible scope for humanitarian law. It
was foiled when the success of Article 1(4) was followed by the
emasculation of Protocol 2.
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(iii) Article 1(4)'s definition is subjective and arbitrary.
Cassese, dividing Article 1(4) into two elements, notes that one
of these, the government against which a war of liberation is
fought is objectively defined as either a colonial regime, a
racist regime or an alien occupying pow~r.~ee Such governments
objectively exist,~ee the present South African Government being
an example. Cassese argues that the other element of the
definition, the national liberation movement representing a
'people' , is not clearly identified in Article 1(4).
Consequently, it appears that any movement or rebellious group
struggling against one of the aforementioned classes of
government may claim that it is engaged in an international armed
conflict. Abi-Saab, however, argues that the characterisation of
the liberation movement in Article 1(4) is not based on
subjective criteria.~8o He notes that Article t(4) does not refer
to the intention of liberation movements but to their objective
situation and whether or not that situation warrants the
application of the principle of self-determination. Both Cassese
and Abi-Saab use objective in the sense of the objective nature
188 A Cassese 'A tentative reappraisal of the old and the new
humanitarian law of armed conflict' in A.Cassese (ed) The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979) vol.1 467.
~e8 A point made inter alia by Cassese op cit 467; G Abi-Saab
'Wars of National liberation in the Geneva Conventions and




of the parties involved. This accords with the definition of
international armed conflict as taking place between distinct,
objectively identifiable, subjects of international law. The
narrow selection of· adversary states and national liberation
movements may appear arbitrary, but it is a result of the
restrictions placed on self-determination as a legal right
because of the slow but politically realistic development of
existing legal categories.
3 4 6 5 ARTICLE 1(4) IGNORES RECIPROCAL/ COROLLARY OBLIGATIONS
Draper feels
... that the international community is likely to be
confronted by entities bound by a body of humanitarian law
that they are unable to apply even if they had the will to
do SO.181
Can national liberation movements be regulated by rules adapted
to regulate states? The law relies heavily on the municipal law
and orgariisational infrastructure of states, together with the
threat or use of reprisals, to ensure compliance. 182 The
infrastructural weakness of national liberation movements may
lead to non-observance of the law because it undermines
reciprocity. South African soldiers instructed to treat ANC
181. G I A D Draper "Wars of National Liberation and War
Criminality" in M Howard (ed) Restraints 00 War (1979) 135 at 159.
182 The traditional point of view is that
... the law of armed conflict should not regulate non state
parties, for this would eliminate the reciprocity between
juridically equal states which is one of the primary
inducements for obedience to the law.
D P Forsythe "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law"
69 American JIL (1975) 81; CDDH/1/SR2 at 12-14; CDDH/1/81 at 5.
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guerrillas according to the law on capture, will not do so if
they cannot expect similar treatment from the ANC. As Draper's
statement outlines, it becomes a question of two factors:
(i) The ability of the national liberation movement to implement
the Conventions and Protocol.
Draper expresses two specific doubts as to this ability.183
Firstly, he questions how the complex requirements of penal
enforcement of the Conventions and Protocol are to be met by
national liberation movements. Do they have the penal law system,
judicial apparatus, substantive and procedural law to, for
instance, govern a trial of a person charged with· a 'grave
breach' of the Conventions or Protocol? What law would govern his
extradition to a third state for trial? Secondly, Draper asks how
the provisions of Geneva Convention 4 relating to occupied
territory are to be enforced? Who are 'protected persons' for the
purposes of the Convention? Members of national liberation
movements are of the same nationality as the incumbent and thus
under Article 4 are precluded from protection. Draper's doubts
are valid. The Conventions especially, envisage a stable battle
zone and ~ophisticated infrastructural resources in a conflict
between states with citizens and territories of their own. As
Bond notes,
... the very fact that they (national liberation movements)
193 G I A 0 Draper "The implementation of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1978" 164
Recueil des Cours (1979) 1 at 48.
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are guerrillas rather than governors precludes their acting
like the latter; and to the degree that the law imposes
obligations on governors qua governors, the guerrillas will
be unable to comply.184
It would be unrealistic to expect an organisation like the ANC to
observe the detailed provisions of all four of the 1949
Conventions and Protocol 1. Dinstein cites this as a good reason
for rejecting Articles 96(3) and 1(4).18~ Despite these problems,
it has been submitted that the common sense solution is to impose
the obligations that can be fulfilled. 186 This would disturb the
balance of reciprocity, but it would leave some enforceable law,
a better situation than no law at all. Protection for lawful
combatants would be easily adhered to. The fact that one party is
a state is no guarantee of adherence and the fact that the other
party is not is no guarantee of non-adherence. Lysaght's solution'
is to draw an analogy with common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which urges parties to an Article 3 conflict to make
special agreements bringing into force "all or part of the other
provisions of the Convention." The Conventions and Protocol would
be applied in Article 1(4) conflicts in so far as they are
capable of application. 18? Bothe et al., Draper and Aldrich, all
184 Gp cit 1975 76.
185 Y Dinstein 31 American University L8 (1982) 850.
18B W Mallison and S V Mallison
Privileged Combatants under the
concerning international conflicts" 42
Problems (1978) 4 at 74.
"The 'Juridical Status of
Geneva Protocol of 1977
(2) Law and Contemporary
18? C Lysaght liThe Attitude
Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian
(1979) 352.
of the Western Countries" in A
Law of Armed Conflict vol.!
144
take issue with this point of view, insisting that it is· not
admissable to argue that a party to a conflict does not have at
its disposal the material means of organisation to comply with
the Protocol because an Article 96(3) declaration cannot be made
without the material conditions necessary for fulfillment of all
obligations under the Conventions and the Protocol. 1s8 Aldrich
concludes that the Conventions and Protocol do not apply to wars
of national liberation because few, if any, national liberation
movements would have the ability to carry out such obligations
unless they were about to succeed in becoming the government of a
state and would therefore be unlikely to file Article 96(3)
declarations. At the Conference the national liberation movements
asserted that they were fully capable of implementing all the
obligations, but the ANC's limited commitment suggests otherwise.
Nevertheless, Aldrich's argument avoids the fact that many states
will also undertake the obligations of the Conventions and
Protocols by becoming party to them without possessing the
infrastructure to actually implement them. Yet, unlike national
liberation movements, these states will not be required to prove
their ability to comply. Their ability will be assumed. Imposing
such strict criteria of ability to comply also ignores the
similar problems facing organised resistance movements under
Article 4A(2) of Geneva Convention 3, which ·does not prevent the
188 Bothe et al. op cit 43-44; Draper 164 Recueil loc cit;
G Aldrich "Progressive development of the laws of war: A reply
to the criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol 1" 26 Virginia JIL
(1986) 694 at 701-2.
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corpus 'of the law being applied to resistance movements. The
question of compliance in these situations is a question of the
operation of the law once it is applied, not an issue of
application. Therefore, it is submitted that the ability to
comply with general principles should be regarded as adequate for
national liberation movements. Capability of full compliance
cannot serve as a conditiorr for preventing or invalidating
Article 96(3) declarations by national liberation movements,
such as the the ANC. What is more, wars of national liberation go
through stages and are not always by definition
unconventional. 199 The ANC might regard the basic infrastructural
requirements as being met by its organisational structures in the
'safe harbours' of the Frontline States and through its covert
structures within South Africa, until such time as it liberates
territory and establishes permanent bases in South Africa. The
representative of FRELIMO at the Conference claimed that,
... it has been shown in practice that, despite disparities
in the resources of the parties involved, nothing prevented
the national liberation movements from respecting the
principles of humanitarian law. 2oo
Violations of the letter of the law would occur, but they are
just as likely to occur in interstate conflicts. Perhaps,
therefore, a more important consideration is:
199 Abi-Saab op cit 1979 383.
200 CDDH/1/SR3.
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(ii) The willingness of national liberation movements to comply.
The FRELIMO representative also said:
The essential requirement indeed [is] not the technical
apparatus or the material means, but the will to apply the
principles of humanitarian law and the political outlook of
the parties. 201
The ANC's 1980 Declaration indicates an obvious interest in
a?plying the law. Nonetheless, its adherence record is grim. 202
The recurrent practice of making the civilian population the
object of attack, despite its professed strategy of avoiding
attacking soft targets,203 is in direct violation of
international law. But the low impact of the law is also due to a
lack of reciprocity. The South African Government has made little
effort in the humanitarian field. 204
Ultimately, we must recall that the rationale for applying
humanitarian law in the South African armed conflict is to
restrain anti-humanitarian behaviour rather than apply highly
technical obligations. It is submitted that the best course for
both sides in the South African armed conflict to follow would be
201 CDDH/l/SR14 at 20.
202 The adherence records of national liberation movements
are not good. In the Portuguese colonies their record was
dubious. The law failed in Zimbabwe because ZANU denied the
applicability of any law.
203 See Appendix A.
204 J Bond 32 Washiogtoo & Lee L8 (1975) notes at 77 that
incumbent regimes seldom hamstring themselves when dealing with
guerrillas who torment them; contra Graham 32 Washington & Lee LR
(1975) 45.
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a policy of flexible application of the law, concentrating on its
core principles and only applying the more detailed law when it
becomes possible. As Lysaght noted, common Article 3 of the
Conventions anticipates such an approach by allowing for separate
agreements to bring more of the law into operation. Given the
nature of the adversaries, such agreements in the South African
situation are likely at best to be only tacit understandings
based on strict reciprocity. Each party would sanction technical
violations by the other, concentrating rather on adherence to the
rules that prohibited unnecessary destruction and suffering,
torture, terrorism, and violations of lawful combatant status and
P.O.W status. These types of rules are easiest to comply with
because they do not rely on infrastructure, but on the political
will of the opposing sides. Violations of these rules are also
more conspicuous from the point of view of international opinion,
a potent force for compliance. An even more potent force for
compliance is that ugly face of reciprocity, reprisals. As the
ZANU spokesman at the conference said:
It was obvious that in the absence of legally enforceable
provisions in the Conventions that would ensure that they
were respected in all circumstances, the only thing that
would make the parties to the conflict respect the
Conventions would be the knowledge that whatever acts were
committed by one party would be committed by the others. The
liberation movements could take prisoners, they could attack
enemy civilians, they could take hostages and they cpuld
give no quarter. 205
Reprisals are a common practice in the South African conflict.
ANC bomb attacks are followed by SADF cross border raids,
205 CDDH/l/SR6.
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township massacres by ANC offensives. In Vietnam, the granting of
lawful combatant status to the Vietcong only occurred after
United States prisoners were threatened with execution unless
such status was accorded. Similar incidents occurred in Algeria.
Once a national liberation movement takes prisoners, the
complexion of the incumbent's attitude to lawful combatant status
and P.O.W status changes. Moreover, as the legal context of the
South African armed conflict alters, the conduct of both sides
must alter. The law is self-reinforcing.
The ANC's 1980 Declaration points to such a flexible response to
the law. It has undertaken to apply the practicable general
principles of the law. The declaration appears to be, if not a
rejection of Article 1(4) and Article 96(3), at least a tacit
admission by the ANC that the machinery in Protocol 1 for
applying the law in toto is unlikely to lead to its application.
The overture calls for a reciprocal response from the South
African Government.
3.4 6 6 ARTICLE 1(4) HAS A BUILT IN NON-APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 1(4) is unlikely to be useful as conventional law because
of its wording, especially the labels "colonial," "alien" and
"racist" attached to the incumbent regimes. Norms of justice are
not alien to international treaty law, but they are non-
functional when they not only require relaxation of state
sovereignty, but impose what are formally unacceptable labels on
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the target government, no matter how correct those labels may be.
Such governments, either will not become parties to the Protocol,
or if they do, will not agree that they are colonial, alien or
racist. 206 The Israeli explanation of its vote against Article
1(4) is symptomatic:
Draft Article 1, paragraph 4 had within it a built in non-
applicability clause since a party to it would have to admit
that it was either racist, alien or colonial - definitions
which no state would admit to. 207
The South African Government will never admit to being "racist"
and thus will never become party to the Protocol. The problem for
the sponsors of Article 1(4) was how to keep its scope so narrow
that it would not impinge upon their own sovereignty. The
solution of using the three labels, was, in effect, no solution
at all. Although the labels were suitable for use in the U.N.
where the majority could impose them on the target state, they
were of no use in a treaty because they destroyed any possibility
of agreement with those nations that were to apply the treaty. In
fact, many Western delegations only withdrew their opposition to
Article 1(4) when they realised that not only was it unlikely
that it would be applied to them, it was unlikely ever to
constitute successful treaty law. Article 1(4) became something
of a hollow victory. Not one Article 96(3) declaration has yet
been made. The ANC appears instead to have moved the application
206 Borrowdale 15 CILSA (1982) 48; G Roberts "The New Rules
for Waging War: The Case against Ratification of Additional




of humanitarian law outside the rigid parameters of Articles 1(4)
and 96(3).
3 4 6 7 SUMMARY OF CRITICISMS, ATTITUDES AND ALTERNATIVES
Because Article 1(4)'s backers concentrated on its usefulness as
an instrument in the general political struggle against colonial,
alien, and racist regimes, while its detractors concentrated on
its technical deficiencies, consensus was lost. We are left with
two competing norms; one supportive of the internationalisation
of wars of national liberation, politically strong but legally
shaky; the other arguing that those conflicts are non-
international, legally'stronger but politically weak. In essence,
the concept of internationalising certain wars of self-
determination can be accommodated within the structure of
international law, but the language of Article 1(4) was not the
correct means to achieve this accommodation. 2oe
In the South African armed conflict, Article 1(4) left the ball
in the Government's 'court; where it will probably remain. The
South African Government has not become a party to the Protocol
nor is it likely to. Thus as treaty law the Article has not
advanced nor will it advance humanitarianism in South Africa. Are
208 Lysaght op cit 360 feels that a better solution would
have been to apply the corpus of the law in full to conflicts
attaining a certain level of violence, disregarding the
international/non-international dichotomy, which is the source of
most problems of application. But such a solution was, and
probably remains, politically unacceptable.
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we then left with a humanitarian vacuum in the South African
conflict?20e It is possible that the South African Government
would have rejected Article 1(4) even if it had been couched in
more acceptable terms. Indeed, the sponsors of Article 1(4),
realising the impossibility.of the acceptance by South Africa of
the concept that wars of national liberation are international
armed conflicts in treaty law, may have had its transformation
into custom as their long term goal. An examination of the
possibility of such a transformation is called for.
208 Borrowdale's fear, op cit 1982 56.
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3- 5 THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
3,5.1 INTRODUCTION
The compilers of the Encyclopedia of International Law note: .
Against the target state's/government's objections to
entering into formal treaty relations with liberation
movements, scholars and state representatives supporting the
cause of liberation have argued that wars of liberation are
international wars according to customary international law
and that the treatment of members of liberation movements as
combatants and P.O.W's is a matter of ius cogens derived
from the principle of self-determination within the context
of decolonisation. 21o
The transformation of the notion of the international character
of wars of national' liberation into a rule of custom is
controversial. It is the aim of this section to ascertain whether
or not a new rule of custom to this effect has come into
existence at the time of writing. But before we do this, a brief
word must be said about the formation of international custom.
3 5.2 FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 211
The two essential elements required to establish a custom are
state practice and opinio iuris. 212
210 Encyclopedia of International Law Vol 3 (1982) 248.
211 See generally, I Brownlie
International Law (1973) Sff.
Principles of Public
212 Article 38(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice defines "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law." Although logically incorrect in that
it is the practice which provides the evidence of the custom the
Article contains the two essential elements of custom. J
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Villiger defines state practice as
••• anyact, articulation or other behaviour of a state, as
long as the behaviour in question discloses the states
conscious attitude with respect to its recognition of a
customary rule. z13
State practice provides evidence of the formation of the
customary rule. It includes a state's abstract as well as
concrete actions. 214 The state practice must be (i) general.
Common and widespread practice, not universality, is required. 218
The state practice must be (ii) uniform and consistent. The
practice must be identical under generally uniform
circumstances. z1b The practice must be consistently applied in
the sense that single parties cannot, and do not, alter it. The
(iii) duration of practice varies according to the objective
requirements of the establishment of the rule. In general there
is no set period,217 but a practice requiring repeated repetition
must last the required duration, while a practice requiring only
one act may bring the rule into existence immediately.21.
Opinio iuris can be defined as an awareness upon the part of a
213 M E Villiger Customary International Law and Treaties
(1985) 4.
214 M Akehurst "Custom as a Source of International Law" 45
BYBIL (1974/5) 1 at 3-4.
Brownlie op cit 7.
D P O'Connel International Law (1970) vol 2 15.
217 Brownlie op cit 6. Cf Asylum Case 1950 ICJ Reports 296ff.
218
42-43.
Akehurst op cit 15. Cf North Sea Cases ICJ Reports 1969
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state that it follows a certain practice because that practice
arises from a legal obligation or right. 218 Because of its
abstract nature, ocinio is normally inferred from practice. 22o
The two elements have a dynamic relationship. The less conclusive
the state practice, the clearer must be the evolving opinio
iuris. 221
Generally, customary rules bind all states whether they assent
thereto or not. But customary rules do not bind states that
dissociate themselves, either expressly or by implication, from
the formation of such rules. States seeking to dissociate
themselves from a rule must unequivocally and steadfastly oppose
themselves to the formative process of the rule. 222 Sustained
objection to the emergence of a custom by many states may prevent
that emergence by negating state practice and a general opinio
iuris.
3 5 3 RELEVANT SOURCES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF
ARTICLE 1(4) INTO CUSTOM
Written observations by states on draft texts to bodies like the
ICRC, statements made in the General Assembly or in other li.N.
organs, votes on U.N. resolutions, statements at diplomatic
218 North Sea· Continental Shelf Case 1969 ICJ Reports 28.
220 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969 ICJ Reports 43ff.
221 Villiger op cit 28.
222 Fisheries Case 1951 ICJ Reports 116,131.
155
conferences, amendments labeled at such debates, explanations of
votes, interpretive declarations, reservations made in connection
with the adoption of a text, are all instances of state
practice.223 Mere participation in a conference has no connection
with a concrete rule and possesses no value as practice. Votes on
single draft rules and draft texts as a whole are significant,
both vis a vis the individual states and with respect to the
state community. Large votes for or against a rule either erode
or build a communal opioio. But all these actions are abstract
and are not unequivocal, requiring further material practice to
circumscribe and apply the contents of the rule in question. 224
Treaties can incorporate existing customary law. They may in the
course of time also come to be regarded as evidence of customary
law. 225 The conduct of states in connection with their
contractual obligations - signature, ratification or accession-
and subsequent application of a treaty, is crucial to gauging its
evidential weight. However, the passage of the general principles
of a treaty into custom applicable to non-parties to the treaty
will not be immediate even if the vast majority of states became
a party to it because, as Baxter Dotes, there is DO such thing as
223 Villiger op cit 8.
224 Loc cit.
225 R R Baxter "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of
Customary International Law" 41 aY81L (1965/6) 275 at 278.
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international legislation. 228 The superficial unanimity of, for
instance, the 1949 Conventions, is undermined by a large number
of reservations and understandings. Baxter does believe that the
number of state parties is "roughly proportionate" to I a treaty's
evidential weight. 227 Separate proof of an opinio that the treaty
is declaratory of custom or contains custom does clarify matters.
Such proof can be had from statements made about customary law in
the text of a treaty or statements made subsequent to the
treaty's conclusion that assert that at the time of adoption it
constituted custom or that it had come to reflect the rules of
custom since its adoption. 228 The burden of proof lies on he who
asserts that a treaty contains custom. He must adduce evidence of
state practice and opinio from the time of adoption of the text
of the treaty to the date of the issue of application.
3 5 4 ARTICLE 1(4) AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.5,4 1 INTRODUCTION
The debate has focussed on Protocol 1 as the foundation of a
226 Baxter op cit 1965/6 286.
227 Baxter op cit 1965/6 277. Villigei loc cit argues that
something more is required.
228 A Borrowdale "The Future of the Law of War: The Place of
the Additional Protocols in Customary International law" 14 CILSA
(1981) 79 at 88.
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custom internationalising certain wars of national liberation. 229
What must be proved?, Sufficient evidence must be adduced to
support a customary rule that the South African armed conflict
is, as provided in Article 1(4), international. This evidence
must establish the existence of state practice in respect of such
a rule and an opinio that it is law. International law provides
little assistance as to the level of proof necessary.
3.5 4 2 AT THE 1974-77 CONFERENCE
The Conference records indicate that the proposed Article 1 was
greeted with apprehension by some and welcomed by others. Several
delegates were of the opinion that Article 1 incorporated
existing law as developed in the D.N .. 230 The Egyptian delegate
said:
We are just proposing to them to state explicitly in the
"field of humanitarian law what they have already accepted as
existing and binding law within the framework of the U.N.
and general international law. 231
If such sentiments were correct, it would make proving Article
1(4)'s transformation into custom irrelevant because· the concept
it contains would already be custom. But one would have to accept
that U.N. activities before 1974, especially General Assembly
228 For a definitive study see: A Borrowdale "The Future of
the Law of War: The Place of the Additional Protocols in
Customary International law" 14 CILSA (1981) 79ff.
230 CDDH/1/SR22 at 1 and 15 - Romania.
231 CDDH/1/SR2 at 20. See also K Asmal The Status of the
Combatants of the Liberation Movement of South Africa under the
Geneva Conyentions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol 1 of 1977 (1980) 7.
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resolutions, were a fons et origo of such a rule of custom, an
extremely tenuous proposition because of their abstract nature.
Although by 1974 the principle of self-determination had become a
part of general international law, it is fairly certain that
concept of the international nature of wars of national
liberation had not. That the concept was viewed as innovative
before the 1974 Conference, is evident from the objections raised
against Abi-Saab's liberal interpretation of "power" in Article 2
paragraph 3 of the Conventions. Most Western delegates saw
Article 1(4) as innovatory and by "no means a formalisation of
the 1 "232aw. Socialist states also regarded it as an
innovation. 233 The extreme position, taken by Israel, was that
Article 1(4) violated accepted legal norms. At the Conference,
apparent consensus on Article 1(4) was achieved, despite Western
problems with the Article, partly because there was no perceived
threat to their interests and partly because of their desire to
make concessions in order to keep the Conference going. The
problems certain states had with Article 1(4) reemerged on the
signing of the Final Act of the Conference - the UK's declaration
limiting the Article's operation to high intensity conflicts
being a case in point. Many Western nations accepted the
principle of Article 1(4), but were opposed to the terminology or
232 H Hallison and V Hallison "The Juridical Status of
Privileged Combatants under the Geneva Protocol of 1977
Concerning International Conflicts" 42(2) Law and Contemporary
Problems (1978) 18; C Hurray 33 ~ 465.
233 See the statements of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Syria
in CDDH/1/SR2 at 6ff.
possible inroads on their sovereignty.
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The problem of
practicability was an added doubt, more deep rooted than
cosmetic. It is possible that many nations signed the Final Act
in the belief that the Article would never become effective law.
Only Israel indicated resolute opposition to the Article at the
Conference by consistently voting against it. But the other
protagonist, South Africa, had indicated its opposition by
leaving the Conference very early on. The signing of the Final
Act was an instance of state practice, but it carries little
weight because such signature does not bind states. It is evident
that at the conclusion of the Conference Article 1(4) had not
been transformed into custom. Further evidence of state practice
and opinio was necessary.
3.5.4 3 RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION
Ratification or accession, processes by which states legally bind
themselves, are of significance when adjudging the evidentiary
weight of state practice in respect of Article 1(4). Mallison and
Mallison state:
If Protocol 1 becomes a widely ratified multilateral
convention, and the major military powers are included among
the state parties, there is strong reason to believe that
Article 1(4) will be accepted as prescribing a standard or
norm of international law. 234
The rate of ratification and accession of Protocol 1 began
tardily, but has taken off in recent years. In 1979 there were 11
234 Op cit 18.
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parties. 235 In 1980, there were 17. 236' By the beginning of 1982
there were 21. 237 At the beginning of 1986, 57 states had become
party to Protocol 1. 238 By the end of that year, the number had
increased to 66, exactly forty percent of the number of states
party to the Geneva Conventions. 238 These include a number of
Western powers, such as Italy, originally opposed to Article 1.
But major military powers such as the United States have not
become a party to Protocol 1. 66 states is a substantial number,
constituting just under forty percent of the international
community, but it is not substantial enough. Only if the whole or
a very substantial part of the international community were party
to Protocol 1 would Article 1(4)'s transformation into custom be
unequivocal. The norm may have been established between the
states already party to Protocol 1. But it cannot regulate the
nations to which such a norm must apply because it fails the test
of generality of practice.
235 F Ribeiro "Humanitarian
Backwards" 97 SA1.J. (1980) 42.
Law: Advancing Rapidly
236 A Roberts & R Guelff (eds) Documents on the Laws of War
(1982) 459-460.
237 C Hurray "The Status of the ANC and SWAPO in
International Humanitarian Law" 100 SA1.J. (1983) 402 at 404.
238 251 ~ (1986) 112. Italy was the 57th state to become a
party to Protocol 1 - 27 February 1986. It was also the 50th
state to become party to Protocol 2 .
238 256 TOD~ (1986). Sl'xty states, . 1 d' g F~ Inc u In ranee, are
party to Protocol 2.
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3,5 4 4 SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL AS SPECIALLY AFFECTED STATES
As noted, Israel opposed the formation of Article 1(4) - voting
consistently against it and not becoming party to the Protocol,
By leaving the Conference in 1974, not signing the Protocol, and
continuing to treat the matter as an internal affair, the South
African Government has also dissociated itself from the existence
of any customary norm aimed specifically at South Africa,240 It
is, however, more than a question of dissociation. When the only
two states who can actually apply such a norm - South Africa and
Israel consistently dissociate themselves from the formative
processes of such a norm, the emergence of the norm itself
becomes endangered, 241
stipulated that
In the North Sea Cases 242 the ICJ
... a very widespread and representative participation in the
(1958 Continental Shelf) Convention might suffice of itself,
provided it included that of states whose interests were
specially affected.
Specially affected states were those coastal nations which
possessed a continental shelf as opposed to landlocked states
that had no special interest. Villiger notes that this implies
that " ... without the practice of specially affected states, a
customary rule could not arise, nor continue to exist." 243 South
Africa and Israel may be regarded as specially affected states.
240 Israel denies it explicitly - see C J R Dugard 10 SAYIL
(1984) 35 at 53.
241 See Villiger op cit 13.
242 1969 ICJ Reports 43.
243 Ibid.
Without their participation· it can,
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despite widespread
international participation, be argued on the basis of the North
Sea Cases that no 'custom internationalising the' armed conflicts
within the two states can arise. 244 There are historical
precedents for binding states against their will, for example,
the eradication of the slave trade. The Fisheries Case245
provides some precedent for establishing a customary rule binding
on a state which rejects the rule in question, but only where
that rejection is minor. Although there is no doubt that the tide
of international opinion has swung strongly against South Africa,
we find ourselves in something of a legal twilight zone. The
situation calls for a closer look at the target states'. municipal
practice to gauge whether or not they are as hostile to the
formation of such a norm as they appear to be.
3 5 4.5 MUNICIPAL PRACTICE
Municipal practice provides indirect evidence that affected
states are beginning to pay attention to humanitarian law. Israel
244
245
o Schindler 163 Recueil des Cours (1979) 136 sums it up:
It must be emphasised that the question whether wars of
national liberation can be regarded as international
conflicts is ... not a question of whether a new rule
of customary law has developed. A rule of customary law
may well have come into existence with regard to the
principle of self-determination, but not with regard to
the application of the Geneva Conventions to wars of
national liberation. The requirements for a new rule of
customary law in this respect are hardly fulfilled, as
the states particularly affected by such a rule as well
as other important states have consistently taken up
against it.
1951 ICJ Reports 116,138.
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is, according to the International Commission on its invasion of
Lebanon, obliged to give P.O.w. status to captured PLO
combatants. 248 The Israeli Government rejects such suggestions
and denies that they are customary law, a view confirmed by its
courts in Military Prosecutor v Omar Mobamed Kassem247 and Jab'r
y Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Regions.2~8 But the
Israeli Government has not ignored the new developments in the
law entirely. It undertook to extend to PLO combatants in Lebanon
the general principles of humanitarian law embodied in Geneva
Convention 4 (Civilians), including ICRC and legal access. 248 In
1981 the death penalty was abolished in occupied territory.
Dugard notes that as 'a result PLO combatants are not martyred
like their ANC counterparts in South Africa. 25o In Israel itself,
the death penalty is a competent penalty, but only two executions
have taken place since 1948. 251 Israeli practice does not accord
with its stated position. PLO combatants are accorded a de facto
special status and special treatment, viz.: special military






Dugard op cit 1984 51.
1971 42 ILR 470.
13 Israeli Year Book of Human Rights (1983) 339.
Dugard op cit 1984 52.
Ibid.
251 Dugard loc cit, notes that in December 1983 an Israeli
court sentenced two Israeli Arabs to death for murdering a
soldier on instructions of Al Fatah. Dugard says that the
prosecutor never asked for the death sentence and officials and
academics assured him that the sentence would be altered on appeal.
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Rubin illustrates that this tendency of labelling 'terrorists' as
criminals while in fact treating them as P.D.W's, is common in
states denying the applicability of the law of armed conflict. 252
He notes that in Vietnam, the Vietcong were classed as P.D.W's
without regard to the technical question of status, where on a
strict application of the Geneva Conventions it wotild have been
denied. 253 In Ulster the British Government has granted
'political prisoner' treatment to the IRA, but not political
prisoner status. In Italy the Red Brigade also gets special
treatment. 254 Towards the end of the Algerian conflict the French
courts began to grant P.D.W status to FLN combatants. 255 Rubin
sums up the trend:
Arguably, the behaviour of states and defending governments·
ref·lects, as part of the lawmaking process, a series of
political evaluations developing parallel to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. These evaluations may be better suited to the
realities of modern armed conflict than the legal categories
established by the Conventions. The treatment accorded to
captured 'terrorists' in practice more closely conforms to
the underlying principles of humanitarian law than the
Geneva formulation would require and may· spring from the
same humanitarian roots. The formulation however remains
unmodified, possibly reflecting the statesman's desire to
reserve to themselves the legal discretion asymmetrically
advantageous to defending governments under the present
treaty formulation. 256
252 A P Rubin "Terrorism and the Laws of War" 12 Denyer
Journal of International Law and Policy (1983) 219 at 220.
253 Gp cit 226.
254 Rubin op cit 227.
255 E Rosenblad International Law of Armed Conflict (1979) 84.
256 Lac cit.
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Rubin does not mention South Africa, but he may well have. South
African municipal law regards ANC guerrillas as criminals guilty
of common law crimes, such as treason, and statutory crimes, such
as terrorism under the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. 257 A
number of recent cases indicate, however, that the municipal
position is not as consistent as the black letter criminal law
would have us believe. As in Israel, the South African
Government, in the form of its judicial arm, reacts sensitively
to international opinion in what is technically occupied
territory - Namibia. In S y Sagarius,2S8 three SWAPO members were
convicted of participating in terrorist activities in terms of
the Terrorism Act 83 of 1967. Evidence before the court showed
that the accused were part of a group of 22 guerrillas who had
infiltrated Namibia from Angola armed with automatic rifles and
explosives. They engaged in sabotage and were subsequently
captured by the SADF after a skirmish. They were wearing the
distinctive blue denim SWAPO uniform. The death sentence was
competent but there was no evidence of the accused having caused
death. Professor J.Dugard was called as an expert witness for the
257 Implicit in this approach is the judgement of the old
English case Proceedings against Aeneas Hacdonald alias Angus
Hacdonald (1747) 18 SI TR 858 at 868 (BritiSh Int. Law Cases
Vol.4 522 at 523). The court held that:
Because by the laws of all nations subjects taken in arms
against their lawful prince, are not considered prisoners of
war, but as rebels, and are liable for the punishment
ordinarily inflicted on rebels.
258 1983 (1) SA 833 (SWA). Commented on extensively by Hurray
op cit 100 ~ 402ff.
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defence. Noting that South Africa, not having become party to the
1977 Protocols and not bound by them, was not obliged to confer
P.D.W. status on SWAPO members, he suggested
... that there is support for the view that this position has
become part of customary international law, part of the
common law of international law. In my judgement this
'argument is premature, in that Protocol 1 has not yet
received that support that it is part of international law,
binding upon states that have not ratified the Convention.
Yes, I have already expressed the view that in' my judgement
a South African Court has no option but to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over SWAPO; that a court cannot simply direct
that members of SWAPO be treated as P.O.W's. Nevertheless,
it is my view that having regard to the new developments in
international humanitarian law as reflected in Protocol 1 of
1977 and having regard to the special status of a Namibian,
that such factors should be taken into account when it comes
to the imposition of a sentence, and in particular it is my
view that the court may have regard to these developments
when it comes to the question of the death penalty because
the Convention of P.O.W's of 1949 makes it clear that a
P.D.W. may not be executed by the detaining power for
military activities prior to 'his arrest unless they amounted
to war crimes. 258
Dugard argued not for the legal diminishment, but for the moral
diminishment of the accused's guilt - extenuating circumstances-
because of the trends established in Protocol 1. Although he
ruled that South Africa was not bound by Protocol 1 and thus
intern~tional law served as no legal excuse for the accused's
crimes,280 Bethune J held that the developments were relevant at
the sentencing stage.
In die getuienis is daarop gewys dat daar 'n neiging in die
internasionale reg is om gevangene wat openlik in n
kenmerkende uniform deelgeneem aan n wapenstryd teen
koloniale, rasistiese of vreemde moonthede, die status van
258
260
At 836. Quoted by Hurray op cit 1983 ~ 406.
At 837G.
krygsgevangende te gee. 281 ... die neiging
beskou moet word by oorweeging van
doodsgevonnis opgele moet word. 282
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. . . .. as n faktor
die vraag of die
Van der Schiff has extracted the mitigating factors taken into
account in the judgement. 283 Those relevant to the impact of
international law on the Namibian armed conflict are:
(1) The ICJ and other U.N. organs have branded the South African
presence in Namibia as illegal. 284
(2) This attitude is shared by a large part of the international
community.265
(3) The accused regarded their actions as part of a just struggle
with strong legal and foreign support. 26e
(4) The skirmishes between SWAPO and the SADF amount to a war
situation. 267
(5) There is a tendency in international law to accord P.O.W.
status to combatants captured in a characteristic uniform in an
armed conflict against a colonial, alien, or racist regime. 268
261 At 836C-D.
262. Further.at 836E-F.
263 C van der Schiff "Consideration of international
humanitarian law in the sentencing of members of SWAPO S v







(6) Although the South African legislature has qualified the
accuseds' offences as a particularly serious misconduct, this did
not appear to be the view of the major part of the community of
SWA, nor that of the international community, according to the
undisputed evidence given in court. 2sa
The court did not hand down the death sentence, but sentenced
accused no's 1 and 2 to seven years and accused number 3 to
eleven years imprisonment. 27o Cowling asserts that the new
judicial flexibility could hasten the transformation of the
relevant provisions of the Protocols into customary international
law and that the judgement is of great relevance to South Africa
itself. 271
The recognition of humanitarian law as a moral excuse is not yet
settled in South Africa itself. Evidence that it has been
rejected as a moral excuse is provided by the judgement in ~
268 8370.
270 Van der Schiff op cit 115 criticises the judgement for
ignoring the principles of sentencing in South African law. The
court did not question whether tendencies of international law
could be accepted as mitigating factors in South African courts.
But as a general rule the court has a wide discretion in this
area, and can probably take into account such tendencies even
though they are contrary to South African law.
271 M G Cowling liThe Effect of International law on Municipal
Law in times of Armed Conflict - Sagarius 1983 (1) SA 833 (SWA)"
7 ~ (1983) 79 at 83.
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Mogoeraoe and otbers. 272 Mogoerane, Hosoli and Motaung were three
Umkhonto members who had attacked police stations at Horoka,
Wonderboomspruit and Orlando, killing four civilians and police
and injurIng 11 others. One police constable was shot down with
his hands in the air. There was no evidence that the accused
distinguished themselves in any way from civilians. The accused
were charged with treason. The death sentence was competent.
Professor Dugard gave similar evidence to that which he had given
in Sagarius before Curlewis J in the TPD. Curlewis J held that
his evidence "was of no relevance at all"273 because South Africa
is not a signatory to the 1977 Protocols and the concept of
giving P.D.W. status to members of groups such as the ANC/PLD had
not become part of customary international law. After a~vigorous
tirade against the PLO, which, as Hurray correctly points out,
was not germane to the issue,274 Curlewis J noted that
it may be said that Prof. Dugard's view ... is that
there may well be a move among academics to think that this
should ~e regarded as custom, and thus influence the court.
I have taken that. into account.
272 TPD 6 August 1982 unreported - published in 1 Lawyers for
Human Rights Bulletin (1983) 118.
273 Lawyers for Human Rights Bulletin op cit 123.
274 Op cit 1983 £ALJ 408.
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Hurray points to the factual differences between the cases-
unlike Sagarius and his co-accused who wore SWAPO's distinctive
uniform and had not killed anyone, Hogoerane's and his co-
accused's actions were much more violent and destructive of human
life. 275 Because of their use of civilian disguise there is
serious doubt whether they would have been protected had Protocol
1 applied unqualifiedly as they would not have met its personal
conditions for the application of lawful combatant status. But
that is an issue which can be resolved within the jurisdiction of
international law. Curlewis J made no response to the political
nature of the accused's crimes. Hurray notes that his treatment
of Dugard's evidence was informed by his categorisation of the
ANC " ... as an organisation prepared to shed the blood of innocent
people and does so ... " and one which attacks the police in order
to bring about anarchy and chaos. 276 Curlewis sentenced the three
accused to death. In December 1982 the Security Council and
General Assembly called upon the South African Government not to
execute them, with the General Assembly declaring expressly that
they should be P.O.W'S.277 This call was repeated in a unanimous
Security Council Resolution 278 endorsed by the European Economic
275 Ibid.
276 Loc cit, quoting from 1 LHRa (1983) at 124 and 126
respectively.
277 C J R Dugard "Traitors or Prisoners of War" 1983 AS. 60-
source 1983 (20) U N Monthly Chronicle no 2 at 14,15,31.
278 Resolution 533 (7/6/1983).
Community.278 Despite
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concerted international and internal
appeals, all three were executed in June 1983. 280
The inconsistency of the South African courts is revealed by ~
Buthelezi and Gthers. 281 In this case the accused were convicted
of contravention of section 2(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 83 of
1967 for undergoing military training and of a contravention of
section 2(1)(c) for possession of fire arms, other weapons and
ammunition. Didcott J recognised 282 that black people in South
Africa have real grievances and he sympathised with their
personal circumstances. 283 As Murray notes,284 however, it was
his appreciation of the accused's factual situation· that was
significant. The accused, he said, " ... came under the influence
of agents of and recruiters for the Umkhonto wing of the ANC. So
they joined up as soldiers."285
278 Rand Daily Hail 8/6/1983.
280 The execution revealed deep divisions on the issue in
South African society. Many whites said that the executions were
correct; blacks were of the opinion that they should have been
treated as P.O.W's - The Star 8/9 June 1983. Pamphlets to this
effect were circulated in Soweto.
281 (D&CLD) 22 Sept.1982 Case no. CC/85/82 reported in 1
Lawyers for Human Rights Bulletin (1983) 129.
282 Gp cit LliRa at 129.
283 Gp cit at 131.
284 Loc cit.
285 Gp cit 132.
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Hurray points out that the South African and Namibian cases can
be distinguished because of Namibia's international status. 286
But the position within South Africa is contradictory. Hurray
notes that in Buthelezi, Didcott J in effect accorded legitimacy
•
to a movement that is intent upon overthrowing the government of
which he is technically a part and in doing so he took cognisance
of the opinion of the majority in both South African and
international society. On the other hand, Curlewis's approach in
Mogoeraoe bolsters criticism that the South African judiciary is
a part of the repressive racist state machinery and that South
African law deliberately ignores trends in international law. 287
Ultimately, however, Sagarius and Butbelezi express judicial
sentiments of a relatively isolated nature. Horeover, even should
the relevance to sentencing of the developments in international
law become widely accepted by the courts, it can never dev~lop
into a legal excuse without either of the following developments
occurring: 288 Ca) The South African Government becoming party to
the Protoco1 2se or executive directions being issued to the
286 Gp cit 1983 ~ 409.
287 Ibid.
288 The problem of reception of international humanitarian
treaty and customary law into South African law in order to be
used io the South African courts, although unrelated to the
correct international legal position, is of obvious practical
import to captured combatants.
2se Under South African law, which follows English law in
this respect, treaties are not directly operative in the
municipal sphere, but require transformation by legislative
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effect that the Government recognises that the armed conflict is
international and that ANC members are to be accorded lawful
combatant status' and P.O.W. status. 290 (b) It is proven in the
courts that Article 1(4) is a part of custom and that the Article
is not in conflict with any act of parliament.
Such a proof was attempted in the Cape Supreme Court in the
recent case of S v Petane. 2B1 Petane was an ANC political
commissar indicted for attempted murder and for terrorism under
the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. When asked to plead, he
refused to do so, raising the point in initio litis that the
Court had no jurisdiction to try him because he was a P.O.W. in
terms of Protocol 1 and the procedure for trial of a P.O.W. set
out in Article 45 of the Protocol had not been followed. Conradie
J chose to construe the accused's defence as asserting a right to
intervention for their municipal application - Pan American World
Airways Incorporated y S.A. Fire and Accident Ins. Co. Ltd 1965
(3) SA 150 (AD). J Dugard 1968 A£ 58-60 notes that the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 Here gazetted in May 1968 by the
Defence Department, apparently for "general information" only
(Govt Notice nos R749, R750, R751, R752. GG no. 2064 3/5/1968.).
They were not incorporated by legislative process. However, R-Y
Gjuseppe 1943 TPD 139 and R y Werner 1947 (2) SA 828 (AD),
treated the unincorporated 1929 Convention as part of South
African law. The Pan American case conflicts with these early
cases and the correct position is unclear.
290 H Booysen "Treaties, Enemy Aliens and P.O.W's in South
African law" 90 SALJ. (1973) 386 at 388-391 riotes that if an act
lies within the power of the executive, the enactment of the
treaty is unnecessary. But' the decision is the executive's not
the court's, which cannot question the act and enforce the treaty
against the government if it changes its mind.
281 1988 (3) SA 51 (CPD).
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lawful combatant status. 292 In other words, he viewed the issue
as a question of whether international law applied in the South
African context and thus could serve as a legal excuse for the
accused's crimes. This occasioned a detailed examination of the
relevant legal developments. Conradie J seized on the crucial
issue of whether Article 1(4) of Protocol l's extension of the
definition of international armed conflict to' include wars of
national liberation had crystallised into a norm of customary
international law binding the court. 283
Conradie J accepted that, on the authority of Nduli and another y
Minister of Justice and Others,284 customary international law is
part of South African law unless it conflicts with an act of
parliament. Despite the strict test for proof of customary law
set out in Nduli, requiring that such custom be " ... either
universally recognised or have received the assent of this
country," Conradie J conceded that universality was not a
requirement for the proof of custom in international law285 and
accepted that where a custom is recognised by international law,
282 At 54G.
283 At 56C.
294 1978 (1) SA 853 (AD). See also the more unequivocal
statements in Kaffraria Property Co.Pty Itd v Govt of the
Republic of Zambia 1980 (2) SA 709 (E) at 712-715 and
Intersciences Research and Development Services Pty ltd v
Republica Popular de Mocambique 1980 (2) SA 111 (T) at 124.
285 Following Margo J
Development Services Pty ltd
1980 (2) SA 111 (T) at 125.
in Intersciences Research and
v Republica Popular de Mocambique
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it will also be recognised by South African law. 286 After
examining the essential elements of custom, usus (usage or state
practice) and oQjnio jurjs,287 the learned judge emphasised that
before a customary international rule would be accepted into
South African law it " ... would at the very least have to be
widelyaccepted." 288
Conradie J then attacked the defence's argument that such a near
universal state practice in the form of U.N. resolutions directed
at South Africa had transformed the provisions of Protocol 1 into
cllstom. 288 He considered U.N. resolutions to be abstract
condemnation of South Africa's




298 At 58A et seq.
300 At 58F ..
30l. At 59A.
statements constituting opinio iuris rather than usage and went
on to hold that without a " ... preceding usua, such a declaration
cannot give birth to a customary rule ...... 300 Only " ... the
material, concrete and/or specific acts of states ... are relevant
as 1lS..1lS.." 30 l. On this basis he regarded as irrelevant the general
internal policies in international
of Protocoll into custom. The
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learned judge appeared to rely on HacGibbon's argument 302 that
General Assembly resolutions per se cannot provide evidence of
either of the elements of custom because (a) they are abstract
actions that cannot constitute evidence of state practice and,
(b) when states vote for a General Assembly resolution they know
they are voting for a recommendation, thus it cannot convey the
sense of legal obligation essential to an opinio iuris. 303
Conradie J backed up MacGibbon's point with Thirlway's statement
that the abstract assertion of a rule cannot be construed as
state practice, which must be material, but can at best serve
only as supplementary evidence of state practice and opinio
iuris. 304
Conradie J based his judgement on the extent to which states had
become party to the Protocol. He accepted Thirlway's argument
that the ratification or accession of states to a treaty, despite
its abstract appearance, is in fact a concrete practice because
the state accepts the rules in the treaty as governing it. 305
Conradie J had earlier stated that " ... since ratification of
Protocol 1 is open to every state, very little short of that
302 I MacGibbon "Means for the Identification of
International Law - General Assembly Resolutions: Custom Practice
and Mistaken Identity" in B Cheng (ed) International Law Teaching
and Practice (1982) 10.
303 At 59C-F; MacGibbon op cit at 23.
304 H W G Thirlway
Verification (1972) 58.
305 At 601-618.
International Customary Law and
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could be construed as an acceptance of its provisions. "308 After
a brief excursus,307 the learned judge examined the rate at which
states had become party to the Protocol since it came into force
in 1978. 308 He concluded that the fact that by December 1986 only
66 states were party to the Protocol as opposed to the 165 states
party to the Geneva Conventions and that no major world power had
acceded to or ratified the Protocol, indicated that the
... approach of the world community to Protocol 1 is, on
principle, too half-hearted to justify an inference that its
principles have been so widely accepted as to qualify as
rules of customary international law. 30B
After noting that the defence had been unable to cite any
statement in the published literature that Protocol 1 had
attained the status of custom3~0 - he quoted from articles by
Murray,3~~ Swinarski,3~2 and A~mal,3~3 and at length from
Borrowdale,3~4 all to the effect that they feel the norm has yet
308 At 59E.




3~~ SAL.J. 1983 loc cit.
3~2 C Swinarski "Customary International Law and Protocol 1"
in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red
Cross Principles.
3~3 K Asmal The Status of Combatants of the Liberation
Moyement of South Africa under the Geneya Conventions of 1949 ;;d
Protocol 1 of 1977 (1980).
3~4 Gp cit 1981 89-90.
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to crystallise - he disagreed with Dugard's3~5 conclusion that
there is a growing conviction among writers that the Protocol has
spawned such a rule of custom.3~6 He then held:
For the reasons which I have given I have concluded that the
provisions of Protocol 1 have not been accepted in customary
international law. They accordingly form no part of South
African law.3~7
The preliminary point was dismissed and the trial continued.
Although the judgement is a fair reflection of the position ~
lege lata, it is, perhaps, unadventurous. Conradie J constantly
hinted at further stumbling blocks to the transformation of the
Protocol into custom beyond the lack of international support.
One such impediment was the ANC's unwillingness to "apply the law
in the future. In a brief excursus within the judgement, Conradie
J postulated a situation where Protocol 1 had become a part of
custom and it governed the South African armed conflict. He
argued that even if this were the case, neither party has
accepted the Protocol. He noted that the ANC's 1980 Declaration
was not an Article 96(3) declaration and nor had the ANC agreed
in the interim to abide by Protocol l's terms.3~e The ANC'~
reluctance to commit itself to humanitarian law, he imagined,





arose from its unwillingness to be bound by the provisions within
the Protocol enforcing the distinction between civilians and the
military and prohibiting attacks on civilians.3~8 He also noted
the unlikelihood of the South African Government accepting the
Protocol in the future. He concluded that the defence argued that
both parties are bound by the Protocol despite the fact that the·
only thing they agree on is that they don't desire it to
apply.320 The fact that neither party recognises the application
of the law or applies the law at present, does undermine the
assertion that it is custom binding on them. However, it is
submitted, with respect, that the learned judge went to far. He
intimated that the ·ANC's conduct since 1977 indicates a
disinclination to the future application of the law. Conradie J
ignores the fact that if the application of humanitarian law was
settled, the ANC would be able to accept the quid pro quo-
application of humanitarian law in exchange for abandoning
tactics in violation of that law. In other words, it is
impossible to moot a situation where the law applies and then
prejudge the attitude of the parties in that situation on the
basis of their attitude at present when the law does not apply.
At the end of his judgement, the learned judge went so far as to
say that he was " ... not sure that the provisions relating to the
field of application of Protocol 1 are capable of ever becoming a
318 Articles 48, 51 and 52.
320 At 63I-64A.
180
rule of customary international law ... ". He did not decide the
point. 321 But it should be seen in the light of a key objection
he broached in the course of his judgement to Protocol 1 ever
giving rise to custom, viz.: that the two affected states, Israel
and South Africa, were the only states who could apply the
Protocol in practice and they were too few to establish a general
practice in respect of armed conflicts of this kind. 322 The
argument was left undeveloped because the lack of adequate
international support for the Protocol made its articulation
unnecessary at this stage. Indeed, Conradie J's acceptance of
large scale international support for the Protocol as the
criterion for its transformation into custom, negated the
inference that the custom was unviable because it was incapable
of sufficient generality of practice. Conradie J also left open
the possibility of proof that these two states had dissociated
themselves from a rule of custom to Protocol l's effect. With
South Africa clearly in mind, he conceded that multilateral
treaties such as the Protocol could bind non-parties as custom,
but only if they exhibit an unambiguous opinio iuris that they
consider the treaty provision to be a rule of custom binding
them. 323 He viewed non-ratification as strong evidence of non-
acceptance. The learned judge ignored the possibility that





Africa, accompanied by the constant reiteration of calls for its
application, might change the complexion of the situation to such
a degree that the law would bind these states against their will.
In the final analysis, the defence's argument that the Protocol
has been transformed into custom failed because of lack of
evidence of state practice and opinio iuris to confirm it.
However, the learned judge took a fairly conservative view of
what constitutes the practice of states. Conradie J was correct
to condemn U.N. resolutions not aimed at a specific rule
internationalising the South African armed conflict as irrelevant
to the formation of such a rule. 324 Nevertheless, he ignores the
fact that certain General Assembly resolutions have articulated
this specific rule. Moreover, his reliance on MacGibbon's
dismissal of General Assembly resolutions as evidence of state
practice and acinic is not completely sound. It is possible that
when states vote for certain types of resolutions, for instance
those in the human rights field, they do not regard their votes
as just recommendatory, but in fact intend those instruments to
have a greater legal weight. Just as treaties entered into on a
contractual basis can spawn ·custom, it is possible that
resolutions made with something more than animo commendatio can
also spawn custom. In Thirlway's analysis,325 the apparently
abstract nature of the state practice of ratifying a treaty
324 At 59E.
325 Gp cit 58.
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becomes concrete because of the apinio that it is binding, an
oDinio with a contractual basis. Likewise, when states vote for
certain General Assembly resolutions, they may have an apinia
that the resolution is more than just a recommendation - they may
feel that it is in fact binding. That apinio can transform the
ostensibly abstract vote on the resolution into a concrete state
practice supporting the growth of a rule of custom. A custom
established through resolutions would require supportive evidence
that the resolutions were not regarded by the states as purely
recommendatory. Such evidence is available in the assertion in
the General Assembly that certain resolutions are binding. The
fault of MacGibbon's argument is that he assumes that because the
U.N. Charter sets out that General Assembly resolutions are
recommendatory that is what they always are and always will be.
He leaves no room for the development of the legal weight of
these resolutions outside the parameters set down originally for
them. Nevertheless, it is not settled that General Assembly
resolutions asserting the international character of the South
African armed conflict lend enough extra weight to confirm the
Protocol's transformation into custom and the conviction and
execution of ANC combatants continues unabated.
In response, the international community increasingly supports
instruments urging
... governments to take the appropriate measures to save the
lives of all the persons threatened with execution in trials
staged by the illegitimate racist regime on charges of high
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treason and under the obnoxious terrorism act. 328
The calls for the commuting of Hogoerane's and his co-accused's
death sentences are just one instance of the response to this
appeal. The Security Council also appealed to South Africa on
several occasions in 1982 not to execute ANC members sentenced to
death for treason. 327 Such appeals continue to be made. Some are
successful, others not.
ICRC activities in South Africa have also increased dramatically
in recent years in response to an upsurge in the intensity of the
conflict and a concomitant increase in international concern
about it. The ICRC plays an extensive role in humanitarian law328
and also acts on behalf of political prisoners not covered by the
law. 328 But the ICRC does not invoke international law to justify
326 G.A. Resolution 341/9H (XXXIV) 1979.
327 C J Dugard "Appeals for Clemency" 1982 AS. 58 - source 19
D.N.Monthly Chronicle (1982) June 33. In Resolution 503 (1982)
the Security Council unanimously called upon the South African
government to commute the death sentences imposed on N Lubisi, N
Munera and P Mashingo. Later their sentences were commuted to
life imprisonment. In December 1982 the G.A. and Security Council
unanimously called on the government to commute the death
sentences imposed on A Tsotsobe, I Shabangu and D Moise, whose
appeals were dismissed by the South African Appelate Division in
September - S y Tsotsobe 1983 (1) SA 856 (AD).
328 See M Veuthy "The International Red Cross and the
Protection of Human Rights" 1979 Acta Juridica 207.
328 Veuthey op cit 218, notes that the ICRC sees itself as
having a general duty to work in situations of internal tension
where detention is common. The organisation's approach is
informal and secretive, but appears to be successful. It has
established a permanent delegation in Pretoria. Its main
activities are (i) prison visits to political prisoners including
convicted ANC combatants, in prisons throughout South Africa and,
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its presence in South Africa.
3 5 4 6 CONCLUSION
We are left with weighty evidence of growing interest in the
international regulation of the South African armed conflict.
This interest is exhibited in three marked tendencies:
(i) Growing international support for such regulation expressed
in many different international fora and not only in the U.N ..
(ii) Partial reception of the special status of liberation
movement combatants by other states and in respect of sentencing
in South African courts.
(iii) Increased humanitarian activity in South Africa ..
(iv) An increase in the rate at which states are becoming party
to Protocol 1.
But it is still not proven that there is a rule of international
custom to Article 1(4)'s effect. Only near universality of
consensus on the same concrete rule will confirm it as custom.
Such consensus does not yet exist. Although calls in
international fora are generally directed to the granting of
protected status for ANC members, some appeal only for the
commutation of the death sentence. Support for the Protocol in
the form of ratification is often accompanied by extensive
reservations and is sometimes based on the"implicit belief that
(ii) relief assistance to the civilian population. The frequency
of ICRC visits has increased proportionately to the level of
violence, and has also responded to distinct forms of violence,
especially to recent township unrest where extensive relief work
has been carried out.
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Article 1(4) is a dead letter. Reception into the specially
affected states' domestic law is fragmentary, inconsistent, and
most often of an administrative rather than a legal nature. In
fact, such reception is arguably part of a growing trend to
accord special status to prisoners fighting for political causes
in situations which fall totally outside ~he ambit of Article
1(4). Finally, increased humanitarian intervention in the South
African armed conflict is based on a studious avoidance of the
legal issues involved, in order to prevent the political logjams
that prescriptive statements might occasion.
What must still happen before the norm contained in Article 1(4)
conclusively becomes a part of customary internatio~al law?
(i) Major military powers must become party to the Protocol on
the express undertaking that Article 1(4) is part of positive law
and is not a dead letter. Powers such as the. US and the UK have
been supportive of Security Council resolutions urging the
commutation of the death sentences of ANC members. Their
opposition to Article 1(4) and the concept it contains appears to
be waning. Their ratification could override South Africa's
objection to the formation of such a norm. It is interesting to
note, however, that Aldrich, arguing for ratification by the
United States, attempts to convince those against ratification
that Article 1(4) does not present any threat to the established
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legal order because it is a dead letter. 33o Ratification under
these circumstances would militate against the formation of a
.norm of custom based on Article 1(4).
(ii) Statements must be made by states party to the Protocol to
the effect that they view Article 1(4) as declaratory of
customary international law.
(iii) The South African courts must make a pronouncement to the
effect that the norm is part of custom. But Petane makes such a
pronouncement impossible in the foreseeable future. Moreover,
even if such a custom were established, it would still run into
the problem of the courts being unable to enforce rules of
customary international' law which conflict with South African
statutory law as the Protocol manifestly appears to do. Further
acceptance of the concept as a mitigating circumstance is
possible.
(iv) The South African Government must acquiesce. Accession to
the Protocols is highly unlikely. An executive direction to the
courts admitting the existence of such a norm as custom is only
slightly less improbable. Any contradictory administrative
practice according ANC members special status, would, however, do
much to undermine the official position and contribute to the
formation of such a norm.
In light of the fact that Article 1(4) has yet to be transformed
330 G Aldrich "Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A
Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol 1" 26 Virginia
~ (1986) 694.
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into custom and the South African armed conflict does not
conclusivelY fall within the material field of application of the
law of international armed conflict, why continue with an
examination of its personal field of application? A number of
justifications exist:
(i) The rule will conceivably coalesce in the future, and prior
exploration of its ramifications is useful.
(ii) It is already being used indirectly at the sentencing stage
in South African courts.
(iii) It is regarded by the majority of the international
community as being a part of international law applying to South
Africa and although -this opinion is legally precarious, it
carries great political weight.
(iv) There is a legally viable case, although not strong, for
considering South Africa bound under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of
the 1949 Conventions. Thus a violation by South Africa of this
interpretation would be a violation of the Geneva Conventions to
which it is party.331 There are, as noted, good arguments against
such an option. The framers of the Conventions never envisaged
such an interpretation and it stretches the Conventions too much.
There is also no unanimity as to such an interpretation, making
it difficult to prove as a rule of law, which such an
interpretation by definition must be. But it remains a remote
possibility.
(v) Alternatively, one can view Article 1(4), if not as a binding
331 G Abi-Saab 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 433.
interpretation of paragraph 3 of Article 2 of
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the 1949
Conventions, then at least as an authoritative one and one with
which the South African Government must be urged to comply.
Application of the Geneva Conventions may only bring into.play
the impractical personal conditions for lawful combatant status
contained in Article 4 of Convention 3. But it is arguable that
Articles 43 and 44 of Protocol 1, with their more flexible
conditions, are in turn an authoritative interpretation of
Article 4 of Convention 3.
(vi) Flexible developments, such as the ANC's 1980 Declaration,
point to a future for the law.
(vii) South Africa must be urged to apply, if not the Conventions
and Protocols in their entirety, then at least those provisions
relating to lawful combatant status and P.O.W status because:
(a) South Africa has as much interest in the ANC in ensuring that
combatants are regarded as lawful and thus qualify for P.O.W
status; (b) South Africa must avoid a situation where the ANC
rejects humanitarian law as happened with ZANU in Zimbabwe;
(c) South Africa has a fundamental interest in preserving its
domestic law by decriminalising ANC combatants. 332
For these reasons it is submitted that there is justification for
a detailed examination of the personal requirements for lawful
combatant status in the South African armed conflict.
332 J Dugard "SWAPO: The Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello"
93 ~ (1976) 156 advanced similar reasons i.r~o. SWAPO.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
4 1" INTRODUCTION
Rosas notes:
When claims for P.O.W status are put forward by entities
other than states, or entities whose statehood is in doubt,
the claimants usually have in mind one overriding
implication, which is not expressly mentioned in the third
Convention (P.O.W) but which has traditionally been linked
to the concept of P.O.W: namely that while P.O.W's may be
held in custody for the duration of the war, they may not as
lawful combatants be punished for the sole act of having
participated in hostilities.~
The ANC is such a non-state entity and the claim of P.O.W. status
for its combatants undoubtedly has lawful combatant status as its
prime objective. This important protection, along with P.O.W
status, was traditionally confined to interstate armed conflicts
and predicated on the meeting of certain personal conditions.
Article 1(4) was a revolt against the concept of international
armed conflicts as taking place exclusively between states. Not
surprisingly, the campaign for the protection of combatants of
national liberation movements also came up against entrenched
concepts in the personal field of application. The pre-1970's law
focussed on the protection of regular state armies and moderated
efforts to enlarge the personal field of protection. 2 Protocol
l's inclusion of irregular guerrillas among the groups of
~ A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 222.
2 M S McDougal & F P Feliciano "International Coercion and
World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War" 67
Yale Law Journal (1958) 551 at 829.
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permissible participants was pivotal to Third World emphasis on
the protection of 'freedom fighters' such as ANC combatants. How
is this protection to be achieved at an individual level in the
South African armed conflict? Whether combatants in the South
African armed conflict fall within the personal field of
application of the law of international armed conflict is
.
dependant on the answers to a two simple questions, viz.: Who
qualifies for lawful combatant status and P.D.W. status? What
must they do to qualify? These two questions prompt two further
questions, viz. : What happens to them if they do not qualify?
What other basic protections are available to combatants? In
answering these questions, attention must be focussed on the
conditions for protected status for irregular combatants because
ANC combatants fight largely as irregulars. Although less
controversial, the conditions the South African Government's
regular armed forces must meet will also have to be examined.
The conditions for lawful combatant status are weakly and
confusingly delineated in the 1949 Conventions. Protocol 1 went
some way to clarifying the rules, but created ambiguities of its
own. Enormous problems of interpretation occur, largely because
of the absence of a consistent and logical basis for
categorisation. It is useful to begin to unmesh the law by first
considering the theoretical concepts and distinctions of the
personal field of application and then examining these concepts
in the context of the South African armed conflict, before going
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on to examine the personal conditions themselves.
4 2 A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMBATANT STATUS IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4 2 1 FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS
Any understanding of the operation of lawful combatant status in
the South African armed conflict must be underscored by knowledge
of the technical meanings of certain classifications and their
distinctions from other classifications because the consequences
of these distinctions, all of which are extant in the South
African armed conflict, manifest themselves in the personal
regulation of oombatants. The distinctions are between (1) armed
forces and civilians; (2) combatants and non-combatants;
(3) lawful combatants and unlawful combatants. While the
categories overlap, they are not,. as we shall see, identical. 3
4 2 1 1 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARMED FORCES AND CIVILIANS
The population of a belligerent state or entity is divided into
two broad classes, viz.: The armed forces, including regular and
irregular combatants as well as non-combatant members, and those
who are not members of the armed forces, the civilians. 4
3 See generally G Schwarzenberger International Law as
applied by International Courts and Tribunals yol 2 The Laws of
armed Conflict (1968) 110.
4 M Greenspan The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959) 53;
Schwarzenberger ibid.
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4,2 1 2 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS
This distinction differentiates between combatants who have the
right to engage in actual fighting, i,e" to kil+, wound or
otherwise disable members of opposing forces,5 and non-combatant
members of the armed forces 6 as well as the whole of the civilian
population, who do not have this right, Non-combatants who engage
in actual combat are guilty of an offence, in certain
circumstances punishable by death, The distinction between
combatant and non-combatant serves to indicate to the combatant
the persons whom he can attack and by whom he can expect to be
attacked, Non-combatant members of the armed forces have the
5 Greenspan op cit 53.
6 The more technical meaning of non-combatant is given to
non-fighting members of armed forces such as doctors, nurses,
chaplains and medical staff. They (a) belong to the armed forces;
(b) wear a uniform or some form of fixed and distinctive sign;
(c) are not entitled to participate in hostilities unless
unlawfully attacked (Article 2(1) of Geneva Convention 1 1949 and
Article 35(1) of Geneva Convention 2 1949); (d) are not
legitimate objects of attack; (e) must be returned to their own
side on capture unless they are retained to look after sick
P,O.W's (Article 3 of the Hague Regulations). They are not
P,O.W's (Article 3 of Geneva Convention 1). They get their
special status from Article 28 or Geneva Convention 1 and Article
35 of Geneva Convention 2, A further class of non-combatants are
camp followers, They are civilians who follow an army without
belonging to it, eg" "Newspaper correspondents, reporters,
sutlers and contractors" - Article 13 of the Hague Regulations as
well as "civilian members of aircraft crews", ,members of labour
units or services responsible for the welfare of the armed
forces" - Article 4A(4) Geneva Convention 3, They are entitled to
P,O,W status on capture if in possession of a certificate from
the military authorities of the army which they are accompanying
- Article 13 of the Hague Regulations. The distinction is also
used to differentiate between fighting and service troops-
Article 3 of the Hague Regulations. However, service troops can
be employed in combat, and can be objects of attack.
general right to immunity from attack
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because of their
humanitarian role, identified by their wearing of distinctive
b d g the red cross for medics. Civilians receive thisages, e.,
immunity solely from their civilian status.
4.2.1.3 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS
Lawful combatants are those members of the armed forces of a
party to a conflict who are exclusively entitled to participate
in hostilities. 7 Their belligerent actions are not justiciable in
an enemy's criminal courts. s They are also entitled to P.O.W
status under customary international law, the Hague Regulations,
Geneva Convention 3, and Protocol 1. Traditionally, to gain
p~otected status combatants had to belong to either the 'regular'
armed forces of a party to the conflict, in which case the
conditions their status depended on were assumed complied with,
or to 'irregular' groups, in which case they had to conform to
the conditions originally laid down in the Hague regulations,
viz.: Be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
wear a fixed and distinctive sign recognisable at a distance;
carry their arms openly; conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war. A number of approaches have
been taken to the fate of civilians or irregulars who did not
7 E Rosenblad International Humanitarian
Conflict (1979) 590.
Law of Armed
8 W A Solf liThe Status of Combatants in Non-International
Armed Conflicts under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice" 33
American University LR (1983/4) 53 at 58.
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meet these conditions, but who took part in combat:
(i) The lawful/unlawful approach was to the effect that civilian
participants were not only unprotected by international law,s
they had in fact violated it and could be treated accordingly on
capture. 10 Guerrillas, partisans, war traitors, francs tireurs
and other de facto combatants not meeting the requirements for ~
~ combatant status, were war criminals under international law
by the very fact of their participation in combat and were
generally subject to the death penalty. The approach appears to
be incorrect in that under pre-1977 law the failure of a
combatant to distinguish himself from the civilian population -
considered essent~al by pundits of this theory - involved no
breach of any positive prohibition of international law, except
to the extent that it might have involved a treacherous killing
or wounding under Hague regulation Article 23(8).11 It is
probable that the unlawful label comes not from international
law, but from the condemnation of such a combatant by the
municipal law of the state concerned or the penal law of the
occupying power, as the case may be.
S They are not protected as combatants, but would still
receive the minimal protections as civilians under Geneva
Convention 4 and customary international law.
10 G I A D Draper "The Status of Combatants and the Question
of Guerilla Warfare" 45 aYLk (1971) 173 at 176. Despite a
disclaimer he appears to support this theory.
11 Greenspan op cit 61.
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(ii) The privileged/unprivileged approach, advocated by Baxter in
a seminal article in 1951, is the reigning orthodoxy. 12 After
tracing the history of spies, guerrillas and other forms of
hostile activity by non-armed forces members, he concludes that
individuals who disregard or deliberately do not comply with the
requirements for 'privileged' combatant status are governed by a
single legal principle. Their actions are not violative of
international law as SUCh,13 but they are deprived of the
protections of international law and are in the power of the
enemy.14 Thus they are 'unprivileged' combatants, not unlawful
combatants. 15 Unprivileged combatants are entitled to the
substantive and procedural protections of Geneva Convention 4
(Civilians), but only in occupied areas. They are, however, open
to drastic sanctions under the municipal law of the detaining
power. Baxter bases his theory on the state practice of
belligerents' military manuals and the decisions of national
tribunals applying the law. The Privy Council, in Mohamed Ali and
another V Public Prosecutor,16 expressly sanctioned his approach.
12 R R Baxter "So Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies,
Guerrillas and Saboteurs" 28 aYlk (1951) 321.
13 Baxter op cit 1951 342.
14 Baxter op cit 1951 343; J Stone Legal Controls of
International Conflict (1954) 549,561,562,563,569.
15 Baxter op cit 1951 notes at 344 that judicial
determination of adherence to the international law requirements
is a question of status, not of guilt. Once an unprivileged
status is established then a combatant can be guilty at municipal
law.
16 1968 (3) All E R 488 (PC) at 493.
196
(iii) The modern tendency is to ignore the conditions for the
attribution of lawful or privileged combatant status and to treat
all those who take up arms and belong to a party to the conflict
as lawful or privileged combatants under international law, with
a right to take up arms and to admission to P.O.W. status
precluding prosecution at municipal law. 17 This tendency is
grounded on a number of points. Firstly, it is contradictory to
deprive a combatant of his protected status for failing to adhere
to the conditions set out in the law while allowing a protected
combatant to retain his protection even if he has violated the
law in other respects .. 18 Secondly, many states in practice treat
combatants who do not fulfill the requirements for protected
status as P.O.W·s on capture, although denying them that
status. 19 Thirdly, the principle of distinction discriminates
against weaker parties as it is almost impossible for them to
display their status. Cowling takes a new approach, underpinned
by the realisation that the principle of distinction is
17 The approach in Committee 3 of the 1974-7 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference - CDDH/11/SR33-36, CDDH/236 Rev.1 at 24-23.
18 Rosenblad op cit 88 referring to Article 85 of Geneva
Convention 3.
19 A P Rubin "Panel Discussion on P~otocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War" 74 Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law (1980) 191-212. He cites at
194 US practice with regard to the Vietcong in Vietnam, which
must set a valuable precedent for all guerrillas, because of the
flexible response of the US to the inability of third world
guerrillas to conform to the conditions of visibility.
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unworkable under modern conditions of warfare. 2o He submits that
combatant status attaches to individuals permanently, derived
from their membership of a group belonging to a party to the
conflict. Civilians not part of a group belonging to such a
party, do not have protected combatant status. Their taking up of
arms does not alter their non-participant status and is a'
violation of a state's or detaining power's national law. Cowling
argues that violations of the conditions of visible distinction
are violations of the manner of participation, not a question of
participation itself. He retains the criteria of visibility only
to discover whether the combatant is guilty of a violation of the
law of armed conflict~ i.e., the war crime of not distinguishing
himself from the civilian population. Unfortunately, while the
1974-77 Conference did set up violation of the visibility
principle as a separate war crime in Article 44 of Protocol 1, it
retained the principle in the Article as a condition for
participant status in special situations.
4.2.2 LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION OF THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED
CONFLICT
4 2 2,1 PROBLEMS WITH GUERILLA WARFARE
Guerilla warfare is the main method of fighting in the South
20 M G Cowling The Question of Combatant Status in Relation
to the Application of the Laws of War (unpublished thesis - 1977)
138ff,
African armed conflict.2~ Umkhooto we Sizwe is weak in numbers
and resources. It can only mobilise dispersed groups of men
employing tactics such as sabotage. It avoids pitched battles.
Guerilla warfare suits the ANC because of the vastly superior
conventional military capability of its adversary. The .South
African armed conflict is an ideological war in which the
allegiance of the civilian population is the principle objective
and military tactics are less important than political and
psychological methods, for without the population's support, ANC
guerrillas have no logistical base. The incumbent's conventional
troops also use guerilla warfare as a tactic. At the final stages
of the armed conflict, 'conventional warfare may come into its own
as the opponents become more equal in strength. At present,
however, the use of guerrilla tactics causes immense problems for
the application of a system of law derived from experience in
conventional wars.
4 2 2 2 THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE QUARTER
Hague Regulations Article 23(c) prohibiting anyone from killing
or wounding "" ,an enemy, who having laid down his arms or having
no longer means of defence, has surrendered ... " and Article 23(d)
stating that it is forbidden " ... to declare that no quarter will
be given ... " are now part of customary international law. All
21 Since 1945 guerrilla warfare has played a central role in
the conflicts in Algeria, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Vietnam, the middle east, the Portuguese colonies, and
in Southern Africa.
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combatants in the South African armed conflict fall under an
obligation to give quarter to all other combatants, regular or
irregular, lawful or not. Quarter is anterior to all other
protections afforded combatants. Nevertheless, it must be
recognised that in guerilla warfare the obligation to give
quarter can become a major logistical problem. It is difficult to
take prisoners under fire; it is difficult to transport prisoners
away from the combat zone. The situation is exacerbated when your
opponents appear to be civilians, a common occurrence in South
Africa. But as Kalshoven notes, there is nothing in Article 23
that applies the obligation only to lawful combatants. 22
Kalshoven outlines three situations where irregular guerrillas
may be at an armed force's mercy, but quarter still applies:
(i) Guerrillas encountered in battle. The fact that the guerilla
does not wear a distinctive sign or uniform does not make any
difference. He may be guilty of crimes, but he may not be
executed immediately. (ii) Suspected guerrillas caught in search
operations among the civilian population. He submits that to
finish off suspects on the spot is murder. (iii) Guerrillas
caught in a hostile act not amounting to a fight. He submits that
killing them in this case is not permissible. These situations
occur in the South African armed
circumstances can quarter be refused.
conflict and under no
22 F Kalshoven "The Position of Guerilla fighters under the
Laws of War" 11 RDPMDG (1972) 55 at 67-69.
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4.2.2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION AS A FUNCTIONAL CRITERION
FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
The modern formulations of Rousseau's distinction between
civilians and armed forces plays a key role in the conferring of
lawful status on combatants in the South African armed
conflict. 23 Is the principle functional in this role?
In its modern forms, the principle has two components:
(i) Although only assumed in Article 4 of Geneva Convention 3,
Article 43 of Protocol 1 requires expressly that legitimate
participants must belong to the armed forces of a party to the
conflict. Legal participation is predicated on individual or
group membership of a party to the conflict. Membership is
established through a command link to that party. Members are
distinguished from non-members, i.e., civilians who do not have a
right to participate in combat.
(ii) The Convention and Protocol also require - implicitly for
regulars, expressly for irregulars that lawful combatants
visibly distinguish themselves from the civilian population and
the opposing side. They do this by the carrying of arms openly
and the wearing of a fixed and distinctive sign. In the sense of
this visibility principle, the distinction between participants
and non-participants is based on what the individuals physically
hold themselves out to be. The conditions of acting under
23 This distinction was reaffirmed in Articles 48 and 50 of
Protocol 1. Article 50 defines "civilians" and the "civilian
population" as distinguished from combatants.
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responsible command and obeying the laws of war have been
traditionally allied to the conditions of visibility. Together,
these conditions constituted an effort to regulate the manner of
for lawfulas criteriaparticipation. They were attached
combatant status before it was realised that combat was not going
to remain rigidly defined in terms of nineteenth century
conventional warfare and that changes in its manner would
endanger whole classes of combatants with the loss of the right
to participate.
Not surprisingly therefore, the principle of distinction has been
under sustained attack-in recent years. Historically we have seen
the numbers of ·participants grow and the numbers of civilians
decrease. Resistance movements were added to the sanctioned armed
forces in 1949, national liberation movements in 1977. The
increase in the numbers of lawful participants has been coupled
with the narrowing of the scope of the visibility aspect of the
principle of distinction. Baxter points to the eventual demise of
the law's "clothes philosophy," which he regards as a throwback
to nineteenth century warfare. He states:
As the current tendency of the law of war appears to be to
extend the protection of P.O.W status to an ever increasing
group, it is possible to envisage a day when the law will be
so retailored as to place all belligerents, however garbed,
in a protected status. 24
The post-1949 trend towards wars of national liberation sparked
24 R R Baxter "So Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies,
Guerrillas and Saboteurs" 28 aYl.L. (1951) 321 at 343.
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off a debate about the functionality of the four Hague criteria,
especially the carrying of arms openly and the displaying of a
fixed and distinctive sign. In the context of wars of national
liberation, guerilla warfare challenges the principle of visible
distinction because guerrillas must mix with civilians. Often
civilians serve as their logistical base, often they are
civilians. Von Glahn argues that it would be tantamount to
suicide for guerrillas who are members of national liberation
movements to adhere to these conditions. 25 Paust regards this
argument as a myth. He notes that arms need only be carried
openly when an attack is on and that few participants attack with
their arms hidden. 26 , He argues that the drafters of the 1949
Conventions were aware of the problems of guerilla warfare and
that the rigorous conditions set out in Article 4A(2) were based
on the perception that guerilla irregulars violated a principle
of humanity in war by concealing their identity.27 Nevertheless,
the modern perception is that the four conditions do impose
unrealistic requirements on irregulars, especially on irregulars
in wars of national liberation. Humanitarian law has always
assumed the equality of belligerents and that observance of the
law neither benefits nor harms any side. The relaxation of the
conditions of distinction in the 1970's was a direct result of
25 K Von Glahn 1 Israel Year Book of Human Rights (1971) 233.
26 J C Paust "Law in a Guerrilla Conflict: Myths Norms and
Human Rights" 3 Israel Year book of Human Rights (1973) 39 at 73.
27 Op cit 45-56.
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the perception that the law discriminated against national
liberation movements because they did not have the infrastructure
to comply with it. They tended to ignore the law because it
limited them. 28 The law was partially adapted in Protocol 1 to
suit combatants in wars of national liberation. At the 1974-77
Diplomatic Conference, Third World states urged the abolishment
of the distinction between civilians and combatants. They argued
that the distinction was the product of Western concepts of armed
conflicts between regular armies composed of clearly defined
military personnel confronting each other along clearly defined
front lines. These assumptions were not suitable for 'peoples
wars' where every patriot was to be classified a soldier. 28
Western states agreed to the enlargement of the categories of
sanctioned combatants, but would not do away with the principle
of distinction entirely. Because of Western insistence on the
principle's retention, the Third World group switched its
attention to restricting its requirements as much as possible.
The four Hague criteria were narrowed to the carrying of arms
openly under certain conditions in Article 44.
Was there a need to retain the principle of distinction? When the
28 H Meyrowitz "The Law of War in the Vietnamese Conflict"
in R Falk Ced) The Vietnam War and InternatiOnal Law vol 2 (1969)
516 at 541.
28 The North Vietnamese delegate said that as a national
liberation movement consisted of the whole civilian population,
the whole population should have ,the right to participate _
CDDH/111/SR33.
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law was being formulated in the nineteenth century, the solutions
to two problems the problem of protecting the civilian
population from attack by forcing the military to separate
themselves from it through some effective sanction - and the
problem of deciding who shall have the right to enter into combat
- were found by.binding the two together. The right to enter into
combat was made dependent on meeting the requirements identifying
the military as military, the solution of a suitable penalty to
enforce the distinction between civilians and military. The
principle of distinction's non-physical operation in the law, the
membership of armed forces of a party to the conflict or command
link, serves as the' fundamental point of distinction between
civilians and lawful participants. It must be retained to avoid
the politically untenable situation of making the whole civilian
population lawful combatants and thus legitimately open to
attack. In the ·sense of its physical operation in the law, as a
means for ensuring that combatants can be physically
distinguished from civilians and from the opposing side, the
principle of distinction can also not be abandoned without making
the protection of the majority of the civilian population
impossible. It should, however, have been abandoned as a
criterion for lawful combatant status and rather enforced as a
separate war crime. Why, if loss of status has been the penalty
for ignoring the visibility condition for so long, should it be
discarded now? There is nothing illogical per se in attaching
conditions to protected status. But membership of armed forces is
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enough to establish lawful participation because this right is
really a case of the political acknowledgement of the legitimacy
of the opposing group and, by extension, of its combatants. It is
not a question of how a war is fought. Therefore, violation of
the criterion of visibility should not remain arbitrarily
connected with removal of the right to participate. 3o The
arbitrary connection of status and visible distinction is
unviable in modern guerrilla wars because too many combatants
resemble civilians and they stand to lose their status because of
this connection. The connection of status and distinction also
leaves the assessment of compliance with the visibility
conditions in the hands of the detaining power, offending the
principle nemo iudex in re sua causa. The detaining power's
discretion with regard to the award of status should be strictly
limited. In addition, it is discriminatory to insist that a
combatant who uses his 'invisibility' as a tactic to compensate
for his material disadvantage should lose his status, while the
combatant who engages in indiscriminate bombing does not. Both
are actually guilty of a violation of the law of war because
their manner of participation endangers civilian lives.
Prosecution for the war crime of not distinguishing oneself is
not only a suitable replacement for the loss of status as the
penalty for contravening the visibility principle, it is also
more appropriate to enforcement of that principle.
30 See M G Cow 1ing ...T A.olh~et--...;sQoLJul4.:..e~s.JotL..oliu.oLJ.n~--!J.o .....f~Co!.J,QJ.Jmwb~a..wt-'ilal.J..nutll-....JS,,;u,..t ,g,a~tJ.lUU;;SL.....l.LJ·nu..
Relation to the Application of the Laws of War (unpublished
thesis - 1977) 138ff.
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Unfortunately, despite its update in Protocol 1, because of the
retention of the visibility aspect, Rousseau's. principle of
distinction is not completely functional as a criterion for
lawful participation in the South African armed conflict. We have
yet to reach the stage that Baxter foresaw when the 'clothes
philosophy' is entirely abandoned as a criterion for lawful
participation and the legality of this participation rests solely
on the combatants link to a party to the conflict. It is likely
that ANC guerrillas will find it difficult to meet the less
onerous conditions set out in Protocol 1. But the practice of
states in conferring such technically unprotected combatants with
protected status ex gratia sets a valuable precedent that should
not be ignored in the South African situation. 31 In addition, we
must recall that the De Maartens clause states clearly that the
categories of lawful combatants established by the Hague
Regulations and, by extension, in the 1949 Conventions and 1977
Protocol as the clause is now part of custom, are not exclusive.
4,2,2,4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS ANP
POW, STATUS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
Most General Assembly resolutions claim P.O,W. status for
31 For instance in Vietnam, all Vietcong members were given
at least P.O.W treatment on capture even if they did not qualify
for it under international law. Indeed, the US went much further
than legally required too, and worked out its own taxonomy of
captured combatants in direct response to the different types of
combatants it confronted.
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national liberation movement members because it implies lawful
combatant status. p.a.w. status and lawful combatant status are
historically linked. Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regulations of
1899/1907 laid down the categories of persons to be regarded as
lawful combatants. Article 3 explicitly linked this status to
p.a.w. status. Geneva Convention 3 of 1949 added to the
categories of combatants being classed as p.a.w's and implicitly
assumed they had a right to lawful participation. Article 43 of
Protocol 1 spells out the link between p.a.w's and lawful
combatants. Nevertheless, although lawful combatants are always
granted p.a.w. status on capture, the modern tendency to identify
p.a.w. status with lawful combatant status is not sound in law.
Not all p.a.w's are lawful combatants before capture, eg., camp
followers. Lawful combatant status is a question of a political-
military nature, involving an individual's objective connection
with a party to the conflict and his compliance with a number of
conditions distinguishing him as a soldier from the civilian
population. P.O.W status on the other hand, is a question of a
humanitarian nature. It is a guarantee of humanitarian treatment
granted to captured lawful combatants and other, non-combatant,
enemy aliens. It affords certain guarantees even to combatants
who have violated the laws of war, but it is denied to those
combatants who have not participated lawfully.
4,2 2,5 CONCLUSION
The basic tenets of the personal field of application of the law
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of international armed conflict are not always appropriate to the
South African armed conflict. The problems with the law are most
acute with regard to the personal conditions for lawful combatant
status set out in the 1949 Conventions, the area of law that must
be examined first. Bearing these problems in mind, it is
submitted from the outset that a liberal interpretation of the
provisions is the only tenable interpretation.
4.3 PERSONAL CONDITIONS FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS UNDER THE
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS32
4.3 1 INTROPUCTION
This section examines the personal conditions for protected
status set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions against the
background of the reality of the South African armed conflict.
The conditions for members of regular armed forces differ from
those set out for 'irregulars'. They are examined in turn. 33
4.3 2 REGULAR COMBATANTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMEP CONFLICT
4 3 2 1 REGULARS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 4A(1)
Article 4A(1) of Convention 3 of 1949 refers to regular forces as
32 Respect for lawful combatant status under Geneva
Convention 3 is implemented through the simple expedient of
Article 87 which provides that P.O.W's, as set out in Article 4,
may not be sentenced to any penalties except those provided for
members of the detaining powers armed forces who have committed
the same act. The right of lawful combatants to participate in
combat is universally recognised and is thus not the subject of
sanctions in any detaining power's legal system for its own armed
forces.
33 The use of the terms regular and irregular is not
explicit in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but because of their
customary use when referring to the pre-1977 distinctions in the
categories of permissible combatants, they have been retained
when dealing with the 1949 Conventions. According to this usage,
regulars are the official armed forces of a party to a conflict;
official in the sense that their existence is set out in the
internal legislation of the party. Irregulars are members of
groups of a voluntary nature who come into existence during
wartime. Their connection with the party to the conflict is
therefore more tenuous. Regulars tend to fight in a more
conventional manner, while irregulars usually embrace
unconventional tactics, but this is not necessarily so.
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(1) Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict,
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps not
forming part of such armed forces.
Members of 'the armed forces and of attached militias and
volunteer corps are lawful combatants. South Africa's armed
forces falls within this category. The precise military elements
that constitute its armed forces is a question of its domestic
law34 as set out in the Defence Act of 1957. It is the direct
nature of this organisational link that distinguishes regulars
from irregulars.
Can the ANC have regular forces? Following Rosas, it can be
argued that the ANC can field regular forces. 35 The definition of
regular forces in Article 4A(1) does not necessarily imply
conventional warfare. 36 Why then, should the unconventional
warfare practiced by the ANC imply irregular forces? All that is
required is an objective link between the party to the conflict
and its regular forces; the forces must be objectively
subordinate to the high command through internal legislation. The
ANC has set up an administration. There is little reason why it
should not, through the usual process, establish regular armed
34 H S Levie Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict
(1978) 36.
35 A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 329-
330. He argumes that all national liberation movements can
potentially have regular armed forces.
36 Consider the unconventional nature of the anti-insurgency
operations of many units of the SADF.
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forces within the meaning of Article 4A(1). These forces may
practice unconventional warfare just as the South African
Government's armed forces do. They could include full-time
uniformed combat troops not tied to any particular region or
popular militias organised at village -level. Their apparent
nature is not the issue; it is the nature of their objective link
to high command that is crucial. Units of Umkhonto can arguably
be considered to be the regular armed forces of the ANC. Despite
this possibility, the unconventional warfare that the ANC engages
in has resulted in its armed forces being generally characterised
as irregular.
Do members of regular armed forces involved in the South African
armed conflict have to observe the criteria of distinction set
out for irregulars in Article 4A(2)? Article 4 explicitly
regulates only irregular forces because it was traditionally
assumed that regular forces meet these conditions anyway.37
Rosenblad cites a number of relevant judicial decisions that are
authority for the general principle that members of regular armed
forces, captured while engaging in sabotage or espionage in
occupied or enemy territory wearing civilian clothes or the
uniforms of the opposing armed forces, would not be protected by
international law because they have not conformed to the
37 A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 328.
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requirements of distinction explicitly set out for irregulars. 38
A typical decision was that made in Mohamed Ali and Another V
Public Prosecutor. 38 The accused, members of the Indonesian armed
forces, planted a bomb in an office building in Singapore,
killing 3 civilians. They were caught escaping in a boat still
dressed in civilian clothes. At the trial, their defence was that
they were armed forces members. The Federal court held that,
... under international law a member of the armed forces of a
party to the conflict who, out of uniform or in civilian
clothing, sets off explosives in the territory of the other
party to the conflict in a non-military building in which
civilians are doing work unconnected with any war effort
forfeits his right on capture to be treated as a P.O.W.40
The Privy Council dismissed their appeal. It held that members of
regular armed forces in terms of Article 4A(1) had to comply with
the four requirements of Article 4A(2), notably the possession of
a "fixed· distinctive sign recognisable at a distance". The court
relied heavily on the writings of Lauterpacht, Stone, Baxter and
Pictet and on the official military manuals of states. The court
noted the importance of the distinction between non-combatants
38 E Rosenblad International Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict (1979) 80. The cases include, inter alia, The Trial of
General Oberst Von Falkenhorst War Crimes Reports vcl 2 18-30; ~
Parte Quirin War Crimes Reports vol 2 28; Colegaugh International
Law Reports 1956 79; The Trial of Skorzeny War Crimes Reports vol
9 92-94, appears to contradict this general principle. General
Skorzeny's troops wearing US uniforms, infiltrated US lines.
Witnesses said that on two occasions they were still dressed in
US uniforms when they opened fire. Although Skorzeny was
acquitted, it was because of lack of proof, and thus the case can
be distinguished.
39 1968 (3) All E R 488 (PC).
40 At 493.
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and members of the armed forces and held that:
Persons who adopt the protective clothing of the peaceful
civilian in order to engage more effectively in hostile acts
are 'unprivileged belligerents' not entitled to treatment as
P.O.W's and in the words of Stone are 'left to the
discretion of the belligerent threatened by their
activities.' [The court held that] the accused forfeited
their rights under the Convention by engaging in sabotage in
civilian clothes.
The two accused were hanged.4~
The conditions of distinction that regulars must adhere to will
be fully explored when the problematic of irregulars is dealt
with. But if regulars are not engaged in espionage or sabotage in
enemy territory then their status is uncertain. What if regulars
are attacked while out of uniform? Realistically, they must
retain their lawful combatant status. The more·controversial
situation would involve entering into conventional combat out of
uniform. Following the practice of denying irregulars lawful
combatant status under these circumstances, regulars should also
lose this status. Indisputably, there is security in fighting in
uniform.
In South Africa, in order to remove the issue from domestic
jurisdiction entirely, it is submitted that it would be better to
allow regular combatants to retain their lawful status even
4~ R R Baxter t'The Privy Council and the Qualification of
Belligerents" 63 American JIL (1969) 290 notes at 295 that the
court could have treated the attack on a civilian building as a
war crime under international law, but chose instead to treat it
as a crime under municipal law, the general practice of a number
of states since World War 2.
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though they do not obey the overt conditions of distinction and
rather prosecute them under international law for war crimes,
including the crime of not distinguishing themselves. West
Germany has adopted this approach in its Federal German Republic
Manual on the Laws of War. 42
4.3 2 2 REGULARS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 4A(3)
Article 4A(3) reads:
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or authority not recognised by the detaining
power.
The subsection is a response to the World War 2 predicament of
governments in exile. 43 The meaning of "authority" is uncertain.
Levie notes:
Apparently, it was intended to cover such contingencies as a
gov€rnment which had ceased to exist and has not been
replaced even by a government in exile. 44
What of the ANC? It has been argued that national liberation
movements are "authorities" and that thus their regular
combatants are lawful. In Military Prosecutor y Gmar Mohamed
Kassem and Gthers,45 the defendants, PFLP members caught in
Israel, argued that they were entitled to the protection of
42 A Rosas The Legal
at 336.
Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 328
43 For example France, where the Free French government was
not recognised by the Germans.
44 Gp cit 60,
Conference of Geneva
based on F......i .......n Joja....l~.....JRu..:elot..c~o ...r~d"'----!aoL.jfl......-tk.Uh.s;c:e~D~i.J:pL.lI....IQ.lJmiU..a~t....r.i~c
2A (1949) 415.
45 1969 Israeli Military Court Ramallah file 9/67, 67 ~
( 197 1) 409.
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Convention 3. The court held that the Convention applies to
relations between states, and not between states and non-states,
and that this automatically excluded the defendants from the
protection of Article 4A(3). The verdict was based on the
traditional conception of international conflicts as interstate
conflicts. Arguably, the ANC could insist on the lawful combatant
status of its regular armed forces in terms of Article 4A(3)
because it represents a people. Such fighters would, by analogy
to Article 4A(1), have to prove their command link to the
national liberation movement and, by analogy to Article 4A(2),
conform to the conditions of distinction.
4.3.3 IRREGULAR COMBATANTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4.3 3.1 IRREGULARS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 4A(Z)
4.3 3.1.1 INTRODUCTION
Article 4A(2) of Geneva Convention 3 reads:
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including these of organised resistance movements,
belonging to a party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias and volunteer corps
including such organised resistance movements, fulfill th~
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at
a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the law and customs of war.
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Article 4A(2) is applicable to "other" militia and volunteer
corps, and organised resistance movements, in the sense that
these forces are not under national law a part of the regular
armed forces of the country.46 How does the ANC fit in under
Article 4A(2)? It is neither a volunteer corps, militia or
resistance movement. But these groups are no longer appropriate
.
to modern times and they cannot be taken as a numerus clausus. It
appears that members of any irregular group of a voluntary
nature, fighting on behalf of a legitimate party to an armed
conflict such as the ANC and abiding by Article 4A(2)'s
conditions, can qualify under the Article as lawful combatants.
Rosas notes that it has been generally assumed that should the
combatants of national liberation movements wish to be classified
as lawful under the 1949 Conventions, they must conform to the
conditions laid down for irregulars in Article 4A(2).47 He
criticises this assumption because it confuses the supposedly
irregular nature of the national liberation movement with its
armed forces, which may in fact be regular. It is likely,
however, that most, if not all the ANC's forces, will be
irregular until very late 1n the armed conflict when public
hierarchical military structures are established.
48 H Levie Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict
( 1978) 39.
47 Gp cit 332.
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Article 4A(2) sets out six conditions for lawful combatant
status, viz:
(1) That the movement to which the combatants are attached
belongs to a party to the conflict;
(2) That the movement is organised;
(3) That the movement is commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
(4) That the combatants have a fixed distinctive sign
recognisable at a distance;
(5) That the combatants carry their arms openly;
(6) That the combatants conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.
4,3,3 1,2 COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE?
Must these conditions be collectively or individually complied
with? A range of feasible interpretations has been made. The most
rudimentary is that Article 4A(2) only requires individual
compliance, But the text clearly contradicts this interpretation
as it refers to groups, Equally as simple is the interpretation
requiring collective adherence without exception. But an
individual's non-compliance cannot deprive all the members of a
group of their status as lawful combatants,48 A popular approach
insists on collective compliance with those conditions that can
be fulfilled by a group and individual compliance with the
48 R I Miller The Law of War (1975) 30.
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conditions that can be complied with by individuals. 48 Individual
failure to comply with the collective conditions does not result
in an individual losing his lawful combatant status, but renders
him liable for his violation of the law of war, a war crime. 50
Collective failure to observe the collective conditions entails
collective loss of lawful combatant status
compliance is of no avail.
and individual
The latter approach is the most functional. It can be expanded as
follows: With regard to the conditions of belonging to a party to
the conflict, group organisation and responsible command, the
obligation is initially individual, in that the individual must
first join a group, and then collective, in that the group must
be organised, under responsible command and belong to a party to
the conflict. If the individual does not join such a group then
he never qualifies as a lawful combatant. If the group is not
organised, under responsible command and linked to a party to the
conflict, then all its members do not qualify as lawful
combatants. The conditions of carrying arms openly, having a
fixed and distinctive sign and obeying the laws of war are also
fulfilled by the individual first and through collective
compliance second. But unlike the first three conditions,
48 0 Bindschedler-Robert "A Reconsideration of the Law of
Armed Conflict" in The Law of Armed Conflict (1971) 40,43.
G Draper "The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla
Warfare" 45 B.YlL. (1971) 196.
50 Draper op cit 1971 197.
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collective compliance is a function of individual compliance and
is not a separate issue. Compliance need not be universal.
Majority compliance within the group is enough to establish
collective compliance; all the members of the group qualify as
lawful combatants and individual violators do not lose their
lawful combatant status. But individual non-compliance should be
regarded as a violation of the laws of war and thus as a war
crime. This approach goes part of the way to the more logical
position of ignoring the latter three conditions entirely for the
purpose of lawful combatant status.
The situation becomes complex when there are different groups
participating under a single front, as appears to be the case
with the ANC. What happens when the ANC does not in the
preponderance collectively obey the conditions? Does every member
of every group linked to the ANC lose lawful combatant status? It
is submitted not. Compliance is adjudged group by group. If
combatants of one group collectively meet the conditions, then
lawful combatant status is established for that group, even if
every other group does not so qualify.
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4 3.3.1 3 THE SIX CONDITIONS ANALYSED
(1) The condition that the group belong to a party to the
conflict.
This condition explicitly links the material and personal fields
of application of lawful combatant status. Can the ANC be a party
to the conflict? The traditional viewpoint is that the phrase
"party to the conflict" must be read as referring to a signatory
state in the sense of Article 2 and not to a rebel party that has
not adhered to the Convention. 51 Such an interpretation would
require the ANC to belong to a state that is party to a conflict.
This traditional approach was taken by the Israeli Military
Tribunal in Military' Prosecutor V Omar Mahumed Kassem and
Others. 52 The defendants were PFLP members, one of the
constituent organisations of the PLO, who had crossed into the
West Bank from Jordan. They raised the defence that they were
P.O.W's and could not be charged as criminals. The court objected
that the PLO did not take orders from the Jordanian Government
and was an illegal organisation in Jordan, nor at the time did
any other state at war with Israel accept responsibility for the
acts of the PLO. It held that:
... the literature on the subject overlooks the most basic
condition of the rights of combatants to be considered upon
capture as P.O.W's, namely, the condition that the irregular
forces must belong to a belligerent party. If they do not
51 J S Pictet Commentary 3 57.
52 1969 42 International Law Reports 470. This position was
maintained in Israel's invasion of Lebanon see R Sabel
"Problems of the Law of Armed conflict in Lebanon" 77 Proceedings
gf the American Society of Internatiooal Law (1983) 240 at 241.
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belong to the government or the state for which they fight
it seems to us, that from the outset, they do not possess
the right to enjoy the status of P.O.W's on capture. 53
Nevertheless, the court went on to decide the case on the
accused's compliance with conditions (2)-(6).
Abi-Saab challenges the incumbent regimes' avoidance of the law
through their refusal to recognise opposing national liberation
movements as parties to the conflict. 54 He asserts that in wars
of national liberation the party is the people represented by the
national liberation movement and therefore the non-recognition of
the movement by the adversary government is of no effect. His
argument accords with ·the general principle that unrecognised
governments of states can be party to international armed
conflict. It is difficult to see why a liberal interpretation of
"party" should not include a 'people'. After all, De Gaulle's
Free French were fighting for the French people, despite the
53 The court appears to have sanctioned the viewpoint that
the PLO must be explicitly recognised by a government party to
the conflict. G Schwarzenberger "Terrorists, Hijackers
Gueriileros and Mercenaries" 21 Current Legal Problems (1971) 257
points out at 270 that such an assumption is incorrect. He argues
that Article 4A(2) must, on a liberal interpretation in
accordance with the humanitarian objects of the Conventions, be
read so that a group can belong to a party to the conflict
irrespective of whether it is recognised by a government or
whether under the law of a particular state it is legal or
illegal. L Nurick and R Barrett "Legality of Guerilla forces
under the Laws of War" 40 American JIL (1946) 563 at 568, note
that sovereign authorisation was dropped at the end of the
nineteenth century as a constituent requirement of lawful
combatant status.
54 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols" 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 355 at 417.
armistice agreement signed by
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thed~~e~__J~·u~r~e~ Vichy French
Government. In South Africa, ANC combatants belong to the ANC
and, by extension, it can be argued that they represent the
majority of the South African people in their struggle for self-
determination and the elimination of racism. In theory nothing
precludes ANC members from belonging to a."party to the conflict"
on a liberal interpretation of the Article, except the absence of
widespread support for such an interpretation. The disputed
material application of the law through Article 2 is of obvious
relevance here.
How does a group belong to a "party"? The exact nature of the
nexus between them is not defined. Pictet proposes that it be
tested by a theory of liaison. 55 In other words a de facto
relationship should be established. Possibly even tacit agreement
would be sufficient. 56 Draper argues that.it is not sufficient to
receive logistical support from such a party, but neither is it
necessary to, be logistically dependent and under the party's
operational command and discipline. 57 An explicit declaration by
the ANC of its responsibility for the activities of a specified
group of combatants would clarify the situation in South Africa.
ANC combatants would have to prove their membership of the ANC,
55 J S Pictet Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War
Victims (1975) 104.
56 Bindschedler Robert op cit 40.
57 G Draper "The Status of Combatants and the Question of
Guerrilla Warfare" 45 B..YI1. (1971) 200.
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the further link between the people and the ANC being a nebulous
concept that can only be inferred from widespread popular support
for the ANC. It is evident that ANC combatants do fight under the
ANC's ~d~e__~f~a~c~t~o authority and that the ANC holds itself
responsible for their actions. For example, the ANC claims
responsibility for bomb attacks. made within South Africa. Each
group's claim must be scrutinised separately. Splinter groups
such as the Western Cape Suicide Squad and various township
'comrades' groups would probably have difficulty in establishing
membership of the ANC.
(2) The condition that the group be organised.
Irregular forces tend by nature to operate in small bands and to
act on their own initiative. Nevertheless, to qualify for
protection they must have a central organisation and be subject
to the discipline and directives of a central command. 58 They may
consist of every kind of ex-civilian including women and
children, as long as they operate under superior command. 59
Disorderly bands and individual guerrillas acting on their own
are excluded from lawful combatant status. 60 The operation of
this condition in the context of wars of national liberation is
illustrated by three cases cited by Rosenblad.6~ Late in the
se M Greenspan The Modern Law of Armed Conflict (1959) 60.
58 Draper op cit 1971 199-200.
eo Greenspan lac cit.
61 E Rosenblad International Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict (1979) 84.
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Algerian war of national liberation the Supreme Court of France
attempted, in 3 judgments, to establish the principle that
captured rebels should enjoy the same protection as French
soldiers. In the Trial of Zamouche Houre and the Trial of Becetti
Hodelkoder in 1961, the court refused to grant the accused lawful
combatant status because they had not belonged to organised
military units. But in the Trial of Berrais the accused was
acquitted because he had acted as a member of an organised rebel
unit.62 In S y Sagarius63 Bethune J also made reference to the
fact that the accused entered Namibia as part of an " ... organised
military group under SWAPO's authority." ANC members who claim
lawful combatant status must prove their membership of an
organised m~litary group with a discernible chain of command.
Individuals acting on their own responsibility would be precluded
from arguing that their participation was lawful.
(3) The condition that the group must be under the command of a
person responsible for his subordinates.
As leadership is an essential element for success in military
62 Ibid. Rosenblad notes that towards the end of the
Algerian conflict French courts often treated FLN members as
P.O.W's, provided they belonged to an organised combatant unit
and could not be accused of terrorist attacks on civilians. A
similar distinction was made in Vietnam where captured irregulars
were classified as either guerrillas, self-defence forces, or
secret self-defence forces. Members of all 3 groups were regarded
as lawful combatants if they were caught engaged in combat or
upon proof that they had previously engaged in combat, but were
denied lawful combatant status if they had engaged in terrorism,
sabotage or espionage; see 62 American JIL (1968) 765-768.
63 1983 (1) SA 833 (SWA) at 834.
operations, this condition should be easily
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satisfied. In
interstate armeq conflict it was usually met by the command of
the resistance movement by an officer of the regular armed
forces. Such a situation is unlikely in the South African armed
conflict. Nevertheless, all that is necessary is that there be
someone in effective authority, either appointed by the ANC or
elected or appointed from within the group. Some way of
ascertaining rank, for instance badges or identity papers is
preferable, but not essential. Authorisation from high command is
helpful because it assists in establishing the nexus between the
group and the party to the conflict. A commander is responsible
for his subordinates' 'actions to a higher authority, whether it
be the high command or his own troops. Because the condition of
responsible command is an attempt to guarantee respect for the
other conditions, part of the evidence of non-compliance with it
will be non-observance of the'other conditions. 64 The internal
disciplinary regime of the group should also be such that the
conditions of lawful combatant status can be met in practice. 85
A problem that will undoubtedly manifest itself in the South
African armed conflict is how a captured ANC member will
establish that he is a member of a group under responsible
command without naming his commander and setting out the chain of
64 Draper op cit 1971 201.
85 Draper ibid. He submits that one way of doing this is to
make the conditions part of the internal disciplinary regime.
226
command, an action that would spell extinction for the group. In
Military Prosecutor y Omar Mahumed Kassem and Others,66 one of
the reasons the court gave for refusing the accused lawful
combatant status was because they had failed to show that they
acted under responsible command. ANC groups operate under
commanders, but for security purposes they are loathe to reveal
their identity. It is debatable whether an assertion of command
without revealing the commander's identity is enough to establish
membership of a responsibly commanded group. Article 17 of the
Convention does make provision for identity cards, which would,
to some extent, facilitate proof of such membership.
(4) The condition that the members of the group must have a fixed
distinctive sign recognisable at a distance.
This condition is the first of the two conditions that require
ANC combatants to distinguish themselves visibly from civilians.
It also serves to distinguish them from members of the Government
forces and from members of other organisations. It has two
constitutive parts:
(a) The sign must be fixed and distinctive: The first issue is
the measure of permanency required. The ICRC Commentary states
that the sign must be worn constantly and it cannot be removed at
convenience. 67 Accommodation with the reality of modern warfare
66 File no 9/69 Military Court Ramallah April 13 1969 at 56;
65 American JIL (1971) 409.
67 Commentary 3 59.
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has, however, meant that the condition of constantly wearing such
a sign has had to be relaxed. The test is that a combatant must
distinguish himself from civilians while engaged in all military
action.68 The sign must be 'fixed' in the sense that it is worn
when the combatant is in or is about to enter combat, secured in
such a way that it cannot be taken off to permit concealment of
the individual's combatant nature. On this basis, Levie rejects
easily disposable signs such as handkerchiefs, rags and loose
armbands. He approves of sewn on armbands and unique types of
jackets. s8 A distinctive uniform is best. The second issue is the
manner of distinction. The sign should be distinctive in that it
should provide a recognisable association with a widely known
group and should not be easily confused with the insignia of
other groups or the insignia of the opposing side. In other
words, it should be unique. What such a fixed and distinctive
sign will be in the South African armed conflict is a question of
fact.
(b) The sign must be "recognisable at a distance". The distance
at which the sign should be recognisable is controversial. No
specific distance is laid down. Draper argues that combatants
must be distinguishable from ordinary civilians at the distance
68 1971 Goyernment Experts Document vol 6 at
cit 47. 0 Bindschedler-Robert "A Reconsideration
Armed Conflict" in The Law of Armed Conflict
supports this interpretation as it flows from
preparatoires - a 1949 Danish proposal that the sign
in military operations was not expressly laid down -
2A 424,444.
68 Gp cit 48.
11; Levie op






at which weapons can be brought to bear. 7o The ICRC states that
combatants should be recognisable at a distance calculated by
analogy with the uniforms of the regular army.7~ This condition
harkens back to the days when regular armed forces wore coloured
or harmonious uniforms. In the age of automatic and long range
weapons and air support, camouflage has become the norm for both
regulars and irregulars. 72 An enemy is identified more by his
opening fire or his being in a certain territorial area than by
the colour of his uniform.
National liberation movements have complied with the condition of
wearing a fixed and' distinctive sign by wearing uniforms. In
Kassem's case the accused had distinguished themselves from
civilians in the area by wearing dark green uniforms and mottled
green caps.73 In Sagarius, Bethune J emphasised the fact that the
accused were clad in military uniform and were wearing fixed and
distinctive SWAPO emblems throughout their encounter with the
South African forces. 74 In South Africa, ANC .members often wear
70 Op cit 1971 272.
71 1971 Goyernment Experts Document 3 at 11; Levie op cit
48.
72 G Schwarzenberger "Terrorists, Hijackers, Guerrillas, and
Mercenaries" 24 Current Legal Problems (1971) 273.
73 Israel claimed that the PLO did not display a fixed and
distinctive sign in Lebanon; see R Sabel "Remarks: Problems of
the Law of Armed Conflict in Lebanon" 77 Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law (1983) 241.
74 1983 (3) SA 833 (SWA) at 834.
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uniforms when operating in rural terrain, but in the urban
context the condition is not adhered to. In the reality of modern
guerrilla warfare, this condition is completely unworkable. 75 The
carrying of arms openly is usually considered sufficient. But
arms, like signs, may be discarded in combat to allow a combatant
to assume the camouflage of a crowd of civilians. Solutions
involving factual criteria will always lead to controversy. A
better solution would be to require that combatants in the South
African armed conflict factually distinguish themselves without
stipulating exactly how and to judge their methods objectively
from the point of view of a reasonable combatant. This is in fact
what tribunals are likely to do in terms of the existing
criteria ..
(5) The condition that the members of the group must carry their
arms openly.
This is the second condition requiring ANC combatants to visibly
distinguish themselves from civilians. The arms should be carried
openly, not obviously, i.e., not more openly than a regular
soldier. 76 Customarily arms had to be carried openly constantly77
and could not be concealed when the combatant was not using them
or when he wished to pass himself off as a peaceful civilian. It
75 A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 346.
76 J S Pictet Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War
Victims (1975) 105.
77 Draper lac cit.
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is submitted that today arms need only be carried openly in
combat situations, i . e . , during actual engagements or
preparations for engagements. That the condition is difficult to
comply with is illustrated by Kassem's case, where one of the
grounds for disallowing the accused lawful combatant status was
that they had not carried their arms openly.78 In Sagarius,
Bethune J found that the accused had been carrying their arms
openly.78 Whether the condition will be problematic in South
Africa again depends on the sphere of operations. In rural areas
it will be comparatively easy for ANC guerrillas to carry their
arms openly. In the urban context concealment is the prevailing
tactic and ANC members 'would most probably find themselves in
violation of this condition. Therefore, it is submitted that an
objective test should also be used, based on how a reasonable
combatant would have carried his arms in the particular
circumstances of the inquiry.
(6) The condition that the members of the group conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
This condition has a constitutive effect in that the majority of
the members of a group must comply to secure lawful combatant
status for the group's members. 8o Individual breaches entail
78 Israel claims that PLO members do not as a rule carry
their arms openly - Sabel loc cit.
79 1983 (1) SA 833 (SWA) at 834..
80 D Bindschedler-Robert "A Reconsideration of the Law of
Armed Conflicts" in The Law of Armed Conflicts (1971) 41.
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personal responsibility, but no loss of lawful combatant status.
An expedient way for the South African Government to deny lawful
combatant status to ANC combatants is to insist on compliance
with the whole corpus of the laws of war. It is impossible for
ANC groups to comply with the four Geneva Conventions and the
Hague Regulations in all their details. Rosas argues, correctly
it is submitted, that this condition should·be seen only in its
constitutive sense and not as the basis for the compliance with
the law of armed conflict in its entirety. Compliance with the
corpus of the law is ensured by the Convention through the group
having to belong to a'party to the conflict that is itself bound
to observe the law. Used in its constitutive sense, .the condition
should be interpreted as only requiring compliance with the other
five conditions and the main principles of humanitarian law. 81
This accords with a realistic appraisal
ANC groups. Miller submits that what
of the capabilities of
must be looked for is
substantial compliance, especially in respect of prohibitions on
the wounded and dead, improper conduct towards flags of truce,
pillage and unnecessary violence and destruction. 82
Another major issue is whether the failure of the ANC as a whole
to observe the law of war can be imputed to all the groups
belonging to the ANC, without evidence of the adherence of the
81 Rosas op cit 363.
82 R Miller The Law of War (1975) 30.
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group in question. It is submitted that one groups failure to
observe the law-cannot serve as a reason for denying protected
status to all ANC members. In Kassem's case the court held that
the numerous acts of violence directed by the PFLP against
civilians precluded the argument that the defendants acted in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. The court made its
judgement without personal evidence of the accused's violations
of the law, basing it incorrectly on the general disregard of the
PFLP of the law. In contrast, the PC in Mobamed Ali and another v
££,83 the French Supreme Court in its response to appeals from
Algeria and the US in Vietnam, all made their decisions on the
basis of the individual's or his group's observance of the law
and not on the whole organisation's observance. Even the Israeli
court relied on the somewhat tenuous possible future individual
breach of the law inferred from the accused's carrying of
civilian clothing.
Rosas notes that there is an apparent contradiction between the
condition of compliance with the laws of war and Article 85 of
Convention 3, which states that persons prosecuted and convicted
for war crimes 84 committed before capture, retain the benefits of
83 1968 (3) All E R 488.
84 Although the Article reads "prosecuted under the laws of
the detaining power" and therefore literally does not include
prosecution under international law, Draper 45 aYLk (1971) 197
submits that the laws of the detaining power must include
international law - war crimes are part cif domestic law.
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the Convention. 85 At first blush, it appears that Socialist
reservations to Article 85 to the effect that P.D.W. status is
not retained after conviction, are in line with Article 4A(2).86
A closer look at Articles 85 and 4A(2), however, reveals that
they are compatible. We must recall that observance of the law of
war is a collective condition for lawful combatant status. If the
group as a whole ignores the law, then all its members fail to
qualify as lawful combatants. Article 85 does not apply because
they are not and never were lawful combatants and thus cannot
"retain" the benefits of the Convention. But if this condition
has only been violated by individual it is not constitutive of
protected status. The individual remains protected by Article 85,
i.e., he does not lose his lawful combatant status or p.a.w.
status despite his conviction for war crimes. But this does not
mean that an individual offender cannot be charged under the
detaining power's (DP) domestic law for a violation of that law
or for a war crime, except for the act of participation and penal
offences peculiar to that state. 87 P.O.W's are only given certain




made by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Romania, Ukraine, Byelorussia, USSR,
87 Commentary 3 419ff. F Kalshoven' "Reaffirmation and
Development of International Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts:
The 1974 Diplomatic Conference" 2~ (1971) 68 at 70, argues
that such prosecution of p.a.w's under Article 85 is unlikely in
the course of hostilities because it encounters grave practical
problems.
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formal safeguards88 which, it is submitted, should also apply to
unlawful combatants not qualifying as P.O.W's charged with war
crimes or crimes under the DP's national law. It is a rule of
natural justice that a person is entitled to a proper hearing by
a properly constituted court before he can be convicted and
punished for acts committed during hostilities.
No doubt observation of this condition will be difficult in the
South African armed conflict. It is not unlikely that the
Government will deny the application of lawful combatant status
to ANC combatants because of wholesale non-compliance with the
laws of war by the- ANC. As was submitted above, however,
compliance must be tested group by group. In addition, the ANC
has committ~d itself in its 1980 Declaration to meet the general
principles of the law and if this policy is applied by the men on
the ground, it will ensure that they meet the condition of
observing the laws of war.
The six conditions are onerous. On a strict interpretation, the
last three will probably not be met by the ANC, unless some
flexibility is introduced. The difficulty that national
liberation movements have with these conditions is reflected in
the reservation the PRG of Vietnam made when it acceded to the
Conventions. It stated that it would not recognise the
" ... conditions set forth in Article 4A(2) ... " as " ... these
ee Articles 84/100/103/104.
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conditions are not appropriate for the cases of peoples wars in
the world today."ss The conditions requiring visible distinction
may in fact have fallen into desuetude, although no consensus has
been achieved on this point. eo The strongest argument for the
retention of the visibility criteria is the protection of the
civilian population. If they are to be retained, they should
perhaps be read together as constituting a single condition of
visibility that must be evident before and during combat. At a
more general level, an approach similar to the US grant of
protected status to combatants in Vietnam who did not qualify
under the strict language of Article 4, if applied in the South
African armed conflict, would do much to accommodate the ANC's
problems with the conditions. It is submitted that the emphasis
in such an approach should be on the condition of membership of a
group linked to a party to the conflict.
~8 Quoted by H Levie Prisoners of War in International Armed
Co~fllct.(1978) 45. ,The accession of the former Portuguese colony
GUInea BIssau contaIns an almost identical reservation.
90 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols" 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 421.
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4,3,3,2 LEYEES EN MASSE
Article 4A(6) reads:
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist
the invading forces, without having had time to form
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry
arms openly, and respect the laws and customs of war.
Article 4A(6) preserves the so called levee en masse. It has
disappeared as a mode of irregular warfare since 1945, which may
seem surprising in view of the advent of 'peoples wars'. But the
sophistication of modern guerilla warfare ensures that national
liberation movements, due to the time taken in the gradual
building of political and military organisation, contest control
with an entrenched enemy. Nevertheless, mass levees may have a
small role in South Africa, perhaps in a township uprising if one
considers the township unoccupied or in the case of right wing
civilians forming into a mass levee in order to repel the ANC. In
either instance the conditions of Article 4A(6) would have to be
interpreted very generously. The conditions are:
(1) The territory must be unoccupied. A territory is considered
occupied when it is actually under the authority of the hostile
army,Sl The territory may be an unoccupied part of partially
occupied territory.92 In South Africa, all territory is at
91 Article 42 of the Hague Regulations.
92 This possibility is illustrated in Omar Mabumud Kassem and
Others v Military Prosecutor File 9/69 Military Court Ramallah 13
April 1969, 6~ American JIL (1971) 409. The court held that the
captured PFLP members did not qualify as lawful combatants under
Article 4A(6) because the area of the West Bank in which they
were captured had been occupied by Israel for more than one year
prior to the incident.
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present occupied by the Government forces and unoccupied by the
ANC.
(2) The mass of the population must spontaneously take to arms at
the approach of the enemy.
(3) They must not have had time to form themselves into regular
armed units. The essence of a mass levee is that it is
unorganised. Thus it can only exist for a very short period,
i.e., only during the actual invasion period. If resistance
continues it must adhere to the other provisions in Article 4A.s3
(4) They must carry their arms openly.
(5) They must respect 'the laws and customs of war.
The comments made in respect of these two conditions in Article
4A(2) apply here. Mass levee combatants are exempted from the
conditions of having to display a fixed and distinctive sign
recognisable at a distance and of having a responsible commander:
4 3 4 LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS AND THE DETAINING POWER'S OWN
NATIONALS UNDER THE 1949 CONVENTIONS
In interstate conflicts, captured combatants who are the DP's own
nationals are not entitled to lawful combatant status or P.O.W.
status as they owe the DP a duty of allegiance. s4 This rule was
not expressed in the 1949 Conventions, but it is implicit in the
83 Commentary 3 68.
94 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht International Law 7 ed (1952) 768.
238
assumptions made in certain Articles85 and was given judicial
sanction in pp y Pie Hee Koi. 8a The accused were twelve Chinese
Malays captured as members of an Indonesian paratroop force
during the Malayan - Indonesian confrontation. Convicted in the
lower courts, they appealed to the PC. They contended that they
were covered by Article 4 of Convention 3 and were lawful
combatants entitled to P.O.W. status. But the PC advised that
nationals of a DP were not entitled to lawful combatant status
and P.D.W. status despite the silence in Article 4. The PC denied
that the Conventions had changed customary international law as
enunciated in the traditional definition. Allegiance was the
governing principle. 97 , It brought into action municipal criminal
law as opposed to international law.
The duty of allegiance is the basis for all prosecutions of ANC
members in South Africa, whether it is explic~t as in the crime
of treason or implicit as in the various statutory crimes. The
international character of the South African armed conflict is
founded on the assumption that the representatives of the people
engaged in a struggle for self-determination are not bound by any
85 For example, Article 87 on penalties for P.D.W's, states
that when fixing a penalty the DP should take into consideration
the fact " ... that the accused, not being a national of the DP, is
not bound to it by a duty of allegiance." Article 100 recalls
this fact in connection with the death sentence in particular.




duty of allegiance to the incumbent regime and may thus not be
punished as rebels or traitors. It is arguable that the denial of
self-determination through non-racism in South Africa cuts
through the tie of allegiance between the Government and ANC
members. No duty exists because the unrepresentative nature of
the Government means that it does not truly represent the state,
the embodiment of the political will of the people. Thus the
principle of nationality as embodied in the operation of the
Conventions and especially with regard to the conferring of
lawful combatant status, caQ be ~egarded as inoperative in the
South African context.
4 3 5 DESERTERS AND DEFECTORS
Levie explains the distinction as follows: se A deserter is
someone whose is absent from his place of duty without the
permission of the proper authorities. His change of status is
motivated by his adversity to the military life and not by
ideology. A defector on the other hand seeks refuge with the
enemy because he disagrees with the policies of his own
government and agrees with those of the enemy. His motivation is
ideological. A deserter is still technically a lawful combatant
of his original side and retains his P.O.W. status. A defector is
also a lawful combatant but if the enemy allows him to serve in
its forces it violates Articles 4, 5 and 7 of Convention 3.
se H Levie Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict
(1978) 77-78.
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Defectors may also run foul of the non-protection of nationals
provisions. But those provisions cannot operate in wars of
national liberation. Defections are common in the South African
armed conflict. Because of the nature of the conflict, it is
submitted that provisions penalising defectors must be ignored.
4 3 6 THE PROCEDURE FOR ADJUDICATION OF STATUS
Where a combatant's status is in doubt, Article 5(2) of
Convention 3 applies. It reads:
(2) Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands
of the enemy, belong to any of categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.
Article 5(2) provides that an individual who falls into the hands
of the enemy is entitled to the protection of the Convention
until his status is established. This provision prohibits the
execution of a combatant before his status has been determined.
Who must raise the issue of status? In PP y Die Hee Koi 98 the PC
based its judgement on the fact that although it was not proved
that the accused owed Malaya allegiance, it was not contended or
proved that they did not. Baxter notes that the PC's position
seems to be that a member of the enemy armed forces may be denied
P.O.W. statu&, unless the detained person contends that he has
such status. 100 The PC was probably incorrect. The better view is
99 1968 2 WLR 715.
100 Gp cit 293.
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that the accused should retain their P.D.W. status until an
Article 5 tribunal decides on proof from the DP that they are not
entitled to P.D.W. status.
What is a competent tribunal? There appear to be many different
versions, eg., military tribunals, ordinary national courts etc ..
The US in Vietnam issued the first ever directive on the
subject.~D~ The Article 5 tribunal was to consist of 3 or more
officers who should be, and at least one of whom was required to
be, military lawyers. The tribunal had to conduct a hearing
according to a set procedure at which the combatant had a right
to counsel. It had to reach a decision as to the legality of his
participation in combat and his consequent entitlement or not to
P.D.W. status. A decision of entitlement was fixed, a decision of
non-entitlement was subject to review, rehearing or an
administrative grant of P.D.W. status by the commanding officer.
There is little information on how this system was actually
applied. The U.N. Secretary General's report on human ~ights ~n
armed conflict recommended that an international agency perform
the function of competent tribunal in terms of Article 5.~02 A
special tribunal of world habeas corpus has also been
~o~
cit 57.
MACV/Directive 20-51 15/3/1966 par 5f cited in Levie op
102 2nd Report of the Secretary General on Human Rights in
Armed Conflict U.N.Doc. A/8052 18/9/1970.
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proposed.103 Although the ANC has international lawyers among its
membership and could supply the expertise necessary for an
Article 5 tribunal as well as appeal and review procedures, it
may prefer an international agency to perform the function of
competent tribunal. Such a solution is, however, unlikely to be
acceptable to the Government. An in house procedure would
probably be most suitable. If so, status should be adjudicated by
a special tribunal made up of senior military lawyers and
officers so that the whole issue is removed from the municipal
legal sphere. Review and appeal procedures should be carried out
by a special board made up of Supreme Court judges. Article 5(2)
also envisages that the adjudication of status will normally be
made by the same court to which a case has been referred for
trial of a substantive offence. The special tribunal could
adequately fulfill both functions - adjudication of status and
trial for violations of the law of armed conflict. The special
tribunal should adopt an inquisitorial procedure to ensure that
the accused's compliance or non~compliance with the law is fully
investigated, bearing in mind that he or she may often be unaware
of the technicalities of the law. Article 17 provides for the
information that a P.O.W. is bound to give (name, rank and serial
number) and sets out the requirements for ID cards to be carried
by combatants and notes in paragraph 4 that no physical or mental
torture- may be used to extract any further involuntary
103 L Rider "International due process for P.D.W.: The need
for a Special Tribunal of World Habeas Corpus" 21 University of
Miami LR (1967) 721.
information. It should be pointed out
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to combatants that
information in regard to their positive compliance with the
conditions for lawful combatant status can only be to their
advantage. Article 43 assists the adjudication procedure because
it requires the communication of ranks of all persons mentioned
in Article 4 by the parties to the conflict.
4.3.7 PROTECTIONS FOR UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS
All combatants in the South African armed conflict who do not
qualify as lawful under Article 4, can still avail themselves of
the minimum protections of Article 5 of the Geneva Civilians
Convention 4 of 1949, 'if they are captured operating in occupied
or enemy territory. Paragraph 3 ~eads:
Such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and
in·the case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of
fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention.
They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of
~a protected person under the present convention at the
earliest date consistent with the security of the state or
occupying power, as the case may be.
Article 5 is ambiguous in that it only concedes the possibility
of a trial - "in case of trial" - when obviously an adjudication
of status is an absolute necessity. But it appears that the
Article refers to a trial for violation of the penal provisions
promulgated by the DP.104 Article 5 is also deficient in that
paragraph 2 denies a prisoner's right of communication under
Article 23/30/136 if absolute military necessity so requires.
104 Articles 66,71-75 of Geneva Convention 4.
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In the South African context the general protections offered by
Article 5 are hit by Article 4 of Convention 4, which states that
protected persons do not include a state's own nationals. But to
be consistent with the argument that the nationality provisions
do not apply in the South African armed conflict, Article 4 also
cannot apply because there is no tie of allegiance. What is more,
Article 5 provides no more than the basic rights recognised under
all civilised legal systems. Unlawful combatants will also remain
protected by the general requirements of the De Maartens clause
for humane and civilised treatment, a general principle of law
recognised by all civilised nations. Draper submits that this
principle demands a fair trial and conviction before
execution.~o5
4 3 8 CONCLUSION
Although members of the South African Government forces will
probably find the personal conditions of lawful combatant status
in Convention 3 fairly easy to comply with, these stringent
conditions will ensure that the application of the 1949
Conventions in South Africa provides little relief for combatant
members of the ANC. Moreover, despite the fact that the
Conventions procedural protections go some way to ensure that a
combatant·s entitlement to protected status is fully
investigated, should such status be lost, the Conventions provide
~05 G Draper "The Status of Combatants and the Question of
Guerrilla Warfare" 45 B.Yl.L. (1971) 198.
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little protection for unlawful combatants. It seems, therefore,
that the ANC must seek application of Protocol l's more relaxed
personal conditions, even if only as an authoritative
interpretation of Article 4 of Convention 3, if the law of armed
conflict is to have much real impact on the South African armed
conflict.
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4 4 PERSONAL CONDITIONS FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS UNDER GENEVA
PROTOCOL 1 OF 1977
4 4 1 INTRODUCTION
This section examines the new, more appropriate, conditions for
the regulation of combatants in the South African armed conflict
set out in Protocol 1.
4 4 2 NEW CONDITIONS FOR LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
The recognition of wars of national liberation as international
armed conflicts in terms of Article 1(4) was bound up with the
reduction in Protocol 1 of the personal conditions of lawful
participation for combatants. Experience had shown that Article 4
of the 1949 Conventions applied far too strict a standard to be
functional in wars of national liberation. The result was a
general lack of respect for international law. The consensus at
the beginning of the 1970s was that Article 4's criteria needed
revision. In response, the ICRC to recommended to the 1971
Government Experts Conference that the criteria for irregulars to
qualify as lawful combatants be relaxed on the assumption that
guerrilla warfare was the principal type of warfare conducted by
irregulars. 10B The experts considered military organisation and
106 ICRC Materials Jan 1977 Document 6 Rules applicable in
Guerilla Warfare 6-23, quoted in W T Mallison and S V Mallison
"The Juridical Status of Privileged Combatants under the Geneva
Protocol of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts" in 42(2) LaR
and Contemporary Problems (1978) 10.
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observation of the laws of war indispensable for irregulars~07
and although a number felt that the two conditions of visible
distinction were inconsistent with guerilla warfare,~oe it was
agreed that irregulars had to distinguish themselves in some
meaningful way from civilians in order to protect civilians.~os
Because of the impetus behind the movement for reduction of the
conditions, the ICRC submitted draft Article 42 entitled "New
Category of Prisoners of War" as the basis for discussion at the
Diplomatic Conference. It read:
In addition to the persons mentioned in Article 4 of the
third Convention, the members of organised resistance
movements who have fallen into the hands of the enemy are
prisoners of war provided such movements belong to a party
to the conflict~ even if that party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognised by the detaining
power, and provided that such movements fulfill the
following conditions:
Ca) that they are under a command responsible to a party to
the. conflict for its subordinates;
(b) that they distinguish themselves from the civilian
population during military operations,
(c) that they conduct their military operations in
accordance with the conventions and the present protocol ...
A footnote provided that members of organised liberation
108
movements would receive P.D.W. treatment if they obeyed the
"above mentioned" conditions. l10 The draft Article codified the
~07 Mallison and Mallison ibid.
108 ICRC Report 00 the 1971 G/E Conference 68 col 2, Mallison
& Mallison ibid.
Mallison and Mallison op cit 19.
1~0 In fact, the only reference to wars of national liberation
in the draft Protocol appeared in the footnote to this draft
Article. It read:
In cases of armed struggle where peoples exercise their
right to self-determination as guaranteed by the U.N.
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liberal interpretation of several aspects of Article 4A(2) of
Convention 3. It made it explicit that irregulars could belong to
a government or authority not recognised by the DP; it made it
clear in condition (c) that compliance with the condition of
conducting military operations in accordance with the law is
collective and that individual violation does not result in loss
of lawful combatant status; it amalgamated the two criteria of
visible distinction into condition (b)'s general requirement that
combatants distinguish themselves from civilians only during
military operations. 111 By not specifying the exact manner of
distinction, the draft Article took into account the exigencies
of modern warfare.
The relaxation of the personal conditions of lawful combatant
status dominated the second, third and fourth sessions of the
Conference, just as inclusion of wars of national liberation in
the definition of international armed conflicts had dominated the
first session. A number of alternative amendments to draft
Article 42 were put forward. 112 Finland's113 and the UK/USA's114
Charter and the 'Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the U.N.' members
of organised liberation movements who comply with the above
mentioned conditions shall be treated as prisoners of war
for as long as they are detained. .
111 Defined by the ICRC as "offensive and defensive moves by
the armed forces in action"- ICRC Draft Additional Protocols to
the Geneva conventions of 1949 Commentary 51.
112 E Rosenblad International Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict (1979) 91-94.
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amendments both endorsed the IeRC's approach, demanding the
distinction of civilians and combatants and retaining the
regular/irregular dichotomy. Norway's amendment l15 legitimised
all combatants who were members of organised, responsibly
commanded, armed forces of a party to the conflict. 118 There were
no other constitutive conditions for protected status - the
logically distinct issues of the right to participate and the
manner of participation were disconnected but there was a
separate provision obliging combatants to distinguish themselves
from civilians during military operations. Ultimately, however,
the debate became a question of compromise between those who
urged the total abandonment of the conditions of visible
distinction and those who wanted to retain the conditions but at
a reduced level.
The national liberation movements' supporters desired to see the
principle of distinction dispensed with entirely. Illustrative of




116 A similar approach had been proposed by Norway, Romania,
Indonesia and the Philippines at the second Conference of G/E's-
G/E Conference 2 Records 15,17,41,49,54.
117 Summary Record of the DAU Seminar on Humanitarian Law Oar
Es Salaam 21-25/1/1974 Annex 4 5,18-19 quoted by A Cassese "A
tentative reappraisal of the old and the new humanitarian law of
armed conflict" in A Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict vol 1 (1979) 473.
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of national liberation the distinction between civilians and
freedom fighters blurred because they fought side by side. It
argued that by accepting the principle of distinction the freedom
fighters would have to give up their principle method of combat
and they were not prepared to do so because colonial or neo-
colonial armies had superior technology and military strength.~~e
The Vietnamese delegate took the extreme view that the draft
articles should be tailored to bring the parties to a factually
equal position.~19 He felt that the condition of visibility
should exist for resistance movements but not for national
liberation movements because it was only justified in the
international armed conflicts envisaged by the Hague Regulations
and Geneva Conventions. He argued that these conflicts took place
between industrialised European countries at about the same level
of development, able to retaliate on each other's territory, and
the activities of resistance movements in these conflicts were
completely distinct from the lives of the civilian population.
But wars of national liberation, he argued, were unequal war
situations where national liberation movements would have to wait
years before setting up regular units, the colonial aggressors
did not fear retaliation on their population and the lives of the
118 The ZANU delegate at the Conference put forward a similar
argument, grounded on the idea that the national liberation
movement was a vanguard party of the people and indistinguishable
from the people. He noted that national liberation movements
simply could not afford uniforms and emblems and sometimes went
to battle in "ragged shorts." - CDDH/lll/SR33.
~~9 CDDH/l11/SR33.
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combatants and civilians were inseparable. On this basis he urged
the total abandonment of the condition of visibil~ty.
The national liberation movements' supporters' efforts were only
partially successful. The condition of visibility was retained
largely through the influence of the rapporteur of Committee 3,
George Aldrich (US), whose amendment to draft Article 42~20
formed the core of the new Article 44. The compromise solution
contained in the report submitted by the working group of
Committee 3 to plenary in 1977,~2~ made various concessions to
those parties who wanted the visibility condition done away with
entirely. Firstly, the condition of visibility had Gnly to be
fulfilled immediately before an attack and the method of
distinction was not specified. Secondly, although the condition
of visibility was made crucial to protected status in certain
special situations - according to the report, primarily in war~
of national liberation - only one condition of visibility was
adopted, viz.: the carrying of arms openly.122
120 CDDH/lll/100.
12l CDDH/236/REV1.
122 In reaching this compromise solution, efforts by certain
states to introduce explicit references to national liberation
movements into the Article were halted after it was pointed out
that Article 1(4) effectively included ·national liberation
movement members as lawful combatants; for instance the
Vietnamese amendment to draft Article 42 - CDDH/ll1/253. It is
interesting to note that Spain, reacting to the new Article 1,
tried unsuccessfully to enter an amendment to Article 42 with an
extra condition, viz.: " provided they exercise effective
territorial jurisdiction - CDDH/ll1/209 .
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On Israeli insistence, Article 44 went to the vote in plenary.
The vote was 73/1/12. Israel voted against, while most Western
states abstained. The rapprochement between those who valued the
principle of distinction and those who sought to reduce the
conditions for protected status, appears to have been weighted in
the latter group's favour. Hence the new Article gained Third
World and Socialist approval, while the Western states felt it
conceded too much, hence their abstentions.
The ICRC also introduced to the Conference a draft Article 41
entitled "Organisation' and Discipline", requiring armed forces to
" ... be organised and subject to an appropriate disciplinary
system." The majority of states recognised the importance of a
disciplinary system for irregulars. The working group of
Committee 3 expanded the draft Article to cover not only the
conditions of organisation and discipline, but also the
definition of armed forces, those who have the right to be
combatants and the incorporation of police forces into armed
forces. 123 The catch all " ... even if the party ... not recognised
by ... adverse party ... " was introduced. The title was changed to
"Armed Forces". Article 43 in its final form was adopted by
consensus in plenary.
123 Ghana attempted to have national liberation movements
expressly mentioned in draft Article 41 as well - CDDH/111/28.
With the expansion of the text the specific mention of particular
types of armed forces, for example national liberation movements,
was abandoned.
Party to a conflict incorporates a
armed law enforcement agency into its armed
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Protocol 1 also saw the introduction of new rules on mercenaries,
spies, and safeguards for unlawful combatants. The aim of the
Protocol was, according to Committee 3's rapporteur," to provide
... a single and non-discriminatory set of rules applicable
"to all combatants regular and irregular alike, and to
prescribe the necessary limited exceptions for spies,
mercenaries, and those guerrillas in occupied territory who
take advantage of their apparent civilian status to conceal
their weapons while making into position for attack. 124
Articles 43 and 44 contain the main complex of rules relating to
protected status for combatants in the South African armed
conflict. This complex must be analysed first, before we turn to
the exceptional legal regimes.




1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of
organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognised by an adverse
Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict
(other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by
Article 33 of the Civilians Convention) are combatants, that




124 G H Aldrich "New Life for the Laws of War" 75 American
JLk (1981) 764 at 770.
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forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.
Article 43(1) brings under legal control all armed forces, even
those belonging to a Party that " ... is represented by a
government or an authority not recognised by an adverse Party."
Thus a party to the conflict must accord lawful combatant status
to combatants of an adversary party which is either (i) an HCP;
or (ii) a state which accepts and applies the Protocols and
Conventions under Common Article 2 of the Conventions or Article
96(2) of Protocol 1, even if the government of such a state is
unrecognised; or (iii) an adversary authority even if that
authority is unrecognised. "Authority" means national liberation
movements as envisaged in Articles 1(4) and 96(3) of Protocol 1
or perhaps under common Article 2 paragraph 3 of the Conventions
and thus includes the ANC. Although logically the people seeking
self-determination through non-racism is the party to the
conflict, it is practically expedient to regard the ANC as the
authority and party to the conflict. Thus the ANC's armed forces
are the armed forces of a party to the conflict. In respect of
both the Government and the ANC, the issue of recognition/non-
recognition by adversaries has been quashed.
The first sentence of Article 43(1) establishes the minimum
criteria for armed. forces and, by extension, lawful combatants in
the South African armed conflict. Article 43 applies a single
standard to all armed forces, doing away with the traditional
dichotomy of regulars and irregulars. Thus, unlike Ar~icle 4A(2)
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of Convention 3, no special law applies to irregular forces in
South Africa. All combatants must meet three conditions to
acquire lawful combatant status.
Firstly, and importantly, Article 43 retains the command link
between a Party to the conflict and its armed forces as the key
criterion of lawful combatant status.~25 The link provides·
membership of armed forces and the concomitant protections only
to individuals who act on behalf of a state - South Africa - or
an entity which is a subject of international law - the ANC - and
excludes private wars.~26
Secondly, combatants must belong to "organised" armed forces.
Organisation of the armed forces, groups or units to which
combatants belong is a collective condition for lawful combatant
status. Individuals who are not memb~rs of organised groups are
not protected by the law. All the members of unorganised groups
lose their lawful combatant status. Organisation is an essential
characteristic of an effective fighting force. It will probably
be inferred from rank structures and hierarchical chains of
command. Umkbonto cadres appear to be organised and should
collectively fill this obligation. Members of unorganised
splinter units may, however, lose the laws protection.
1.25 G H Aldrich "Guerilla Combatants and P.O.W Status" 31
American ULR (1982) 871 at 874.
~26 M Bothe, K Partcsh and W A Solf New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflicts (1982) 237.
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The th~rd condition for lawful combatant status is that the armed
forces must be under a " ... command responsible to that party for
the conduct of its subordinates." Responsible command of the
armed forces, groups or units to which combatants belong is a
collective condition of lawful combatant status. Individuals who
do not belong to such a responsibly commanded group lose the
law's protection. Collective violation of this condition means
the loss of lawful combatant status for all the members of the
group. The condition should be easy to comply with in the South
African armed conflict as it is integral to the effective
functioning of armed forces. Responsible command is one of the
conditions of the Hague/Geneva formulation retained in Article
43. But its formulation here is different to the individual
command responsibility contained in Article 4A(2). Article 43
recognises that national liberation movements in Article 1(4)
conflicts might be under an anonymous collegial command for
security purposes. It thus eliminates many of the practical
problems with the old formulation. Despite this improvement it
appears that Articles 86 and 87 have reinstated individual
command responsibility and have detracted from the effort to
depersonalise command.~2?
Article 43(1) provides in a separate sentence that armed forces
shall be subject to a disciplinary system enforcing compliance
~27 Bothe et al. op cit 237.
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with the laws of armed conflict. There is some dispute as to
whether this condition is constitutive of lawful combatant
status, despite the fact that it is plainly an adaptation of the
Hague/Geneva condition of " ... conducting operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war."~28 If we consider the sentence
in isolation, its use of the peremptory verb "shall" implies that
such enforcement must be in operation and thus appears to be a
sine gua non of qualification for lawful combatant status. But
the structure of the paragraph, by making lawful combatant status
conditional on command link, responsible command, and
organisation, militates against this interpretation. So do the
negotiating record and,the provisions of Article 44(2).128 Bathe,
Partsch and Solf note that Articles 43 and 44 reaffirm Article 85
of Convention 3, which provides that lawful combatants retain
their P.O.W. status notwith~tanding violations of the law of
armed conflict.~3o For these reasons it is submitted that under
Article 43 lawful combatant status is not conditional on being
subject to a disciplinary system enforcing the law. Nevertheless,
armed forces must have a disciplinary system enforcing the law of
armed conflict. Discipline is desirable for military efficiency
128 F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and
International Humanitarian Law Applicable
the Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 1974-77" 8
124 argues it is a-condition, contra Mallisori
20.




RYLh (1977) 107 at
and Mallison op cit
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as well as being essential for observance of the law. 131 Bothe,
Partsch and Solf argue that failure on the part of the armed
force's command to provide a disciplinary system could constitute
a breach of Articles 86, 87 and 43 and may entail the charging of
those responsible with dereliction of duty leading to appropriate
penalties. 132 Lawful combatants who violate the law of armed
conflict remain personally liable for their violations, but
retain the procedural protections of Article 86 of Convention 3
as P.O.W·s. Roberts reacted to Article 43's removal of the
penalty of loss of lawful combatant status for violation of the
laws of armed conflict, by noting that individuals could now only
be punished for their· violations if sufficient evidence to prove
individual guilt could be produced in court. 133 Such evidence
would, however, also be required for removal of status. The point
is that violation of the laws of war is a universally punishable
offence. It should not be enforced by deprivation of lawful
combatant status; it is an issue of how a war is fought rather
than of those qualified to fight it. Observance of the laws of
war is a sound principle in abstract, but its application in
times of armed conflict has been unsatisfactory. Compliance with
131 Statement of the ICRC delegate to the conference
CDDH/ll1/SR30. Such a system imposes an obligation on the command
of armed forces to educate their combatants in the. law of armed
conflict.
132 Loc cit.
133 G B Roberts "The new rules for waging war: The case
against ratification of Additional Protocol 1" 26 Virginia
Journal of International Law (1985) 109 at 129.
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the law of armed conflict could easily become another propaganda
tool in the South African armed conflict.
Article 43(2) defines the persons who have a right to participate
directly in hostilities - lawful combatants - and reaffirms the
principle of lawful combatant status, the right to participate
directly in combat without violating the law ab initio. All
members of armed forces, as defined in paragraph 1, excluding
non-combatants, as defined in paragraph 2,134 are combatants and
all combatants are lawful. 135 By necessary implication those who
are not members of armed forces under paragraph 1 are not lawful
combatants. Hence the importance of the three conditions of armed
forces - command link, organisation and responsible command - for
lawful combatant status. The provision is an improvement over
Article 4 of Convention 3 which, by implication, made the
criteria for P.O.W. status the criteria for lawful combatant
status.
134 The only non-combatant members of armed forces mentioned
specifically are medical personnel and chaplains who have special
functions under the Conventions and Protocols. Generally speaking
they are not allowed to enter into combat and they do not acquire
P.O.W. status on capture - See above 4.2.1.2; Geneva Convention 1
Articles 24, 28; Convention 2 Articles 36, 37; Convention 3
Article 33; Protocol 1 Article 8(c)&(d).
135 Military personnel permanently assigned to civil defence
organisations under the provisions of Article 67 of Protocol 1
are the one exception to the general rule that armed forces
members are lawful combatants. Once such members are assigned to
civil defence organisations and acquire Article 67's protection,
they lose .the -right to participate in hostilities for the
duration of the armed conflict.
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Combatant status has been defined in such a manner as to avoid
controversial terms like 'privileged', 'legitimate' and
'lawful' .138 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the appellation
'lawful' should be retained for the sake of convenience. Article
44 provides for the forfeiture of combatant status by a guerilla
who fails to comply with the minimum rule of distinction in
certain situations and Articles 46 and 47 deny status to spies
and mercenaries respectively. The individual fighter who has lost
'combatant' status still remains a de facto combatant. How then
are we to distinguish him semantically from his legitimate
counterpart? In addition, in the South African context the
appellation 'lawful' is particularly appropriate as combatants
who have lost this status are unlawful under national law.
Article 43(3), an important innovation, sets out the requirements
for incorporation of paramilitary or police forces (considered
civilians in international law) into a party to the conflict's
armed forces and by extension their qualification as lawful
combatants. Two conditions must be met: (i) The party to the
conflict must notify other parties to the conflict of the
incorporation and, by necessary implication, of the identity of
the particular paramilitary force being incorporated. Such
notif·ication is unlikely in South Africa because the Government
does not recognise the ANC. It is submitted that notification may
be dispensed with because the large scale para-military
136 CDDH/l11/361 Add 2.
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activities undertaken by the police is a matter of public
knowledge. (ii) The paramilitary force or police force must meet
the conditions of paragraph 1, i.e., command link, organisatlon
and responsible command. In South Africa the extensive use of the
South African Police in a paramilitary role makes this feature of
Article 43 of enormous significance.
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While Article 43's establishment of the conditions for lawful
combatant status is unproblematic, the long and detailed Article
44 complicates the determination of status. Article 44 reads:
into the power of an adverse
an attack or in military
attack shall not forfeit his
a prisoner of war by virtue of
COMBATANTS AND PRISONERS OF WAR
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into
the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict,
violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of
his right to be a combatant, or if he falls into the power
of an adverse Party, of his right to be a 'prisoner of war,
except as provided in paragraph~ 3 and 4.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognising,
however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where,
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as
a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries
his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while
he is engaged in military deployment preceding the launching
of an attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph,
shall not be considered perfidious within the meaning of
Article 37 para l(c).
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party
while failing to meet the requirements set forth in the
second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be
a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to
prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where
such person is tried and punished for any offences he has
committed.
5. Any combatant who falls
Party while not engaged in
operations preparatory to an
rights to be a combatant and
his prior activities.
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any
person to be a prisoner of war pursuant to Article 4 of the
Third Convention.
7. This Article is not intended to change the generally
accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of
the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed
armed units of a Party to the conflict.
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8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in
Article 13 of the First and Second Conventions, all members
of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as defined
in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to
protection under those conventions if they are wounded or
sick, or in the case of the Second Convention, shipwrecked
at sea or in other waters.
Article 44(1) incorporates the conditions of Article 43 for
lawful combatant status into the conditions for P.G.W. status.
Anyone involved in the South African armed conflict who does not
qualify as a lawful combatant will not qualify as a P.G.W. While
reaffirming the obligation on combatants to comply with the law
of armed conflict contained in Article 43, Artlcle 44(2)
reiterates Article 85 of Convention 3's rule that violations of
the law of armed conflict shall not deprive combatants of lawful
combatant status or p.a.w. status, except through violation of
the specific conditions set out in Article 43 and in Article
44(3). It thus makes explicit what is implicit in the structure
of Article 43, viz.: that compliance with all the rules is not a
constitutive condition of lawful combatant or P.D.W. status.
Article 44(2) recognises that criminal responsibility for war
crimes is individual, not collectively based on the obligations
of group responsibility.~37 In other words, if an ANC member
blows up a bar on the Durban beach front, he and all other ANC
members should not be deprived of protected status when he can
~37 G H Aldrich "Progressive development of the laws of war: A
reply to criticisms of the 1977 Geneva protocol 1" 26 Yirgina
Journal of International Law (1986) 694 at 705.
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still be tried and punished for his individual offence. 138
Article 44's most important provisions in respect of lawful
combatant status are contained in paragraph 3. Article 44(3)
contains the compromise between those Conference delegates
favouring the retention of the visibility component of the
principle of distinction either as a separate rule of the law or
as a condition for lawful combatant status and those favouring
its total rejection because of the impossibility of national
liberation movements meeting such a condition. 139 Article 44(3)
sets out a general rule of visibility and a special rule for
exceptional situations~
The first sentence of Article 44(3) provides that in order to
promote civilian protection, all combatants must distinguish
themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in
an attack or in military operation preparatory to an attack. The
138 Article 44(2) confirms the construction that avoids the
apparent contradiction between Article 85 and Article 4A(2) of
Convention 3. It appears to neutralise Communist --bloc
reservations to Article'85 which are to the effect that will not
extend protected status to individuals convicted under the laws
of the DP for war crimes. But Communist bloc representatives
stated in the working group that Article 85 only covered the
period after conviction of a P.D.W., and Article 44(2) should be
understood as only dealing with the situation up to conviction-
Bothe et al. op cit 750; CDDH/236/Revl. Thus they accepted
Article 44(2) as having a limited effect, and still apply their
reservations to Article 85 of the Convention.
139 See CDDH/ll/SR33-36, and the Report of the Committee
CDDH/236/Revl.
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principle of distinction is reaffirmed. 140 An important omission
from Article 44(3) was a condition enforcing the distinction
between the opposing armed forces. Combatants are only required
to distinguish themselves from civilians and not from members of
the opposing side. It can only be assumed that the prohibition
against activities such as wearing the other sides uniform in
combat is part of customary law and applies to the South African
armed conflict. Two features of the general ~bligation of
distinction must be examined:-
(i) How, when and where must combatants distinguish themselves?
The method of distinction is unspecified, but can be deduced from
past practice in the context of the existing law. Traditionally a
distinctive sign and the open carrying of arms was sufficient.
The mention of carrying arms openly in the second sentence of
Article 44(3) suggests that it is the minimum general condition,
but because the second sentence is an exceptional situation, it
1S arguable that under the general rule something more is
required. But the special rule in sentence 2 is exceptional more
in regard to the 'when' than the 'how' of distinction. Article
44(3) sentence 1 definitely applies a less rigorous standard than
Article 4 of Convention 3. In this context we must note Article
140 The general principle of distinction is specifically
mentioned in Article 48 which provides:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants.
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44('7), which is to the effect that the generally accepted state
practice of wearing uniforms remains unchanged under Protocol 1.
Article 44(3) first sentence lowers the standard of distinction
for what in effect will be mostly regular armed forces. Is its
reduced standard overridden in respect of regulars by the
specific rule contained in Article 44(7)? It is submitted that
Article 44(7) only requires that regular forces should wear
uniforms whenever possible. 141 The working group's report noted
that regulars are not required to wear uniforms when they are
assigned to tasks where they must wear civilian clothes. 142 Does
this mean that when they operate clandestinely regular armed
forces may discard their uniforms? As long as they· meet the
conditions in Article 44(3) sentence 1, they will not be in
violation of the Protocol. Article 44(7) does not contain a
specific sanction for failure of regular armed forces to wear
uniforms. 143 It merely encourages a ~enerally accepted practice.
It provides a justiciable standard of distinction, in the sense
of uniforms being the principle means of distinction for regular
armed forces, which is not specifically provided for in paragraph
3 sentence 1. On this basis it is submitted that Article 44(3)
141 After A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War
(1976) 333.
142 CDDH/236/REV2/XV' 373 para 84.
143 Contra M Bothe, K Partsch & W Solf New Rules for Victims
of Armed Conflict (1982) 256, who feel that members of regular
armed forces lose their lawful combatant and P.O.W. status if
they do not adhere to paragraph 7. But such an approach is not
borne out by the text. It is submitted that it is unrealistic
given the nature of modern warfare.
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first sentence requires some functional method of distinction,
based on, but not dependent upon, the carrying of arms openly and
the wearing of uniforms. What it is will be dependant upon the
particular circumstances of a specific armed conflict. Thus the
blue denims of SWAPO members appear to meet the obligation in
Namibia because their appearance is immediately associated with
SWAPO. Although less well known, ANC combatants in uniform wear
khaki with black berets.
The occasions when a combatant must distinguish himself from
civilians prior to attack have been reduced from all times when
on active duty, or at least while engaged in military operations,
to only those military operations preparatory to attack. The
daytime civilian/night time combatant, common in the South
African armed conflict, has been sanctioned by Article 44(3)(1),
provided that he properly distinguishes himself as soon as he
begins to participate in a military operation preparatory to an
attack. It appears that military operations preparatory to an
attack should include administrative and logistical activities
preparatory to an attack. But the phrase probably does not













144 Bothe et al. op cit 252.
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(ii) The consequence to combatants of failure to distinguish
themselves: There has been some debate as to whether non-
compliance with the principle of distinction during the times and
occasions specified, results in loss of lawful combatant status
d P 0 W status. Protected status is lost in respect of thean ...
exceptional situations covered in Article 44(3) second sentence.
Non-compliance with the general rule of the first sentence is
punishable as a war crime. But do combatants who violate the
general rule lose their protected status as well? There is no
explicit reference in the first sentence to the loss of protected
"
status as a sanction for a combatant's failure to distinguish
himself: However, the provision in the second sentence that in
the extreme situations specified there, where ~ompliance is more
difficult that OI ••• he shall retain his status as a combatant ... "
if he complies with the less onerous conditions set out, seems to
imply that in the general situation where compliance 1s easier,
he should only retain his status if he has complied with the
condition of distinction. 145 This implication is supported by the
wording of Article 44(2), which provides that violations of the
rules of international law shall not deprive a combatant of his
protected status OI ••• except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 ... "
and by the traditional legal position of making status dependent
on visible distinction. But the proviso in Article 44(2) may only
apply to the second sentence of Article '44(3) and the authors of
145 Bathe et al. op cit 251 assume that the retention of the
sanction of loss of lawful combatant status for failure to
distinguish oneself in sentence 2, applies to sentence 1 as well.
269
Article 44 may have intended to change the general legal
position. The trayaqx preparatoires do conflict with the
interpretation that status is conditional on visibility in the
general situations set out in sentence 1. The Report of Committee
3 stated that
... with one narrow exception, the article makes the sanction
for failure by a guerrilla to distinguish himself when
required to do so to be merely trial and punishment for
violation of the law of war, not loss of combatant or P.D.W.
status.~46
The narrow exception is contained in the second sentence of
paragraph 3. It is therefore submitted that, despite the
ambiguity, Article 44 shifts the sanction for combatants' failure
to distinguish themselves in general combat situations from loss
of the right to participate and P.D.W. status to penal and
disciplinary sanctions.~47 Failure on the part of those in
command to enforce the new norm of international law becomes a
breach of Articles 86 and 87.
The special rule of visible distinction contained in Article
44(3)'s second sentence is the Article's most controversial
provision. The compromise between those states against a blanket
exemption from the condition of visibility for guerilla forces
~46 CDDH/407/REV 1 para 19. F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 1974-1977" 8 ~
(1977) 130 supports this interpretation.
~47 Aldrich 31 American LR (1982) 879 notes that the
military law of states will have to be updated in order to make
it possible to prosecute the crime of not distinguishing oneself.
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fighting for self-determination and those states advocating such
an exemption, is contained in this sentence. Under this provision
combatants who, finding themselves in the special circumstances
outlined, carry arms openly during the periods outlined, remain
lawful, but are not relieved of liability for violation of the
new offence established under the first sentence. 148 If they fail
to comply with the minimum condition of visibility set out they
forfeit their right to participate and P.D.W. status. 148 This is
the only exception to the general scheme of Article 43-44 which
makes retention of lawful combatant status not conditional on
visibility.150
The special rule applies in " ... situations in armed conflicts
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities ...... The identity
of these situations is not made explicit in the text. The
decisive element in identifying these situations is not the cause
of the conflict, but the nature of the hostilities. The nature of
148 Bothe et al. op cit 253; Kalshoven 8 ~ (1977) 131.
148 CDDH/111/SR56.
150 This means that in effect they are worse off than
combatants in the general situations covered by sentence 1, who
are amenable to prosecution for violation of the principle of
distinction, but retain their protected status. G Aldrich
"Progressive Development of the Laws of War" 26 Virginia Journal
of International Law (1986) 207ff justifies this exceptional
treatment on the basis that (a) failure to carry arms openly can
in certain circumstances create such risks for the civilian
population that the failure must be discouraged by greater
sanctions; (b) it is an incentive to make guerrillas in wars of
national liberation and occupied territory abide by the law which
has been especially adapted to conditions in such conflicts.
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the hostilities must be such that they lead to situations where
the combatant cannot distinguish himself and retain any chance of
success.151 Because subsequent state practice is almost non
existent the meaning of the phrase is best adduced from the
trayaux preparatoires. In the explanation of votes given after
the adoption of the draft Article at the committee and plenary
stages, there was a
... marked unity of opinion that the situation envisaged in
the second sentence of paragraph 3 can arise only in
occupied territory and in the cases of wars of national
liberation, precisely the two types of situation that is,
which inspired the debate from the outset. 152
The states concerned about the loosening of restrictions on
guerrillas in Article '44(3) sentence 2, attempted to, limit its
application to situations of occupation and wars of national
liberation and thus tried to protect their own interests which
were mainly in interstate wars. Lysaght notes that
... whether the drawing of a cordon sanitaire around
situations of occupation and wars of national liberation was
strictly justified on the wording of the paragraph was a
doubt voiced only by the Canadian delegation who pointed out
that it could apply also in guerrilla operations during wars
151 Kalshoven op cit 1977 127.
152 Kalshoven op cit 1977 128 - Statements made by Sweden,
Finland, France, Canada, US,-CDDH/111/SR55-56, CDDH/SR40-41. See
also the UK Declaration on signature:
. Paragraph c in relation to Article 44, that the situation
described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the
Article can exist only in occupied territory or in armed
conflicts cove~ed by paragraph 4 of Article 1.
Paragraph 3 of the Italian statement on ratification states that
such situations exist only in "occupied territory" - 251 I...B..B.C.
March/April (1986) 113. This statement tends to throw doubt on
the efficacy of Article 1(4).
272
conducted by regular armies.~53
On its face the Article does contradict the narrow
interpretation, but this narrow scope, like the narrow scope of
Article 1(4), was one of the arguments used to engender
widespread acceptance of the provision. For example, the Nigerian
delegate said that
... once the colonialist, racist and apartheid regimes
changed their abhorrent practices and withdrew their forces
the fears of certain delegations [about the lack of
protection for civilians in draft Article 42] would be
allayed, the compromise text would be relegated to the
archives.~54
In any event the South African armed conflict is one of the
factual situations falling within the cordon sanitaire. This does
not mean that the special rule governs all combatants in the
South African armed conflict all of the time. The general rule
applies unless the combatant is in a situation where if he
distinguished himself he would lose all chance of success.
How, when and where must a combatant distinguish himself in terms
of Article 44(3) sentence 2? "Carrying arms openly" is the
subminimum of distinction and is a factual question. Arms must be
carried openly, not obviously. The hiding of small arms during
~53 C Lysaght "The attitude of the Western Countries" in A
Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict vol 1.
(1979) 349 at 358. See also the Swiss delegate's statement that a
misunderstanding prevailed about draft Article 42 (Article 44).
It was not specially conceived in the interests of liberation
movements, but was a rule of general scope, applicable to all
armed conflicts - CDDH/SR40.
154 CDDH/111/SR56.
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the delimited periods would mean loss of lawful combatant status.
This single condition of visibility has been accused of
completely undermining the principle of distinction. But it must
be seen in context. Article 37 makes the hiding of arms
perfidious, enforcing what is a practical adaptation of the law.
Arms must be carried openly" ... during each military
engagement ... ". This is a factual question, but includes any
military engagement however small. Arms must also be carried
openly It ••• during such time as he is visible while engaged in
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which
he is ab 0 u t topart i c i pat e . 11 The me an ing 0 f t his p r·o vis ion is
controversial. It must be emphasised that outside of actual
engagement, the only time in which a combatant need carry his
arms openly in Article 44(3) sentence 2 situations is while he is
engaged in deployment for attack. He need not reveal his arms
before he himself is attacked. In other words, the provision
applies only to guerrillas who have taken the initiative. A
guerrilla who is attacked and only then draws and fires is not in
violation of this condition. The drawing of the line between
attack and defence is justified not only on the basis that it is
during attacks that civilians are most likely to be harmed, but
also because conditions of warfare in wars of national liberation
make it unrealistic to expect guerrillas to carry arms openly
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except during engagements and military deployments. 155
There are two parts to this provision:
(i) "Engaged in military deployment preceding the launching of an
attack": At the Conference widely differing meanings were given
to deployment. The Western position is well illustrated by the
Federal German delegate's opinion that it was ... an
uninterrupted tactical movement towards a place from which an
attack is to be launched."156 The Third World's position was
summed up by the Egyptian delegate, who said it was " ... the last
steps in the immediate and direct preparation for an attack,
while the combatants· were taking up firing positions." The
language of the text supports the Western view as the
"deployment" precedes the "launching of an attack". But the
Western view defeats the object of the section, which is to
promote protection for both guerrillas and the civilian
population by inducing guerrillas to adhere to the law through
the realistic use of the law. The value judgement implicit in
paragraph 3 is that the minimum rules can be met even in very
difficult combat circumstances. 157 The Swedish delegate said:
155 G Aldrich "Guerrilla Combatants and Prisoner of War
Status" 31 American ULR (1982) 878; CDDH/111/SR56.
156 CDDH/SR40 - Annex 2; UK
Netherlands, at 7 Canada, at 14
statement on ratification op cit para
on Signature para c.
CDDH/SR40; CDDH/SR41 at 3
USA. See also the Italian
d, and the UK Declaration
157 W T Mallison & S V Mallison "The Juridical Status of
Priviliged Combatants under the Geneva Protocol of 1977
Concerning International Conflicts" 42(2) Law and Contemporary
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... attacks from ambush were the most common form of guerilla
warfare. That method depended on surprise and could hardly
be prohibited. The provisions of paragraph 3 might be
interpreted to mean that guerrillas had to shows their arms
in an ambush. That rule however, would not be easy to apply
and would not in fact change guerilla warfare that much. 158
It is therefore submitted that the better view is that deployment
must be taken to mean when assuming firing positions. But there
is a qualification to this submission. Combatants may engage in
ambush as long as the camouflage they use is natural, but they
will not remain lawful if they engage in ambush using their own
apparent civilian status as camouflage. The general principle is
that the adversary should not expect to be attacked by
civilians. 159 In such a situation arms must be shown. Thus in ~
Mogoerane,160 Mogoerane and his comrades would probably have lost
their lawful combatant status as there was no evidence they
distinguished themselves in any way before they attacked the
police stations.
(ii) "As he is visible to the adversary". The inclusion of this
phrase in the Article sparked a technical debate in Committee 3,
about the different means and methods by which a combatant may
become visible to his adversary. The UK delegate said that they






Swedish delegate - CDDH/111/SR56.
Unreported TPD 6 August 1982 - 1 LHRa (1983) 118.
" ... visible to the naked eye ...
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only, since recourse to
electronic devices rendered the Article useless. 161 The
approach narrows the range
devices that identify the
possibilities raised by for instance, spy satellites, makes such
a point of view more realistic. The debate was still unresolved
at the plenary and it appears that states that possess advanced
scanning devices will give a wider meaning to visible. But as
Kalshoven points out, these interpretations treat "visible" out
of context; the real issue is whether an individual is visible as
a person who does or does not carry his arms openly.162 His
of possible interpretations. Only
carrying of arms are tenable; perhaps
only the naked eye and binoculars. But with modern advances in
detection, the carrying of arms is likely to be easily
identifiable at great range, leaving the interpretation a
technical issue open to partisan interests. It is submitted that
a combatant should rather be judged on whether he displayed his
arms when he could reasonably have expected to be visible to his
adversaries or as the working committee stated, when " ... the
combatant knows, or should know that he is visible."163 An ANC
combatant could not reasonably expect to be visible to the SADF
via CIA satellite photographs. But if he walked into a police
station he could reasonably expect to be visible.
161 CDDH/lll/ at 147.
162 Gp cit 1977 129.
163 CDDH/236/REV1.
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The third sentence of Article 44(3) provides that guerilla
operations in which combatants comply with the conditions of
paragraph 3 cannot be considered perfidious and hence contrary to
the laws of war. Thus it appears that an individual's failure to
distinguish himself according to the conditions of Article 44(3)
first and second sentence will be considered perfidy if those
acts result in the death, wounding or capture of an adversary.
Article 37 - perfidy - is further explored below.
National liberation movements do not generally conform to the
condition of visibility. The PLO still uses apparent civilian
status as camouflage for attacks in Israe1 164 as does the ANC in
South Africa. Obviously, compliance on both sides of the South
African armed conflict, but especially on the part of the ANC, is
militated against by extreme reluctance to be caught because of
the severe consequences. Should lawful combatant status become
possible, adherence is bound to improve. Although the retention
of the principle of distinction's visibility aspect as a
criterion for lawful combatant status in Article 44(3) is
questionable, the principle itself is not, and failure to adhere
to it whatever the penalty will endanger the civilian population.
164 R Sabel "Remarks: Problems of the Law of Armed Conflict
in Lebanon" ·77 Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law (1983) 241.
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A combatant's failure to comply with the conditions of Article
44(3) second sentence results in his losing both his right to
participate and P..D.W. status. Article 44(4), however, removes
much of the sting from this forfeiture. Article 44(4) was used to
induce national liberation movement sponsors to accept the
minimum condition of visibility in Article 44(3). Indeed, the
explicit link between Article 44(4) and Article 44(3) second
sentence implies that Article 44(4)'s similar treatment only
applies in wars of national liberation or occupied territory
because the special rule in Article 44(3) sentence 2 has been
interpreted to apply only in wars of national liberation and
occupied territory.
The first sentence of Article 44(4) spells out that a combatant
who fails to meet the conditions set out in the second sentence
of Article 44(3) forfeits his right to P.O.W. status, but only if
he falls into enemy hands " ... while failing to meet the
requirements ... ". In other words, the sanction of loss of status
becomes operative only if he is captured in the act of failing to
disclose his combatant's nature in terms of Article 44(3)
sentence 2. But Article 44(4) repairs much of the damage done by
loss of lawful combatant status and P.O.W. status. The individual
prisoner gets equivalent treatment in all respects to that set
out for P.O.W's in Convention 3 and the Protocol, including all
the judicial and procedural safeguards if he is tried and
punished for any offence he may
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have committed.~85 Does
equivalent treatment include immunity for taking up arms? Such an
interpretation would render sentence 2 of Article 44(3)'5 removal
of lawful combatant status absurd. Moreover, as Bothe, Partsch
and Solf note, it is clear that the Conference did not intend
such a result.~66 Recalling that under Convention 3 respect for
combatant's privilege is maintained through Article 87, which
provides that P.O.W·s may only be sentenced to the penalties
provided for the DP's own armed forces who have committed the
same act, Bothe, Partsch and Solf point out that the fact that
failure to distinguish oneself is now a breach of the Protocol
puts the DP under a duty to suppress such breaches on the part of
its own personnel and to include appropriate sanctions in its own
disciplinary code. These new sanctions can in terms of Article 87
be applied to captured unlawful combatants. Thus, equivalent
protection will not include protection for acts of violence
committed by unprotected combatants. 16 ? Can these unlawful
165
combatants be sentenced to death? Referring directly to the South
African armed conflict, Asmal argues that an individual protected
by Article 44(4),
... could not be sentenced to death because prisoners of war
cannot as a general rule and ... the provisions of Article
44, paragraph 4 envisage a higher standard than the minimum
CDDH/lll/361 Add 2 Committee report on Article 44(3).
166 Gp cit 255 - CDDH/236/REVl para 90; CDDH/407/REV1 para 19;
CDDH/SR40 para's 26,48,52,74; CDDH/SR44 para's 22,24.
16? M Bothe, K Partsch & W Solf New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflict (1982) 255.
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guarantees that may come into force during a non-
international conflict or under the fundamental' guarantees
accessible to persons affected by a struggle against racism
and apartheid under Article 75 of the Protocol.~6e
Although Article 75 does not prohibit capital punishment for
unlawful participation and it seems that P.O.W's protected by
Convention 3 can be sentenced to death, it is submitted that such
a practice is unviable during armed conflict, contrary to the
humanitarian spirit of the law and wrong on moral grounds. There
is also a growing international opinio iuris that such measures
are not to be taken during wars of national liberation. The South
African Government should be urged to refrain from executing
captured ANC combatants on any ground.
What equivalent protections are available? The Article is not
explicit,and statements in Committee are not helpful either. Are
individuals who have lost their status to be housed in P.O.W.
camps or in prisons with other criminals? What of working
conditions, pay~ent, rights to communicate, ICRC access,
complaints to Protecting Powers? The content of the Article's
protections remains unclear. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
in the South African context, separate detention facilities and
certain basic rights of access would go a long way to meeting
Article 44(4)'s equivalent protections.
168 K Asmal The Status of Combatants of the Liberation
Movement of SA under the Geneva Conventions 'of 1949 and Protocol
1 of 1977 9.
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Kalshoven criticises Article 44(4) on the basis that it does not
encourage compliance with Article 44(3) second sentence's
condition of carrying arms openly during attacks because it has
largely negatived the penalty of loss of P.D.W. status.~8e
Kalshoven notes there were two main reasons for this sanction of
loss of status.~70 Firstly, to encourage guerrillas to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population before an
attack. Secondly, to enable the DP to prosecute the combatant if
he had not so distinguished himself. In fact, a person protected
by Article 44(4) can still be punished for the war crime of
failing to distinguish himself under Article 44(3) sentence 1,
which undoubtedly will encourage guerrillas to distinguish
themselves from civilians. Moreover, Article 44(3) does not
protect combatants who lose their protected status under sentence
2 from prosecution for engaging in combat. The criticism that
Article 44(4) discourages compliance with Article 44(3) is
largely unfounded.
The remaining provisions of Article 44 shore up all possible
loopholes in the granting of protected status. Article 44(5), an
important innovation, ensures that any combatant who is captured
while not engaged in an attack or a military operation
preparatory to an attack, retains his rights "as a combatant and a
168 F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The
Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 1974-1977" 8 RYlL (1977) 132.
170 Ibid.
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P.D.W. whether or not he may in the past have violated the rule
in the second sentence of paragraph 3. This rule will protect the
majority of P.D.W's from fabrications by the DP of their past
histories aimed at depriving them of protected status. 171 But it
only applies to protected status and does not confer immunity
against prosecution for perfidy under Article 37 or for the war
crime of failing to distinguish oneself under Article 44(3)
sentence 1. Article 44(6) is a savings clause designed to make it
clear that Article 44 is not intended to supplant Article 4 of
Convention 3 in cases where the latter would entitle a person to
lawful combatant and P.D.W. status. Article 44(8) ensures that
persons whose entitlement
Article 44 are equally
first and second Geneva
to P.D.W. status arises ·only from
as entitled to the protections of the
Conventions as those whose P.D.W.
entitlement flows from Article 4 of Convention 3.
171 Working Group Report CDDH/236/REV1/XV Para 91.
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4,4 4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PROTECTION. OF COMBATANTS IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
4 4 4 1 INTRODUCTION
Certain types of conduct by combatants and certain categories of
combatants have been singled out for special scrutiny because of
their relevance to the South African armed conflict, Combatants
who have engaged in perfidy, the grave breach of apartheid, and
the use of terror, as well as juvenile and female combatants,
township combatants, spies, and mercenaries, are all subject to
exceptional legal regimes once they ·fall into enemy hands,
4 4 4,2, PERFIDY
Article 37 of Protocol 1 provides important support for the
principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, The
first part of Article 37 reads:
PROHIBITION OF PERFIDY
(1) It is prohibited to kill injure or capture an adversary
by resort to perfidy, Acts inviting the confidence of an
adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or
is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent
to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy, The
following acts are examples of perfidy:",
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status;",
Paragraph (c) of the ICRC's draft Article on Perfidy gave as one
of the examples of perfidy"" ,the disguising of combatants in
civilian clothing,"172 The supporters of national liberation
movements, intent upon the relaxation of the principle of
172 CDDH/1/1,3,12,
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distinction, were concerned about the draft Article's wording
because it did not take into account the fact that many national
liberation movements did not have the infrastructures to provide
their combatants with uniforms. 173 Paragraph (c) was changed to
the "feigning of civilian and non-combatant status" before
Article 37 was adopted. Consensus was achieved through the
inclusion of the provision in what became Article 44(3), which
provides that acts that comply with Article 44(3) are not
perfidious under Article 37(1)(c).174 Article 37(1)(c) places
beyond doubt the right of a DP to punish a combatant who does not
distinguish himself in terms of Article 44(3), despite the
provisions in Article 44(4) and (5). Although Article 37(2)
provides that ruses of war, such as the 'use of camouflage, are
not prohibited, the use of civilian status as camouflage once the
enemy has been engaged by a combatant lD the South African armed
conflict will ensure that in addition to losing his lawful status
in terms of Article 44(3) second sentence, he will also be
punishable for perfidy under Article 37(1)(c).
4.4.4.3 THE PRACTICE OF APARTHEID AS A GRAVE BREACH AND A WAR
CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 85 OF GENEVA PROTOCOL 1175
Against the background of the International Convention 00 the
173 See CDDH/111/SR27 XIV 245.
174 CDDH/111/SR48 XV 101 and CDDH/236/REV1 XV 375 - .Report of
Committee 3.
175 See L C Green "The New Law of Armed Conflict" 15 Canadian
Year Book of Internatiooal Law (1877) 3 at 18.
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Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,176 it was
not surprising that when the Geneva Diplomatic Conference was
deliberating on what" new offeflces to add to the 1949 list of
grave breaches, the addition of the crime of a~artheid should be
insisted upon by the Third World bloc. A number of delegations
pointed put that customary law, the 1949 Conventions and the
Protocol all forbade discriminatory treatment and that therefore
there was no need for a special provision on apartheid. But the
amendment went through in spite of the fact that it violated the
neutrality of humanitarian law.
Article 85(1) sets out· that Articles relating to the repression
of grave breaches under the 1949 Conventions also relate to the
repression of grave breaches of the Protocol. These Articles
provide that all states party to the Conventions have a duty to
seek out and punish war criminals of whatever nationality if
found within the states domestic jurisdiction. 177 Article
85(4)(c) lists as one of the grave breaches under the Protocol,
... practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading
practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on
racial discrimination; ...
176 Adopted in the form of G.A. Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) on
the 30/10/1973, as a result of a campaign in the V.N. by the
majority of Third World states, the Convention, which came into
force in July 1976, incurs individual responsibility for the
commission, participation, conspiracy or incitement of the acts
of aiding, abetting, encouraging or cooperating in the crime of
apartheid.
177 Common Article 40/50/29/120.
The initial problem is that
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of definition. What does
"aQartheid ... [etc.]" mean? AQartheid is not explicitly defined
and appears vague and open to wide interpretation.~78 But it was
pointed out at the Conference that through the International
Convention and common knowledge, everyone was aware of the fact
that apartheid referred to the policy of separation imposed by
whites in Southern Africa.~79 The scope of application is
narrowed by Article 85(4)'s requirements that (i) the breach has
to be in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol and (ii)
that it must be wilful. Requirement (i) ensures that the grave
breach is related to the armed conflict. Requirement (ii)
provides that the legal basis for guilt is the intention of the
party to commit the breach. With reference to this requirement,
Ribeiro submits that simply being a member of the SADF would not
entail a breach of Article 85.~80 For the vast majority of SADF
members, intention is negated by the compulsion of the
disciplinary regime and threat of legal sanction under which they
operate. It is submitted that only those in command who
consciously formulate and impose apartheid within the framework
of the South African armed conflict could possibly be held
responsible for a grave breach under Article 85.
178 F R Ribeiro "Humanitarian Law Advancing Rapidly
Backwards" 97 SAL.J. (1980) 60.
178 Green op cit 1877 19.
180 Loc cit.
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Article 85(4)(c) was unnecessary. +ts criminalisation of a
certain form of political behaviour undermines the law's
neutrality, the foundation of the law's application. It appears
irrational to the author that the backers of the application of
the law of international armed conflict in South Africa should
negate all their efforts to modify the law to achieve this goal,
by including within this effort such a great disincentive to
application of the law as the criminalisation of the very people
who must apply it. Adequate provisions penalising discrimination
against victims of armed conflict were already extant in the law.
Article 85(4)(c) does illustrate the importance of dropping the
condition of conformity to the laws of armed conflict as a
condition for lawful participation under Articles 43 and 44 of
the Protocol. Had this condition been retained, the argument
could have been made that all the members of the armed forces of
the South African Government would not be lawful combatants
because they violate Article 85(4)(c).
4 4 4 4 THE USE OF TERROR IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT
The words "terrorist" and "terrorism" are highly emotive concepts
in South Africa. What is terrorism and how is it regulated by
international humanitarian law in the context of an international
armed conflict?181 There is no decided definition of terrorism in
181 See generally H P Gasser "Prohibition of Terrorist Acts
in International Humanitarian Law" 26 lilli.C. (1986) 200.
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international law,182 but it can be distinguished from the other
forms of warfare practised in the South African armed conflict.
The primary distinction is that while other forms of warfare are
directed against the armed forces of the enemy, terrorism is
directed against unarmed civilians who are not part of military
operations.~83 Of course, all forms of warfare may be
indiscriminate, but terror is intentionallY directed at civilians
with the object of instilling fear.
A psychological element is part of national liberation movement
strategy in all wars of national liberation. However, the use of
terror in this strategy is often magnified for propaganda
purposes by the incumbent so as to classify the whole liberation
movement as terrorist, thus discrediting it in the public eye,
when terrorism is only part of the movement's hearts and minds
campaign. Because the ANC has used terror as a tactic, the
Government has labelled it a terrorist organisation. In the
context of the international law of armed conflict, however, the
ANC's tactics must be divorced from its status. The ANC is a
representative organisation with quasi-international status,
which employs terrorism and' other tactics in its armed conflict
with the South African Government. However, the U.N. General
~82 Gasser op cit 201 notes that the various international
conventions on terror.ism are limited to one aspect of terrorism,
and are therefore of no help in the search for a comprehensive
definition of terrorism.
~83 G Schwarzenberger "Terrorists, Hijackers, Guerrillas and
Mercenaries" 24 Current Legal Problems (1971) 257 at 263.
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Assembly went to far when it asserted that the actions of
national liberation movements fighting for self-determination are
excluded from the definition of terrorism.~e4 Terror is part of,
or at least incidental to, ANC strategy. Why? Falk argues that
... the insurgent faction in an underdeveloped country has at
the beginning of its struggle for power, no alternative
other than terror to mobilize an effective operation.~e5
Such a situation is evident in the South African context where,
although the ANC went to war in 1960, until very recently a large
proportion of its activities involved acts of terror, highly
symbolic in nature, but ultimately of little military value
because of their very low intensity. Indeed, the South African
war machine still effectively keeps the ANC at arm's length. But
it also resorts to terror in its war against the ANc.~e6
In spite of the fact that the South African armed conflict is at
an early stage and terrorism is considered an acceptable tactic,
the law of armed conflict condemns its use. International law
draws a distinction between 'licit' and 'illicit' violence,
implicitly recognising certain methods and means of warfare as
licit and prescribing certain others, including terrorism.
Terrorism runs counter to the principle of distinction between
~e4 G.A. Resolution 34/145 (1979).
185 R A Falk "Six legal dimensions of US involvement" in Falk
(ed) The vietnam War and International Law vol 2 (1969) 218 at 240.
186 Consider the suspected involvement of South African
agents in the recent assassination of Dulcie September, the ANC's
representative in Paris - Natal Mercury 4/4/1988.
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lawful and unlawful objects of attack. In terms of Article 85(3)
of Protocol 1, it is a grave breach of the Protocol to make
" ... the civilian population or individual civilians the object of
attack ... '\, while Article 51(2) of Protocol 1 confirms that
civilians shall not be objects of attack primarily designed to
spread terror and Articles 53 and 56 prohibit the use of certain
objects that could terrorise the civilian population. Illicit
violence against persons in the hands of the adverse party is
also comprehensively prohibited.~87 Violations of these
provisions, such as "wilful killing" or the "taking of
hostages" 1.88 are not only war crimes but are also grave
breaches. It appears ,that within certain limits~8e terror is a
licit method of violence when used to control the armed forces of
an adverse party. Strictly defined, however, terror directed
against armed forces is not terrorism.
The law also provides that only lawful combatants are capable of
licit violence. Lawful combatants in the South African armed
conflict may, however, resort to illicit violence, such as
terrorism, with the result that, under both the 1949 Conventions
and Protocol' 1, they violate the law and their acts are
1.87 Geneva Convention 1 Article 12(2); Geneva Convention 2
Article 12(2); Geneva Convention 3 Articles 13(2),17(4); Geneva
Convention 4 Articles 33,37. Convention 4 Article 34 prohibits
the taking of hostages. Geneva Protocol 1 Articles 33(2) and 75
fill in the gaps.
1.~8 Article 147 of Geneva Convention 4.
1.89 Article 35 of Protocol 1.
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punishable as war crimes or grave breaches. But there is a
distinction between Article 4 of Convention 3 and Articles 43 and
44 of Protocol 1 as to the effect of the practice of terror on
lawful combatant status. Because Article 4 of Convention 3 makes
protected status conditional on observance of the law of armed
conflict, violation of the law through the use of terror makes it
possible for combatants to lose their right to participate and
become amenable to prosecution under municipal law for wrongful
participation and the municipal
contrast, under Articles 43 and 44
crime of terrorism. 190 By
of Protocol 1, while the
observation of the law of armed conflict is required, it is no
longer conditional fbr lawful combatant status. 191 The only
sanction available against a lawful combatant who practices
terror is prosecution for a war crime (grave breach). It is
submitted that this is enough. None of the protections offe~ed
lawful combatants prevent their prosecution for the grave breach
of terrorism under Article 85. Other than the blanket exemption
from prosecution under municipal law, the protections lawful
combatants acquire through P.O.W.status are mainly procedural.
The internationalisation of the South African armed conflict
would in no way legitimise the use of terror. Article 1(4)'s
bringing to bear of the full weight of in~ernational law would
prohibit the use of terror and provide for penalties equally as
180
191
As happened in Mohamed Ali and another y pp 1969 1 AC 430.
Contra Gasser op cit 211.
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severe as those under national law.~82 The set of prohibitions of
terrorist acts under international law is more legally sound than
the vague, contradictory and ill-defined provisions contained in
the Internal Security Act's~83 Article 54.
4 4 4 5 JUYENILE AND FEMALE COMBATANTS
Experience in wars of national liberation has shown that national
liberation movements frequently recruit juveniles and woman into
their ranks. The South African armed conflict will prove no
exception. Protocol 1 attempts to stop the recruitment of
juveniles. Article 77 forbids the involvement or recruitment of
children under 15, but provides that if such children do take
part in the conflict they will, in addition to the rights
accorded them as lawful combatants and P.O.W's, enjoy the extra
rights the Article affords to children. Further, regardless of
any violation of the law of armed conflict by a wrongfully
enlisted juvenile, even a grave breach, such a juvenile cannot be
executed if under the age of 18 when the crime was committed.
Article 76 of Protocol 1 protects captured female combatants
against indecencies. The death sentence is a competent sentence
for woman in terms of the Article but the DP should endeavour not
192 It could be argued that for practical purposes not all
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols apply to
wars of national liberation. But this would not apply to the
prohibitions of terrorism, because these prohibitions are
negative and require no infrastructure to enforce.
193 Act 82 of 1881.
293
to pronounce it. If a death sentence is pronounced and a woman is
pregnant she may not be executed.
4 4 4 6 TOWNSHIP COMBATANTS
The insurrection in South African townships in the past few years
is a facet of the armed conflict in South Africa not contemplated
by international society in its response to wars of national
liberation. 184 International law was developed in relation to a
preconception that these wars would involve classic guerilla
struggles in rural areas. These situations are beginning to
emerge in certain rural areas in South Africa,185 but the armed
struggle is still preclominantly urban based. Legal regulation
adapted to rural struggles is flexible enough to be transferred
to urban guerilla warfare. Lawful combatant status is regulated
in the same way in both these theatres - by obeying either the
rigorous conditions of Article 4 of Geneva Convention 3 or the
better adapted, more flexible conditions of Articles 43 and 44 of
Protocol 1. In both theatres the major criterion for lawful
combatant status is a command link to the ANC as the party to the
conflict. But in the context of township violence directed at the
South African Government, the command link becomes tenuous. A
member of the ANC firing an AK47 from a shack in the middle of a
194 On the insurrection see generally J Frederikse South
Africa: A Different Kind of War (1986) 168ff.
185 Frederikse op cit 174-175. ANC members have also clashed
with the armed forces of the national states in rural areas, for
example in Venda in March 1988 - Citizen 15/4/88.
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township riot would retain his right to participate primarily
because he can identify himself as a member of the armed forces
of a party to the conflict. But many of those rioting around him,
for instance youths throwing petrol bombs at Caspars, would
probably find it extremely difficult to establish a direct link
.between themselves and the ANC. They would also probably find it
extremely difficult to establish that they belonged to an
organised group operating under a responsible command. In many
cases, the total anarchy of the situation. renders absurd the
proposition that they are lawful combatants within the
traditional structures of the law. The essence of the problem is
that they remain civilians despite their actions and, as we have
seen, the law has historically failed to come to grips with the
problem of purely civilian combatants. It has almost universally
condemned them. Levees eo masse are the closest parallel that
comes to mind, but even this category imposes the condition of
carrying arms openly and obeying the laws of war. 196 The law is
not adapted to deal with civilians who engage in combat in the
townships and they will remain beyond all but its most basic
protections.
Nevertheless, there may well be organised groups in the townships
directly affiliated to the ANC, capable ·of qualification as
lawful combatants, even though they are local township combatants
196 See above 4.3.3.2.
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and not highly trained nationalist guerrillas. 187 Such groups
would qualify for protected status if they could prove their
conformity with the personal conditions set out either in the
Conventions or Protocol 1. It is likely that any tribunal which,
faced with a claim of lawful combatant status by members of such
a group, applies the conditions rigorously to the evidence, would
almost always conclude that the conditions have not been met. For
this reason it is submitted that the incumbent authorities should
rather apply flexible guidelines along the lines of those used by
the US in Vietnam, making the conferring of protection in these
cases an administrative decision based solely on the membership
of an organised group able to establish a valid link to the ANC.
All combatants who do not qualify for protection under these less
rigorous . criteria, should still be guaranteed the minimum
protections afforded by Article 75 of Protocol 1.
197 Such a possibility emerged with the training of part-time
combatants by the ANC within South Africa, in the townships or in
the open veld - Daily News 30/11/1987.
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4 4.4 7 SPIES
Article 46(1) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of
this Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a Party to
the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse Party
while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the
status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy.
Combatants in the South African armed conflict who engage in
spying lose lawful combatant status and P.O.W. status. lea There
is nothing in Article 46(1) to suggest that espionage as an
occupation is prohibited by international law. Spies just lose
the law's protection and a DP may punish a spy under its criminal
law, subject to the limitations contained in Articles 29-31 of
the Hague Regulations' (1907). Article 46(1) does not change the
definition of a spy contained in Article 29 of the Hague
Regulations, which limited it to a person who,
... when acting clandestinely or on false pretenses ... obtains
or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of
operations of the belligerent, with the intention of
communicating it to the hostile party.
Article 46(2) makes it clear that a combatant who gathers
information in territory controlled by the adverse party while in
uniform is not a spy. The meaning of "uniform" was deliberately
left undefined, but the report of the committee states that
... any customary uniform which clearly distinguishes the member
wearing it from a non-member would suffice."19B Article 46(4)
provides that a combatant who engages in spying does not lose his
188 G Aldrich "Guerrilla Combatants and Prisoner of War
Status" 31 American ULR (1982) 879.
188 CDDH/236/REV1 para 35.
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protected status " ... unless he is captured before he has rejoined
the armed forces to which he belongs."
Article 46(3) is an innovative provision. It reads:
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who
is a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and
who, on behalf of the party on which he depends, gathers or
attempts to gather information of a military value within
that territory shall not be considered as engaging in
espionage unless he does so through an act of false
pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Moreover,
such a resident shall not lose his right to the status of
P.D.W. and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured
while engaging in espionage.
Article 46(3) recognises that members of armed forces resident in
occupied territory may be privy to information incidental to
their living there and provides that this should not make them
spies or lose them their P.D.W. status. Protection is lost if
covert methods of information gathering are used. 200 The
underlying premise of Article 46(3) is that resident members of
armed forces are not practicing deception simply by appearing to
be civilians while gathering intelligence. It must be recalled
that in terms of Article 44(3) they only need distinguish
themselves in military operations preparatory to an attack.
Article 46(3) also ensures that even should such a resident
actually engage in covert espionage, he only loses his P.O.W.
status if he is caught in the act of spying. Does Article 46(3)
200 M Bathe, K Partsch & W Solf New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflict (1982) 266 list forged passes, concealed cameras,
clandestine radio transmitters etc. as examples of such methods.
apply to
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the . South African armed conflict?20~ Logically
"occupation" includes occupation by an incumbent regime of the
territory of a people seeking self~determination. Although such
an interpretation goes beyond the meaning given to belligerent
occupation in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and
Article 46(3)'s drafters fastidiously included all references to
the traditional terms of occupation, it is submitted that, for
humanitarian reasons, the provision should apply inside South
Africa. It is plain, however, that a single, shared territory
poses enormous problems of application for provisions like
Article 46(3).
4 4 4 8 MERCENARIES
Although there do not appear to be any mercenaries engaged in the
South African armed conflict at present, a discussion of Protocol
l's provisions on mercenaries is useful because the record of
other African armed conflicts tends to indicate their probable
future use in South Africa. 202 Traditionally, no special rules
applied to mercenaries. If they fell into one of the categories
in Article 4 of Geneva Convention 3 and complied with the
conditions set out for that category, they were considered lawful
20~ See generally Bothe et al. op cit 226.
202 See generally, A Cassese "Mercenaries: Lawful Combatants
or War Criminals?" 40 Zeitschrift fur Auslandiches Offenliches
Recht und volkerecbt (1980) 1; L C Green "The Status of
Mercenaries in International Law" 9 Manitoba LJ (1979) 201; A A
Yusuf "Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict" in A Cassese
(ed) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict vol 1 (1979) 113.
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combatants and P.O.W's on capture. In response, however, to their
extensive use in post-1945 conflicts, it has been argued that the
private character of mercenaries distinguishes them from the
public members of armed forces and that they are therefore
unprotected combatants. 203 Against the background of a general
international attack on mercenaries,204 the idea of authorising
the denial of lawful combatant status to mercenaries who fight
essentially for private gain was introduced at the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference. The states that had fought for the
legalisation of national liberation movement combatants were
quick to exclude mercenaries. After heated debate, Article 47 was
finally agreed upon in· the fourth session. 205
203 H Mallison and V Mallison "The Juridical Status of
Irregular Combatants under the International Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict" 9 Case Western Reserye University Journal of
International Law (1977) 17.
204 Between 1969 and 1979 seven General Assembly and three
Security Council resolutions were passed on mercenaries, stating
that mercenarism was a crime against humanity, and condemning
states that permitted or tolerated the recruitment of mercenaries
or the provision of facilities to mercenaries. G.A. Resolution
2548 (XXVV) 11/12/1969 stated that:
The practice of using mercenaries against movements of
national liberation and independence is punishable as a
criminal act and the mercenaries themselves are outlaws ...
G.A. Resolution 34/140 (XXVI) 1979, passed by consensus, called
on all states to ensure,
... by both administrative and legislative measures that
their territory and other territory under their control, as
well as their nationals, are not used for the planning of
subversion and recruitment, assembly~ financing, training
and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the
government of any member state and to fight the national
liberation movement of peoples ....
G.A. Resolution 34/192G 1979 condemned the use of mercenaries in
Namibia.




1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or
a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is a person who:
Ca) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to
fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does in fact take a direct part in hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by
the desire for private gain and, ih fact, is promised, by or
on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks or functions in the armed forces
of that party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a state which is not a Party to the
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
Under Article 47(1), mercenaries are not lawful combatants and do
not acquire P.O.W. status on capture. They can be tried for their
act of participating in the armed conflict under the DP's
national law, but their participation in combat is not yet a
crime under international law. Article 47(1) has been criticised
for offending the basic rule that all those who take active part
in hostilities should be treated without discrimination as to
their motive for joining the fighting. 206 But the law has always
condemned those who fight for private ends. Mercenaries are not
lawful combatants because the command link between them and the
party to the conflict, in the sense of their fighting for public
206 F R Ribeiro "International Humanitarian Law: Advancing
Progressively Backwards" 97 ~ (1980) 42 at 55.
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ends, does not exist. 207 Article 47's deprivation of protections
is just one step in an international movement
mercenarism. 208
to outlaw
Article 47(2)'s strict definition of mercenaries removes much of
the inherent danger in Article 47(1). It defines mercenaries
using three positive and three negative elements. The three
positive elements are:
(a) Recruitment: The person must be especially recruited as a
mercenary.
Cb) Conduct: The mercenary must participate directly in
hostilities. Bathe, Pa~tsch and Solf note that this condition
precludes the classification of advisors and instructors as
mercenaries, even if they are not on official duty on assignment
by a state that is not a party to the conflict. 2os
(c) Motivation: The meicenary must be motivated essentially for
private gain, which is expanded to mean that the mercenary must
earn substantially more than a regular soldier. Proof of such
gain will, in the nature of things, be extremely difficult to
obtain. Ideologically motivated mercenaries remain protected. The
207 Bathe et al. op cit 268-9 equate mercenaries, because
they fight for private ends, with brigands, bandits and Francs-
Tireurs. They point out that Article 47 establishes an analogous
rule to the end of naval privateering for land warfare.
208 See generally "Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the
recruitment and use of mercenaries" note in Virginia Journal of
International Law (1982) 569 at 589 et seq.
209 Gp cit 271.
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test is not entirely satisfactory.2~0 Schwarzenberger feels that
it is risky to establish legal categories by reference to motive,
such as economic incentive, because men, on most occasions,
appear to act from mixed motives.2~~ The Diplock Report on
mercenaries (UK) stated that
... any definition of mercenaries which required positive
proof of motivation would ... either be unworkable, or so
haphazard in its application as between comparable
individuals as to be unacceptable. Mercenaries, we think can
only be defined by reference to what they do and not by
reference to why they do it.2~2
Motivation in an armed conflict like the South African conflict,
imports a dangerous psychological element into the law. Most
mercenaries involved in fighting liberation movements do so for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which is ideological.2~3
The three negative elements exclude from the definition of
mercenaries:
(d) Nationals or residents of a party to the conflict: Bothe,
Partsch and Solf maintain that it does not preclude the DP from
denying p.a.w. status to its own nationals serving in the armed
2~O Green op cit 220.
211 G Schwarzenberger "Terrorists, Hijackers, Guerrillas and
Mercenaries" 24 Current Legal Problems (1971) 281.
212 H C Burmeister "The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in
Armed Conflicts 72 American JIL (1978) 37 quoting from the
Regort of the Committee of the Privy Council appointed to enquire
into the recruitment of mercenaries (1976) para 7 col 6569.
2~3 See Green op cit 220 and the examples quoted.
forces of the enemy.214 However,
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in the context of wa~s of
national liberation, the concept of nationality and allegiance
must be discarded.
(e) Members of armed forces: In South Africa, mercenaries may
enlist in the SADF and thereby circumvent Article 47.
Theoretically mercenaries could also join the ANC as a party to
the conflict, but this is unlikely to occur in practice. If a
mercenary joins the armed forces of a party to the conflict he is
subject to those armed forces meeting the conditions contained in
Articles 43 and 44 in order to qualify for lawful combatant
status and P.D.W. status.
(f) Persons on official duty from third states: This provision
exempts persons sent by states not party to the conflict on
official duty as members of their armed forces from
classification as mercenaries. But as it specifies that they must
be sent by states, it appears not to shield members of other
national liberation movements that assist a national liberation
movement or a state in an Article 1(4) conflict, eg.,
assistance of ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe.
the ANC's
Article 47 does not make the guarantees of Article 75 explicitly
available to mercenaries. 2l5 But Article 45(3) provides that
... any person who has taken part in hostilities and does not
benefit from the more 'favourable treatment ... shall have
214 Gp cit 271; contra Cassese op cit 1980 25.
215 However, at the Conference a Greek delegate said Article
75 did apply to mercenaries and no one dissented - 8 CDDH/243/250.
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the right at all times to the provisions of Article 75 under
this Protocol.
In addition, Article 75 affirms itself, and Article 50 of
Convention 3 also applies.
4 4 5 PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE GUARANTEES UNDER PROTOCOL 1
4.4 5 1 ARTICLE 45 - PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Article 45 of Protocol 1 fleshes out Article 5 of Convention 3,
which provides that if their is any doubt as to a combatants
status, he retains the law's protections until his status is
dete~mined by a competent tribunal. Although the ICRC had felt
Article 5 was sufficient, a number of delegates at the Conference
because of the final nature of the decision of Article 5's
"competent tribunal" final in the sense of no appeal and
because of the possibility of execution - recommended that it be
amended. 216 The major perceived deficiency in Article 5 was the
absence of any provision expressly authorising a person found by
a competent tribunal not to be a lawful combatant and P.O.W., to
raise the issue of his status before a judicial tribunal that
puts him on trial for his allegedly unauthorised participation or
216 CDDH/lll/260. National liberation movements were
especially suspicious of these competent tribunals. The ZANU
spokesman said,
... in the racist regimes courts and judicial tribunals have
been used and are being used to further the interests of
these regimes. Fair trials are a thing unheard of in these
regimes. And yet these regimes have always claimed and
continue to claim that their courts and tribunals are
competent. - CDDH/lll/SR36.
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for any violation of the law of armed conflict that he may have
committed. If he was only being prosecuted for unlawful
participation, the conclusive finding of the tribunal that
adjudicated his status would be dangerous. In response to these
and other problems, Article 45 was included in the Protocol.
The first sentence of Article 45(1) creates a presumption of
P.G.W. status if that status is (a) claimed by the person, or (b)
claimed by the party to which he belongs, or (c) he appears to be
entitled to P.D.W. status. Nevertheless, the failure of a person
to claim P.O.W. status cannot be taken as sole justification for
denial of such status. 217 The second sentence provides that in a
questionable case a prisoner will remain a P.D.W. until his case
has gone before a competent tribunal. Article 45(1) makes it
clear that the burden of
protected status contained in




and 44 have not been
Article 45(2) provides that prisoners charged with offences
arising out of the hostilities who have not been awarded P.G.W.
status initially, have the right to assert P.O.W. status de novo
and to have a judicial tribunal decide the issue. In South
Africa, the adjudication of status would have to occur before the
trial because the tribunal's jurisdiction may hinge on the issue.
Article 45(2) also makes allowance for the Protecting Power to
217 CODH/236/REV 1 para 58.
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attend the proceedings or to be advised of them if they are held
in camera for the purposes of state security.
Article 45(3) provides that
entitled to lawful combatant
if a prisoqer is found not to be
status or p.a.w. status and the
prisoner does· not benefit from more favourable treatment in terms
of Convention 3, the prisoner has the right to the protection
afforded by Article 75. Notwithstanding the derogations permitted
by Article 5 of Geneva Convention 4, Article 45(3) also makes the
protections of Article 75 the minimum humanitarian standard
applicable to civilians protected under Geneva Convention 4 who
participate directly in hostilities in the territory of a party
to the conflict or in any other territory other than occupied
territory. It also guarantees the rights of communication of all
persons, except spies captured in occupied territory, and thus
almost neutralises the derogations permitted under Article 5 of
Convention 4. There appears to be an inconsistency between
Article 44(4) and Article 45(3). The combatants who fail to carry
arms openly during military engagements or deployments for attack
in terms of the second sentence of Article 44(3), lose their
right to participate and thus their p.a.w. status, but they are
entitled by means of Article 44(4) to a higher standard of
protections than those prisoners who have lost protected status
and are accorded general protections in terms of Article 45(3).
Article 44(4) is, however, simply a case of a special class
getting more protection than the general class of unprotected
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combatants because the special class were the only group to lose
their combatant status through failing to distinguish themselves.
4,4 5 2 ARTICLE 75 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Article 75 sets out a minimum standard of protection strongly
inspired by the International Convention of Civil and Political
Rights. It contains an irreducible hard core of rights that
cannot suffer derogation,2~e This mini bill of rights is
applicable in terms of Article 75(1) to all persons in the power
of a party to the conflict who do not benefit from more
favourable treatment under some other provision of the
Conventions or Protocol. Article 75(1) would extend the Article's
protections to all those who oppose apartheid and find themselves
in detention in South Africa for reasons related to the South
African armed conflict. It is significant in respect of the South
African situation that such protections apply without adverse
distinction based either on "race" or "colour". The South African
Government's internal policies as they affect prisoner's
conditions would probably violate Article 75(1),218
Article 75(2) prohibits certain acts by civilians or members of
the military. Article 75(3.> provides that a person must be fully
informed of why he is being arrested, interned or detained and
2~8 G Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols" 165 Recueil des Cours (1979) 430.
2~8 For example separate detention facilities for separate
races.
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provides for his quick release if the circumstances justifying
his detention no longer exist. Article 75(4) provides for the
passing of sentence for an offence related to the armed conflict
only after conviction handed down by an impartial and regularly
constituted court following recognised principles of judicial
procedure. These principles include, inter alia: (a) The accused
must be informed of the charge against him and of his rights;
(b) individual penal responsibility; (c) no retroactive
criminality; (d) presumption of innocence; (e) trial in the
accused's presence; (f) no compulsion of self-incriminating
testimony; (g) right to examination and cross examination of
witnesses; (h) autrefois acquit; (i) public pronouncement of
judgement; (j) notice of any further rights of appeal and their
',"
time limits. Article 75(5) provides special protections for
women. Article 75(6) applies Article 75 until final release.
Article 75(7) provides for special rules for prisoners accused of
war crimes or crimes against humanity. Article 75(8) ensures that
if better treatment is available under any other rule of
international law Article 75 does not infringe upon or deny it.
Violation of Article 75 would of course be a violation of the law
of armed conflict and may lead to individual responsibility.
4.4.6 CONCLUSION
From the ANC's point of view Protocol l's personal conditions for"
protected status are a vast improvement on the conditions set out
in the 1949 Conventions. Adherence becomes possible because the
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Protocol pays attention to details that are important in guerilla
warfare in general and in wars of national liberation in
particular. In peripheral areas of the law, such as the grave
breach of apartheid, the Protocol discriminates against the
incumbent. But it is submitted that these discriminatory
provisions are unlikely to ever constitute effective law.
Moreover, in the substantive provisions relating to the
protection of combatants, the Protocol does not discriminate
against the incumbent. It is positive law, functionally adapted
to a factual situation that requires humanitarian regulation.
4 5 GENERAL CONCLUSION·
The law of international armed conflict is a suitable tool for
the protection of individual combatants in the South African
armed conflict. The more onerous personal conditions set out in
Geneva Convention 3 and the better adapted conditions of Protocol
1, provide not only the answer to the question of who qualifies
for lawful combatant status and P.G.W. status in the South
African armed conflict,- but also set out what combatants must do
in order to so qualify. In addition, the Conventions and Protocol
provide procedural protections to ensure the issue of status is
properly investigated and they set out basic human rights for
those combatants who do not qualify for pr~tected status. They
also make provision for suitable penalties for combatants who
violate the law of armed conflict. It is submitted that this
unique system of law can be combined into a single legal regime
310
governing the treatment of combatants in the South African armed
conflict. Although no derogation from the protections provided
should be countenanced, because of the unconventional nature of
the South African armed conflict a certain amount of relaxation
of the conditions for protected status should be allowed,
especially with regard to adherence to the principle of
visibility by combatants. The best solution would be some form of
administrative categorisation of combatants based on the general
principles of the law, which, however, pays special attention to
the peculiar circumstances of the conflict. Creative adaptations
of the law are possible. They require only the political will to
acknowledge the material application of the law.
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SECTION B: CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONFLICT AS A NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
CHAPTER FIVE
THE MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION OF COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND GENEVA PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The bulk of this study has been devoted to exploring the
classification of the South African armed conflict as an
international armed conflict. However, for the sake of
completeness, the alte~native classification of the South African
armed conflict as a non-international armed conflict must also be
examined. This chapter's specific aim is to investigate whether
the South African armed conflict falls within the material field





to the personal application of the
of non-international armed conflict
offering limited protections to combatants,
Before 1949, humanitarian law's impact on non-international armed
conflicts was slight. As noted in chapter 2, non-international
armed conflict was regulated by customary modes that became
ineffective because they were unsuited to the twentieth century.
In 1949 the legal regulation of non-international armed conflict
changed significantly.
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5.2 COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
5 2 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDl
Common Article 3 was, in 1949, both an innovation and an
extension of humanitarian law into the realms of non-
international armed conflict. It is one of the few concrete
examples of the removal of basic human rights from the
jurisdiction of states. Its introduction was a clear, if only
potential, limitation of the sovereignty -of states that became
party to the 1949 Conventions. Humanitarian reformers initially
wanted to apply the whole corpus of the 1949 Conventions to non-
international armed conflicts, including the right of lawful
participation for all combatants. This proposal was rejected ~
limine at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, on the basis
that it would limit the lawful government's efforts to quell
rebellion and restore order and open the door to international
interference in purely domestic matters. Despite this setback,
the reformers, after noting that governments treated rebels worse
than ordinary criminals and resented attempts by external bodies
like the ICRC to intercede on the rebel's behalf, argued that
combatants wounded or captured in a non-international armed
conflict had as great a need of care and decent treatment as the
soldier wounded or captured in an international armed conflict.
1 See generally G Draper
13-16.
The Red Cross Conventions (1958)
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Nevertheless, the various draft proposals submitted encountered
strong opposition. 2 The main objection was that the established
government would ostensibly be required to apply the provision
even in cases of brigandage or ordinary criminality.3 Another
problem was the content of the provision. The compromise
eventually agreed upon has been labelled a " ... convention in
miniature." 4 It contains, in a short Article, basic humanitarian
rules controlling the actions of the parties to a non-
international armed conflict from the outset of the conflict. It
does not include any right of lawful participation for
combatants. The whole Article clearly constitutes a minimalist
approach: the idea tha~ very basic rules are more likely to be
applied than complex rules.
5.2 2 THE MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 3 - "ARMED
CONFLICT NOT OF AN INTESNATIONAL CHARACTER"
As South Africa is a party to the 1949 Conventions, the
application of common Article 3 in the South African armed
conflict is solely a question of interpretation of Article 3. If
the conflict in the country falls within the material field of
application of Article 3, then the Article applies.
2 Final Record of the Diglomatic Conference at Geneya 1949
vol 28 9-15; 40-48; 75-79; 82-84; 90; 93-95; 97-102. Article 3
was discussed first as Article 2 and later as Article 2(4).
3 J Pictet Commentary 3 32.
4 Draper op cit 15.
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Article 3 states that it applies in the case of an "armed
conflict not of an international character", It leaves the
specific conditions of such a conflict undefined. Although done
deliberately to make the application as wide as possible, it
offers no assistance in solving our specific problem of
application. s The reference to conflicts "., .occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" would seem to
exclude conflicts at sea or in neighboring territory;6 the latter
situation being an important consideration in the South African
armed conflict. Article 3's use of the term "armed conflict"
requires definition. What distinguishes an "armed conflict" from
a riot, faction fight or student protest? Pictet submits that
"armed conflict" refers only to disturbances akin to war and does
not cover ordinary crimes; while the expression "each party"
confirms the conflict has reached a certain stage of
development. 7 But "armed" does not necessarily mean with fire
arms, and the stage of development is undefined. The Article's
content provides vague clues to its material scope. Article 3
appears to demand a fairly high degree of organisation,
5 Article 3's ambiguity prompted T J Farer "Humanitarian Law
and Armed Conflict: Toward the Definition of International Armed
Conflict" 71 Columbia LR (1971) 37 at 43, to remark:
One of the most assured things that might be said about the
words 'armed conflict not of an international character' is
that no one can say with assurance precisely what meaning
they were intended to convey.
6 A point raised by A P Rubin "The status of rebels under
the Geneva Conventions of 1949" 21 l.C..LfL (1972) 477 at 483.
7 J S Pictet Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War
Victims (1975) 56.
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administration, military command, control and discipline for its
observance. For instance, subsection l(d) implies that the rebels
.must possess a fairlY sophisticated judicial procedural structure
if they are to provide " ... all the judicial guarantees ...
recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples." Subsection 2
implies a fairly extensive medical service to collect and care
for the wounded and sick. The content of Article 3 clearly raises
the threshold of the Article, but we must look elsewhere for
further clarification.
The Conference debates reveal that there was little unanimity
about the precise meaning of "armed conflict not of an
international character". Farer notes that Article 3's ambiguity
served as a reconciliation of fundamentally opposed views. s The
ICRC originally wanted civil wars, colonial wars and religious
conflicts to be covered by the Conventions in their entirety.s
But concern about sovereignty led states to reject this option.
One thing made clear at the Conference was that an armed conflict
must actually be in progress for Article 3 to apply.10 The
Conference records do contain a set of recommended criteria for
•
distinguishing a genuine internal armed conflict from an
unorganised and short-lived insurrection. These criteria lay
heavy emphasis on the international impact of the conflict, the
S Gp cit 48.
e Pictet Commentary 3 30.
10 Final Record 28 335 - Swiss delegate.
incumbents full scale military
316
involvement, the rebel's
organisation, capacity to respect the law and, significantly,
possession of territory.11 But- they do not conclusively define
Article 3's scope because they were formulated to define those
occasions when the Conventions in their entirety would be
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 12 Accordingly,
they incorporate the customary mode of belligerency which is no
longer functional in the law. Moreover, the recommendations were
not adopted. Booysen's argument that the territoriality
requirement makes Article 3 inapplicable to South Africa must
thus be rejected because Article' 3 does not contain this
criterion either expli~itly or implicitly.13 The official ICRC
Commentary sees the recommendations as indicative and not
exhaustive of "conflicts not of an international character". It
concludes that the " ... Article should be applied as widely as
possible."14 The fact that various amendments reducing Article
3's scope by enumerating specific types of conflicts were
rejected, reinforces the Commentary's call for a latitudinarian
application of Article 3. According to the Commentary, the
Conference delegates, faced with a choice between either applying
all the Conventions to a limited range of conflicts or applying a
11 The conditions are listed in Final Record 2B at 121.
12 R R Baxter "The ius in bello interno" in J N Moore (ed)
Law and Civil War in the Modern World (1974) 518 at 526.
13 H Booysen "Terrorists, Prisoners of War and South Africa"
1 SAYIL (1975) 14 at 31.
14 Commentary 3 49-50.
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limited number of principles to an unlimited range of conflicts,
chose the latter course. 15 In addition, the Commentary submits
that the principles contained in Article 3 are so basic that no
government would violate them even if dealing with bandits. But,
as Bond notes, governments have violated these principles. 16 He
concludes that
... no set .of criteria for determining the type of internal
conflicts to which Article 3 applies is buried in the
Conference Committee reports. Reading through them one
nevertheless senses that the delegates intended Article 3 to
apply to insurgencies (Angola), to belligerencies or civil
wars (Biafra), but never to bandits or even to riots
(Watts).17
The Conference delegates plainly envisaged that the parties to
the conflict must have'some minimum form of organisation and that
a certain level of violence must exist, but these levels were
never agreed upon and were left undefined.
The practice of states underscores Article 3's limited range.
Although state practice is fairly confused, it does provide a
number of tangible pointers to the Article's scope. In the
Algerian conflict,
applies,
the French Government stated that Article 3
... when a state can no longer maintain order through the
normal application of its internal common law and is thus
15 Commentary 3 47.
16 J E Bond The Rules of Riot (1974) 56.
17 Gp cit 57. He assumes that the traditional customary
modes of internal conflict regulation are still operative.
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obliged to adopt a special code beyond its common law. 18
Portugal did not recognise Article 3's application in its
colonies. Portugal made a reservation to Article 3, in which
b f ' . ter al;a Art;cle 3's vague material scope,ecause 0, ~n • , •
it reserved the right not to apply Article 3 if it conflicted
with its national law in the territories under its sovereignty.
The reservation appertained to its colonies and was withdrawn on
colonial independence. In the Angolan Civil War, UNITA impliedly
accepted Article 3 by its embracement of humanitarian general
principles in 1980. In 1978 lan Smith declared that Rhodesia
complied with Article 3, but Robert M~gabe refused to endorse the
general principles of the Geneva Conventions and refused to
accept a code of conduct for ZANLA fighters because of practical
considerations. Although these examples tend to indicate a fairly
jaundiced attitude toward Article 3, Forsythe notes that far more
attention has been paid to the Article's application than is
generally realised. 18 He argues that many governments probably
did not made declarations acknowledging the application of
Article 3 in order to save national face and prevent the rebels
claiming international status, despite the fact that the Article
contains an express provision to the contrary. It is true that
18 Algerian Office, White Paper
Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the





18 D P Forsythe "Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977
Protocol on Non-international armed conflicts" 72 American JIL
(1978) 272 at 274-276. He lists 3 ad hoc agreements, 9 explicit
acceptances and 21 cases where the ICRC visited and Article 3
possibly applied.
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the provisions of Article 3 are general principles contained in
most national legal systems and a formal invocation of Article 3
may be seen as legally unnecessary and politically risky.
Nevertheless, Article 3 has a bad record of compliance. Bond
explains that " ... states that quell riots, insurrections or even
revolts quickly, do not feel bound to respect Article 3." 20 They
act under emergency or martial law as long as the conflict ends
swiftly and only accept some obligation to treat opposing forces
humanely if the conflict drags on beyond several weeks or months.
Although not taking the form of explicit acceptance of Article 3,
it often manifests itself in acceptance of an ICRC initiative.
It is submitted that a combination of the lessons of state
practice, the intention of the framers and the textual evidence,
leads to the following rough outline of the material field of
application of Article 3.2~ Article 3 conflicts are delimited
from lesser forms of conflict involving sporadic outbursts of
violence, such as riots resulting in mass arrests. There must" be
an armed conflict in progress between different armed forces,
which is no longer a simple problem of the maintenance of order.
The armed conflict must be of a fairly high intensity and long
duration, so that the government is compelled to use its armed
20 Gp cit 60-61.
2~ See generally ICRe Report on the Reaffirmation and
Development of the Law Applicable in Armed Conflict presented to
the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross Geneva (1968)
99.
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forces and not just its police, although the use of police in a
paramilitary role is sufficient. Such a situation is
characterised by the imposition of special legal regimes to
maintain domestic control. Both parties should be sufficiently
organised politically and militarily, to have a responsible
command exercising control and discipline and to implement the
Article. The insurgent party is, however, not required to
exercise control over territory, nor need it embody any of the
attributes of a government.
Adjudged on these criteria, the South African armed conflict
probably falls within, the ambit of Article 3. While the conflict
is at a low level and violence is fairly sporadic, it is
beginning to change into a long term war of attrition. The level
of violence has risen substantially in the 1980's and can be
expected to continue to rise. 22 The Government has imposed
draconian sets of unique security laws and proclaimed a State of
Emergency. The SADF is heavily involved in the military response
to Umkhooto, in the townships, along South Africa's northern
borders and in the Frontline states. The ANC is a well organised
political collectivity making war on the South African Government
and although it has no territory of its own, it has an
infrastructure adequate enough to both exercise discipline
through a chain of command and apply Article 3. The sustained
humanitarian intervention of the ICRC appears to confirm that the
22 See Appendix A.
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South African situation is more than just a simple problem of the
maintenance of order. There is a strong case for arguing that the
South African Government is bound to apply Article 3 in the South
African armed conflict.
5 2 3 THE BINDING FORCE OF ARTICLE 3
Upon the classification of the South African armed conflict as an
Article 3 conflict, Article 3 makes it clear that "both parties"
....
are automatically bound to apply the Article. The South African
Government is bound through its contractual obligation. Neither
recognition of the ANC nor reciprocity is necessary. The
Government cannot technically withdraw Article 3's protections
because of violations by the ANC.23 The Article binds the ANC,
but it does not indicate how the ANC is bound. The Article's
automatic application appears advantageous. It seems to bypass
highly politicised issues that usually impede the application of
humanitarian law. Because there is no formal mechanism available
to the ANC to bind itself to Article 3, the Government's
application of the Article does not involve implied recognition
of the ANC. Indeed, Article 3 expressly states In Paragraph 4
that the legal status of the parties is not affected by its






fact of applying Article 3 does not in
any recognition by the de jure government
party has any authority of any kind; it
the government's right to suppress the
means - including arms - provided by it's
23 G I A 0 Draper The Red Cross Conventions (1958) 16.
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own laws; nor does it in any way effect the government's
right to prosecute, try and sentence its adversaries,
according to its own laws. In the same way the fact of the
adverse party applying the Article does not give it any
right to any new international status whatever it may be and
whatever title it may give itself. 24
In doing so, Kilgore argues, it overcame one of the major
stumbling blocks of the customary methods of applying
humanitarian law to internal conflicts, viz.: the fact that these
methods linked humanitarian protections to the achievement of
legitimacy by the rebels. 25 He notes that Article 3's failure as
an effective legal instrument is because states in their practice
imported these criteria into it. 26 This practice points, however,
to the necessity for some form. of international recognition of
the rebel group in order to bring it within the bounds of
effective international legal c?ntrol. The attempt to avoid what
is an undeniable fact of the international system was to Article
3's ultimate detriment. The operation of the Article will give
the rebels status. The acknowledgement of the insurgent party is
essential if it is to be bound to apply the Article.
Why is it important that Article 3 have legal effects for the
ANC? The ANC must be able to exercise rights under the Article
and conversely the Article must bind the ANC because unilateral
24 Commentary 3 43.
25 K Kilgore "Law of War: Geneva Conventions Signatories
Clarify Applicability of Law of War to Internal Armed Conflict"




application by the incumbent is a myth, given the reality of
reciprocity as the major motivation for application. The only
credible solution is application of the Article by both sides.
How Article 3 binds insurgent movements like the ANC is a vexed
question. How does one bind an entity which is not a party to the
Convention? Little attention was paid to this ~ssue at the 1949
Conference. Since then, a number of theories have been advanced:-
(i) The original ICRe view was that the insurgents are bound
because the original adherence of the government to the
Convention containing the Article binds all its subjects,
including the rebels, as individuals because the treaty is part
of domestic law. 27 The flaw in this view is that it regards the
rebels as individual subjects of domestic law under a duty to
comply with any international law contained in the domestic law.
What is really at stake here is their tegal status in
international law - their status vis a vis the government and the
international community. Further, it is difficult to conceive of
individuals as international subjects.
(ii) The updated ICRC approach is that the treaties into which a
state has entered are binding for all authorities exercising
effective power in that state. 28 Through a rule of custom,
treaties are also binding on a government assuming power by means
27 Final Record 28 94, Commentary 3 34-37.
28 D Schindler "The different types of armed conflicts
according to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols" 163 Recueil
des Cours (1979) 117 at 151.
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of a revolution as the legal personality of the state does not
alter through a revolution. The ANC can thus be bound as a
potential successor government to the South African Government
within the South African state. This approach avoids the
conceptual problem of obligating insurgents in an international
legal system of which they are not a part, because their
responsibilities are made to stem from their condition - consent
to be treated as a government is found in the claim to be one.
But the ANC may not accept the decision of the Government in
binding the state in the first place. 29 In addition, its claim to
represent the people does not necessarily mean it claims to be a
government, i.e., the finding of consent may be a fiction.
(iii) A third viewpoint is that Article 3, an innovation in 1949,
has since become part of customary international law. 3o The
evidence of state practice and a concomitant opinio iuris to this
effect is contradictory. There have been many internal conflicts
where Article 3 has been ignored and even when its application
has been recognised there has been constant violation of the
Article on both sides. Although some authors argue that a
customary norm has now formed, others deny it, and its creation
remains controversial. 31 It can, alternatively, be argued that
29 D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics (1977) 140.
30 M Greenspan The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959) 624.
31 Among the disbelievers are the Authors of the Article
"The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of P.O.W's in Vietnam"
in R Falk (ed) The Vietnam War and International Law vol 2 (1869)
398 at 403; M Bathe, K Partsch and W Solf New Rules for Victims
of Armed Conflict (1882) 620.
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Article 3's basic provisions are in their substance part of
custom and part of ius cogens. In the Corfu Channels Case,32 the
ICJ expressed the opinion that there were certain " 0 •• elementary
considerations of humanity which have a binding force on all
states." Schindler argues that ·the substance of Article 3 forms
part of these principles and is thus binding on any movement
purporting to act on behalf of a state without its consent. 33
There is merit in this contention and it is supported by the fact
that although few states or insurgent movements have invoked
Article 3 in internal conflicts, many have tacitly agreed to
respect basic humanitarian principles.
The controversy ~s, however, largely resolved when the insurgent
movement has the political will to adhere to Article 3. 34
Articles 34-36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
provide that a treaty can create either obligations or rights for
a third party if the contracting parties intended the treaty to
grant such rights or impose such obligations on third parties and
the third party accepts these rights and obligations. With regard
to the intention of the HCP's, an explicit intention to grant
32 1949 IeJ Reports 22.
33 Gp cit 151-152; See also G Schwarzenberger International
Law as Applied in Courts and Tribunals yol· 2 The Law of Armed
Conflict (1968) 718.
34 This approach was suggested by Cassese's approach to how
Protocol 2 can bind insurgents - A Cassese "The Status of Rebels
under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-international Armed
Conflicts" 30 l.C..L.Q. (1981) 416-439.
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rights and impose obligations on thir~ parties emerges from the
text of Article 3. Its first sentence reads " ... each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply ... ". The Article also urges
special agreements between " ... the parties to the conflict ... " to
apply some or all of the rest of the Conventions and allows the
ICRC to offer its services to " ... the parties ... ". It is plain
that the intention of the HCP's, as embodied in the text, is that
the insurgents benefit and are addressed by Article 3. The third
party must also assent to the rights and duties deriving from the
treaty. This is question of fact. The answer is derived from the
third party's practice. Paragraph 3 of the Article makes
provision for the id~al situatiQn - a special agreement between
the insurgent movement and the~ incumbent gov~rnment. Such
agreements are desirable but extremely rare because of political
considerations. Unilateral declarations by insurgent movements
that they will apply basic humanitarian provisions are more
common. These declarations have the same binding effect as
bilateral agreements and if both parties issue declarations they
are bound as if they had concluded a formal agreement. It is
submitted that the ANC's 1980 Declaration, if it is not an
Article 96(3) declaration in terms of Protocol 1, can be seen at
a minimum as an implicit unilateral commitment to the basic norms
of Article 3. It is arguable that the ANC is bound to apply
Article 3, if not formally, then at least in substance. It
follows that the Government cannot claim that the ANC cannot
invoke the Article.
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It can thus be argued that Article 3 binds both parties to the
South African armed conflict and that neither party can denounce
the Article while the conflict is in progress. Theoretically, if
either party fails to comply, the other party can go to the ICRC
or other HCP's to call on it to comply. Although the Government
is probably already bound to apply Article 3, it would be
advisable for it to affirm its commitment to Article 3 in the
form of a declaration to the effect that it recognises that
Article 3 applies in the South African armed conflict. Together
with the ANC's declaration, such a commitment would solidly
establish a bedrock of·basic protections in the conflict.
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5.3 GENEYA PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
5.3 1 INTRODUCTION - THE GENESIS OF PROTOCOL 235
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although in its own way
a triumph for the legal limitation of violence over unfettered
state discretion, does not provide extensive protections to
combatants in the South African armed conflict. It was far less
ambitious than the original recommendations for the regulation of
non-international armed conflicts. Article 3's inadequacies led
the 21st International Conference of the Red Cross (1989) to
recommend that it should be made more specific and supplemented.
The recommendations included a more detailed judicial process,
the deferment of executions to the end of the conflict, a general
amnesty at the end of the conflict, measures ensuring respect for
hospitals, greater relief and, importantly, provisions that
combatants should not be punished for participation in combat and
an analogous status to P.O.W's for captured participants. These
recommendations, contained in a new Protocol 2, would have
constituted an ideal vehicle for humanitarian regulation of the
South African armed conflict. But as we shall see, the new
Protocol's development became bound up with the development of
Protocol 1, to the ultimate detriment of both instruments.
The ICRC-convened Conference of Government Experts served as the
35 See generally S Junod "Additional Protocol 2: History and
Scope" 33 American ULR (1983/4) 29ff.
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forum for detailing the proposals for supplementing the law of
non-international armed conflict. The experts made a variety of
suggestions, ranging from a Protocol with·the widest possible
material application, covering even low intensity conflicts, to a
Protocol with the narrowest scope, covering only high intensity
conflicts. The ICRC draft's solution was to make the Protocol
applicable to most situations of non-international armed
conflict.
The first session of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference was
completely taken up with the adoption of wars of national
liberation as international armed conflicts. In consequence, the
discussions on Protocol 2 were only taken up hesitantly in the
second session. The initial basis for discussion was the ICRC
draft Protocol. It was a miniature Convention with a relatively
broad material scope that placed a substantial number of
obligations on the parties and gave extensive rights to third
parties such as the ICRC. During the next two sessions the
humanitarian safeguards of the ICRC's draft were expanded upon,
with some watering down of specific obligations. A draft of forty
nine Articles was adopted in Committee by consensus, and was
passed on to plenary at the start of the 1977 session. 36 But the
consensus was a facade covering the profound discontent of a
large number of nations with the draft Protocol. The Pakistani
and Canadian delegations carried on parallel discussions with
36 CDDH/4G2/Protocol 2 Articles 1-47.
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numerous other delegations and
... realised that there was considerable dissatisfaction with
the length of the text as well as with the fact that it
ventured into domains which they considered sancroscant and
inappropriate for inclusion in an international
instrument. 37
As a result, the day before the adoption in plenary, the head of
the Pakistani delegation, Hussein J, made what was formally an
amendment to the Committee's draft Protocol, but which in fact
replaced it. 38 The rationale of this new draft was that it should
not affect the sovereignty of the states party to it or the right
of non-intervention in their domestic affairs. 38 The emasculated
draft Protocol received widespread support not only from Third
World states opposed to the Committee's version, but also from
the Western and Socialist blocs because these states feared that
the Committee draft would not survive a plenary vote. The new
twenty eight Article Protocol was adopted by consensus. Protocol
2 was a drastic revision of the ICRC and Committee drafts. All
apparent recognition of insurgent parties, most of the rules
regulating means and methods of warfare, as well as other
sophisticated regulations, were removed. Why?
The major reasons for the emasculation of Protocol 2 was its
relation to Article 1(4) of Protocol 1 and the strong attachment
37 CDDH/SR49 4 para 11.
38 CDDH/427 of 31 May 1977 and CDDH/427/Corr.1 of 1 June
1977.
38 CDDH/SR49 at 5.
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of most states to national sovereignty.4o The split between those
in favour and those against Article 1(4) carried over to the
negotiations on Protocol 2. Indeed, one of the criticisms of
Article 1(4), denied in debate~ was that the Third World was
trying to bury Protocol 2. This denial was not subsequently borne
out. With the inclusion of wars of national liberation as
international armed conflicts, many Third World countries saw
little reason for Protocol 2. For instance, India, which had
spent most of the 1974 session of the Conference attempting to
force international regulation on South Africa and Israel, spent
most of the 1975 session opposing draft Protocol 2, law which it
f ear ed wo u 1d 1 i mi tit s' de a 1 ing wit h va r i 0 us vi 0 len t situat ionsat
home. 4l The Indian spokesman stated:
If national liberation movements were included under Article
1 [of Protocol 1J, the application of the draft Protocol [2]
to internal disturbances and other such situations would be
tantamount to interference with the sovereign rights and
duties of states. The definition of non-international armed
conflicts was still vague and no convincing arguments had
been put forward to justify the need for draft Protocol 2,
the provisions of which would not be acceptable to his
delegation. 42 .
40 See generally
War: The 1977 Protocol
American J1L (1978)
Reappraisal of the Old
Conflict" in The New
(1978) 461 at 484.
o P Forsythe "Legal Management of Internal
on Non-international Armed Conflicts" 72
280-281; and A Cassese "A Tentative
and the New Humanitarian Law of Armed
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict vol 1
4l CDDH/1/SR28; D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics (1877)
128. The Indian delegation even challenged the continued validity
of Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, arguing that it was drafted
to cover wars of national liberation when these were regarded as
internal armed conflicts, and as this was no longer the case
there was no need for Article 3 - CDDH/SR49 annex 6-7.
42 CDDH/1/SR23 at 56.
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The Indian position was shared by many Afro-Asian countries. 43
Their fragile governments were not eager to accord rights to and
accept obligations in respect of insurgents in non-international
armed conflicts. It is ironic that the argument that these
insurgents were rebels against lawful authority and should thus
be subject to domestic penal laws only, was the same argument
used by colonial, alien and racist regimes. Clearly the authority
of colonial, alien and racist regimes is questionable, but so is
that of many other governments. The application of humanitarian
law in both international and non-international armed conflicts
should have been based on the need to regulate the barbarity of
all armed conflicts. The Norwegian delegation, motivated as they
were by such a need and having supported Article 1(4), viewed the
attitude of the Third World to Protocol 2 with dismay.44
Ultimately, the reality of a state's internal situation
conditioned the way it viewed the Protocol. 45 For those states
43 Nigeria and Iraq were also vocal in their objections to
Protocol 2. Forsythe op cit 1978 281 notes that many Third World
states that had reserved their opinions in Committee, showed
themselves to be opposed to the Protocol at the plenary session.
They argued that the consensus in Committee had been achieved not
on substantive law,. but because of a procedural desire not to
block what others might accept.
44 CDDH/l/SR28. The Egyptian delegate was also critical of
his colleagues. He said:
Selective humanitarianism could not exist. The principle
underlying Draft Protocol 2 was the same as that which had
prompted the effort to extend protection in international
armed conflicts. - CDDH/1/SR24 at 10.
45 Cassese o~ cit 495-6.
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that sought extensive regulation of internal armed conflict at
the expense of sovereignty, there was no prospect of civil war. 46
Hore moderate states that favoured a Protocol covering
exclusively humanitarian issues, probably took this position
because they only faced internal violence on a small scale. 47 The
states which were only prepared to accept a bare minimum of
humanitarian protections, usually had specific internal problems,
such as the UK in Ulster. Those states opposed to any form of
regulation in principle, were like India, the states with
greatest potential for internal conflict.
Cassese feels that ,despite the lukewarm approach of the
Conference to Protocol 2, it should be judged on its own merits
and not solely in relation to' previous drafts. 48 How much
actually changed in the final version? Forsythe notes that only
three rules of relative importance in the Committee draft do not
appear in the final text. 49 These were: Article 10(5), the
provision deferring execution to the end of the armed conflict;
Article 8(4), requiring parties to facilitate visits by
humanitarian organisations; and in Article 33(1), the right of
46 They included Norway, Sweden,
sometimes Belgium, Italy and others.
the Holy See, ICRC and
47 They included most Western states and the USSR, eight
other Eastern bloc states, and a few Third World states such as
Egypt and Pakistan.
48 Gp cit 496.
49 Gp cit 1978 282.
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relief organisations to provide relief was changed from "shall"
to "may". The other changes mostly involved the removal of any
reference to "the parties to the conflict" in order·to deny
rebels any international status. But Protocol 2 contains a
provision that emphasises its status as a statement of good
intentions rather than law. Article 3 provides expressis verbis
... that nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of the state [paragraph
1J ... , or as a justification for intervening, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever in the armed conflict or
in the internal or external affairs of the HCP in the
territory of which that conflict occurs [paragraph 2J.
Kalshoven calls Article 3 a " ... categorical refutation of
international concern in internal armed conflict. o '50
5 3 2 THE MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION OF PROTOCOL 2
5.3 2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 1
ICRC draft Article 1 had integrated Article 3 of the Conventions
and the Protocol by simply applying the former's scope to the
latter. But concern amongst Third World states about national
sovereignty led to the introduction of new elements at the
Diplomatic Conference that raised the threshold of Protocol 2's
field of application substantially above Article 3's. The ICRC
draft Article, supported by the West and Egypt, had excluded
internal disturbances and tensions from its field of application,
50 F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The
Diplomatic Conference, Geneva 1974-1977" 8 NYI.1. (1977) 115.
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but had also rejected territorial control by the adverse party as
a criterion inappropriate in modern warfare. Nevertheless, the
Third World and East Europeans introduced territorial control
into the Committee draft. Furthermore, it was a control of a
special kind; enough" ... to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement the present Protocol."51
Bothe, Partsch and Solf note that this meant that it was no
longer possible to determine Protocol 2's threshold objectively
from the definition in Article 1 itself. 52 Whether the adverse
party was able to implement the Protocol depended on its content.
The detailed obligations in Protocol 2 in effect raised the
threshold. This solution found consensus without much enthusiasm.
While many Western states resigned themselves to Article 1, the
Norwegian delegate said that:
... his delegation objected to the assumption in Article 1
that armed forces needed to exercise control of territory in
order to implement the provisions of draft Protocol 2. That
assumption had been rejected by the committee at the first
session in respect of national liberation movements and he
could see no objective elements which would make the
application of draft Protocol 2 more difficult in some
circumstances for dissident forces than the application of
the whole of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and draft Protocol
1 by national liberation movements. He was forced to the
conclusion that the problem was not lack of material
possibilities concerning the dissident armed forces
concerned, but lack of political readiness on the part of
certain delegates. 53
The narrow version went to the vote at the plenary and was
51 CDDH/l/238.
52 M Bothe K Partcsh W Solf New Rules for Victims of Armed
Conflict (1982) 625.
53 CDDH/1/SR29 at 18.
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adopted 58/5/29. The Article reads:
ARTICLE 1 - MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without
modifying its existing conditions of application, shall
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by
Article 1 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol 1) and which takes place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement
this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and othe~ acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts.
5 3 2 2 ARTICLE 1 INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
Article 1(1) makes it clear at the outset that the material
fields of application of Article 3 of the Conventions and
Protocol 2 are independent. Thus.Article 3's probable application
to the South African armed conflict is not affected if Protocol 2
does not apply.
Article 1(1) goes on to set out the parameters of a new category
of non-international armed conflicts not covered by the general
category of international armed conflicts as designated either in
common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or Article 1 of
Protocol 1. Obviously, if the South African armed conflict falls
clearly under Protocol 1 as an Article 1(4) conflict, then
Protocol 2 does not apply. As noted in chapter 3, however, there
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is not as yet a general acceptance that South Africa is an
Article 1(4) situation. It is thus necessary to examine Protocol
2's application to the South African armed conflict, although it
is conceded that this issue is a moot point at pre~ent as South
Africa is not a party to the Protocol and it is generally agreed
that Protocol 2 has not become a part of custom. Nevertheless, it
remains conceivable that South Africa may become a party to the
Protocol because it is an apolitical instrument containing
nothing more than a number of general guarantees that should
already, for purely humanitarian reasons, be operative in the
South African armed conflict. Protocol 2's very general nature
and its core of basic human rights also points to the possibility
of its transformation into custom, a possibility that is lent
further support by the fact that 60 states had become party to
the Protocol by August 1986. 54
The armed conflicts covered by Article 1(1) are those ., ... which
take place within the territory of an HCP ... ". Both sides may,
however, receive support from the territory of a neighbouring
country. Any other interpretation would be unrealistic. In South
Africa, much of the ANC's infrastructure and equipment comes from
or is stored in neighbouring states. The major lacunae in this
provision is that it implies that the Protocol would not apply to
armed conflict that occurs outside South African territory, for
instance in the Frontline States.
54 256 lRRC (1986).
338
Article 1(1) makes it clear that the armed conflict must take
place between the HCP's "armed forces" and "organised armed
groups". Al though the exact nature. of the Governmen t 's "armed
forces" is undefined, a note in Committee l's report reads:
In this Protocol, so far as the armed forces of an HCP are
concerned, the expression 'armed forces' means all armed
forces - including those which under some national system
might not be called regular forces constituted in
accordance with national legislation under some national
systems; according to the views stated by a number of
delegations the expression would not include other
governmental agencies the members of which may be armed,
examples of such agencies are the police, customs and other
similar organisations. 55
This note does not clarify the status of paramilitary forces. For
instance, would the SAP, acting in a paramilitary role, be
fncluded in "armed forces"? It seems they would have to because
of the extraordinary military nature of their duties.
As to the nature of "organised armed groups", according to an
ICRC statement in committee 1, it does not mean
... any armed band acting under a leader. Such armed groups
must be structured and possess organs, and must therefore
have a system for allocating authority and responsibility:
they must also be subject to rules of internal discipline. 56
The fairly high degree of organisation implicit here is fleshed
out 1n Article 1(1). It sets out four conditions that ANC forces
would have to meet to be classified as "organised armed groups".
Firstly, the group must be under a responsible command. This
55 Bothe et al. op cit 626.
56 Bothe et al. ib id.
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condition can be fulfilled by proof of a chain of command. A
collectively structured group does not require a rigid military
hierarchy. Rather, as in the case of the ANC, it may just be a da
facto authority sufficient to both plan and carry out concerted
and sustained military operations and to impose the discipline
requirements ensuring the application of the rest of the
Protocol. Secondly, the group must exercise effective control
over a part of the territory. How much territory would the ANC
have to control? It is impossible to stipulate the precise
extent. Rather, the extent is determined by its function. 57 The
extent of the control must be enough "to enable" the adverse
party "to carry out sllstained and concerted military operations"
and to apply the Protocol. Even if it is the quality of the
control and not the quantity of territory that is crucial, this
condition makes Protocol 2's application in South Africa even
more of a moot point as the ANC does not control any territory
within the country or at least no territory enabling sustained
and concerted military operations. Thirdly, the group must have
..... the capacity for sustained and concerted military
operations". Possessing such a capacity serves to ensure
effective territorial control. The ANC may be able to carry out
such operations from outside South Africa, but it is incapable of
doing so at this stage from within South Africa. Fourthly, the
57 However, at the Conference various delegations offered
opinions as to its extent, ego Indonesia - "a substantial part"-
CDDH/l/32; Vietnam "a considerable part" - CDDH/56 add 2 at
25; Brazil - "a non-negligible part" - CDDH/l/79.
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group must have If ••• the capacity for implementation of the
Protocol". The ANC must be capable of applying the Protocol. That
capability can be attested to by its acting under a responsible
command, exercising control over a part of the territory and
carrying out sustained and concerted military operations. Junod
notes:
As soon as the material criteria are fulfilled, it may be
reasonably expected that the parties will apply the rules of
protection contained in the Protocol, because the Parties
would then have an adequate infrastructure for such
application. 58
Nevertheless, although Article l(l)'s extensive conditions on the
adverse party ensure that its capacity to apply the Protocol is
beyond doubt, Article 1(2) also explicitly excludes from the
Protocol's application
... situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
Article 1(2) was taken over almost verbatim from the draft
Protocol. The ICRC commentary on the 1973 draft Protocol noted:
The notion of internal disturb~nces and tensions has been
made more explicit by an enumeration, albeit not exhaustive,
of situations considered to be consistent with that notion
irrespective of whether constitutional guarantees have or
have not been suspended:
- riots·, that is to say, all disturbances which from their
start are not directed by a leader and have no concerted
intent;
- isolated and sporadic acts of violence, as distinct from
military operations and carried out by armed forces or
organised armed groups;
- other acts of a similar nature which cover, in particular,
58 S Junod "Additional Protocol 2: History and Scope" 33
American ULR (1983/4) 38.
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mass arrests of persons because of their behaviour or
political opinion. 58
In the South African context these examples may exclude township
unrest, but would probably not exclude all ANC military activity.
Who decides when Article l(l)'s conditions have been met and that
the conflict no longer falls into the situations .excluded in
Article 1(2)?60 Some states at the Conference argued that the
decision was theirs alone. 61 Others argued that the adverse party
must first declare its intention to apply the Protocol. 62 These
proposals were withdrawn. Bothe, Partsch and Solf note that all
the conditions in Article 1 are objective and thus an HCP has no
discretion to decide whether the conflict meets the conditions. 63
Application is automatic and the state must comply with the
Protocol. unconditionally. That implies that only states can apply
the Protocol and only third party states can press them to apply
the Protocol. How then is the adverse party bound and what rights
can it assert under Protocol 2?
59 Bathe et al. op cit 628. Most experts feel that these
situations also fall outside the scope of common Article 3 of the
1949 Conventions. However, were not explicitly excluded in common
Article 3.
60 F R Ribeiro "International Humanitarian Law Advancing
Progressively Backwards" 97 ~ (1980) 42 at 47.
61 CDDH/SR49 11ff; CDDH/1/30 - Rumania.
62 CDDH/1/26 - Pakistan.
63 Gp cit 628.
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5 3 3 THE BINDING FORCE OF PROTOCOL 2
Protocol 2 will bind the South African Government only if it
becomes party to the treaty in terms of Articles 20-22 of the
Protocol. These Articles set out that only states can ratify or
accede to the treaty. There is no provision in Protocol 2 similar
to Article 96 of Protocol 1. From the text it appears that the-
adverse party has no de jure authority under the Protocol. It can
neither bind itself nor exercise any rights under the Protocol.
Thus it has been argued that the Protocol is unconditionally
binding on the state alone and, because the rebels are not bound
as a separate entity, they need not apply the Protocol. From this
point of view, the obligation of the HCP is to the rest of the
parties to the Protocol and cannot be modified by the behavior of
the insurgents. 64 But Protocol 2 must concede some status to the
adverse party because it demands reciprocal obligations from a da
facto authority capable of protracted warfare. It must either
bind the insurgents or allow them to bind themselves. But how is
it bound?
Although the various approaches to how Article 3 of the 1949
Conventions binds the ANC can be applied to Protocol 2, those
arguments are equally as contentious and unconvincing when
applied to Protocol 2. It is submitted that Cassese's approach to
discovering whether the Protocol has legal effects for third
64 View expressed in Article 10 of the draft Protocol-
deleted - Italy CDDH/SR51 annex 122.
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parties, which was adapted in this study to the similar problem
of binding the ANC under Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, is
the correct one. 65 He relies on Articles 34-36 of the Vienna
Convention, which provide that a treaty can create either
obligations or rights for a third party only if the. HCP' s
intended it to grant such rights .or impose such obligations on
third parties and the third party accepts the rights or
obligations. Looking at the intention of the HCP's as embodied in
the text, he argues that because of its explicit connection with
common Article 3 in Article 1(1), the Protocol, like Article 3,
must also give rights to and impose obligations on insurgents.
In addition, he notes' that conditions in Article 1(1) such as
"responsible command" and "organised armed group", require the
compliance of the adverse party with the Protocol for it to
become applicable. He submits that it would be absurd to suggest
that they should comply without acquiririg any rights and duties
because there is no reason for compliance if they do not benefit.
He dismisses the logically flawless argument that once the
objective conditions are met, the Protocol is immediately and
automatically applicable, the duty being on the state to apply it
unilaterally. According to this approach, the interest of the
adverse party is to make the Protocol operational so that they
can benefit by it. If they breach the Protocol the HCP cannot
disregard it, but ii the HCP breaches it, the HCP is answerable
65 A Cassese "The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva
Protocol on Non-international Armed Conflicts" 30 ~ (1981)
416-439.
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to other HCP's. But, as Cassese notes, this approach simply does
not accord with reality. In practice states do not readily
concede applicability. In addition, the insurgents do not live up
to standards they have not accepted. Cassese states:
If insurgents are regarded as beneficiaries and addressees
of the Protocol, this means that they are authorised to
demand from the government in power the full application of
the Protocol, once its activating conditions are present.
The very men for whose sake the Protocol has been elaborated
are the best equipped to prompt the government concerned to
respect it. s6
Cassese cites other provisions in Protocol 2 which assume that
the Protocol binds the adverse party and he concludes that the
.intention of the parties embodied in the text is that insurgents
may derive rights and ciuties from Protocol 2.
The second requirement is assent by the third party to the rights
and duties deriving from the treaty. The willingness of the
rebels is a factual question ascertained by looking at their
practice. If the willingness and ability of the insurgents to
apply the Protocol is evident, then Cassese submits that the
Protocol is automatically binding on both parties. The government
in power cannot claim that the rebels cannot invoke the Protocol
and if the rebels meet the objective conditions the government
cannot refuse to comply.67 In sum then, the ANC, if it met
Protocol 2's objective conditions and South Africa was a party to
66 Gp cit 427.
67 Cassese op cit 433-439 sets out the adverse party's
options if the government does not comply.
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the Protocol, could, if it so desired, invoke and bind itself to
the Protocol. 6S
Cassese's argument is convincing because it acknowledges that an
adverse party involved in a conflict of as high a threshold as
that set out in Article 1, must attain a distinct de jure as well
as de facto international status. 6S He also takes into account
the political will of the adverse party. Protocol 2 is only
applied if the adverse party wants to apply it. Thus the totally
unrealistic expectation of unilateral compliance on the part of
the HCP is avoided. The humanitarian obligations of parties to a
conflict are never' absolute in practice; reciprocity is
fundamental to the enforcement of all humanitarian treaties.
5 3 4 PROTOCOL 2'S APPLICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
It appears that Protocol 2 is of limited application generally.
The development of Protocol 2 provided a unique opportunity to
develop the broadly applicable common Article 3 of the
Conventions, but the opportunity was wasted. Article 1 of
Protocol 2 has raised the threshold of the material field of
6S Technically it could do so even though the South African
Government is not party to the Protocol.
69 Such status is normally accorded through some form of
international recognition from third states and international
organisations, for either political reasons or because of the
possible threat to the rights of these third parties, ego Biafra.
It is highly probable that the major motivation for the
emasculation of Protocol 2 came from the realisation by states
that no amount of legal gymnastics would solve the fundamental
problem of some form of legitimation of the insurgent party.
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application to one commensurate with the notion of a classical
civil war, simply omitting the need for belligerent recognition.
If Protocol 2 were equivalent to belligerency then it would mean
that legal protection had actually diminished at this level of
conflict because in a belligerency there was far greater legal
regulation. For one thing, the belligerent party's combatants
could qualify as lawful participants, a protection not offered by
Protocol 2. Article l's heavy obligations on the rebels makes
Protocol 2's application dubious even in cases of high intensity
conflicts. Moreover, if the South African Government were to
become a Party to the Protocol, when the armed conflict reached
such an intense level, as to bring the Protocol into ,operation,
the impetus behind regarding the conflict as international under
Article 1(4) of Protocol 1 would be so great as to make Protocol
2's application irrelevant. It is probable that Protocol 2 will
never operate in South Africa. Nevertheless, it would seem very
strange if the incumbent claimed that it could allow derogation
of the fundamental protections contained in Protocol 2, either
because the South African armed conflict had not yet reached the
threshold contained in Article 1, or because it was not party to
the Protocol.
5.4 CONCLUSION
At present, the South African armed conflict is probably only
governed by the limited provisions of common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. The very narrowly defined Protocol 2
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doesn't apply to the South African armed conflict and the
prospects for its future application are not good. Obviously, an
examination of Article 3's protections is necessary. In addition,
it is submitted that an examination of Protocol 2's personal
field of application and general protections is also of interest,
more because of what was left out, than what was included.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PERSONAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION OF COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE
1949 GENEVA CONYENTIONS AND GENEYA PROTOCOL 2 OF 1977
6 1 PROTECTIONS
CONFLICTS GENERALLY
FOR COMBATANTS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
The law of non-international armed conflict will never meet the
demands of the international community for international
regulation of the South African armed conflict because it does
not oblige South Africa to recognise the right of ANC combatants
to participate in combat or accord them P.G.W. status. 70
Customary international law imposes no requirements with respect
to the treatment of the participants in civil conflicts 71 and
neither common Article 3 nor Protocol 2 recognises the legality
of the participation of combatants or confers any status on
captured combatants. While both members of armed forces and
civilians who are detained enjoy some fundamental guarantees
under Article 3 and Protocol 2, national criminal law is not
70 G I A D Draper "The Status of Combatants and the Question
of Guerilla Warfare" 45 B-.Y..1L. (1871) 17~1 at 207; W Solf "The
Status of Combatants in Non-international Armed Conflicts under
Domestic law and International Practice" 33 American ULR (1983/4)
53 at 58.
71. R I Miller (ed) The Law of War (1975) 21.; R R Baxter
"Comments·' in P Troboff (ed) Law and Respoosibility in Warfare
(1875) 267. Both these authors contend that no customary law of
war whatsoever applies in non-international armed conflicts. F
Kalshoven "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts" in A Cassese (ed) Current Problems
Q_L International----L..aR (1975) 267 disputes this, but concedes that
the one customary principle that does not apply, is the principle
of lawful participation for combatants.
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sus~ended by either of these instruments. Insurgent combatants
can be tried and convicted under the criminal law for the taking
u~ of arms. Bond notes:
Indeed, a country's initial reaction is usually to decree
martial rule, expand the reach of the criminal law, and
increase the punishment for offenses endangering national
security.72
South Africa, with its State of Emergency and special security
laws, bears out Bond's statement. The reason for such a reaction
is obvious. Host governments fear that any international rule
establishing lawful combatant status in non-international armed
conflict would not only enhance the status of insurgents, it
would also encourage partici~ation by reducing the personal risks
involved. Given the negative attitude of incumbents to rebel
combatants, it is not surprising that in most situations the
rebels t~eat captured members of the incumbent's armed forces in
a reciprocal fashion, executing them on capture. O·Brien notes:
Paralleling the regimes view of rebels as criminals and
traitors, the revolutionaries see government troops as
enemies of the people who merit revolutionary justice. 73
Nevertheless, ln certain large scale civil wars combatants have
been singled out from ordinary criminals. 74 In conflicts governed
72 J E Bond The Rules of Riot (1974) 113.
73 W O'Brien
Counterinsurgency"
(1978) 193 at 224.
"The ius in
18 Virginia
bello in Revolutionary War and
Journal of International Law
74 See 3.5.4.5 supra; A P Rub in ., Terror ism and the Laws of
War" 12 Denyer Journal of International Law and Polioy (1983) 219
at 220-227.
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by the customary mode of belligerency, lawful combatant status
was recognised because of the great magnitude of the conflict.
Under modern international law, however, ~rotected status is not
conferred even in large scale non-international armed conflicts.
But modern states do tend to refrain from ~rosecuting insurgents
for ~articipation and they tend to
the conflict is over. 75 However,
grant a general amnesty once
these de facto ~ractices have
not as yet been translated into de iure obligations. They remain
within the discretion of the incumbent government, which tends to
apply such standards only when the
intensity and extended duration.
conflict is one of great
It also remains within the
discretion of the rebel group to abide by such practices. If the
South African Government were to accord s~ecial status to ANC
combatants ex gratia, then, coupled with a similar commitment by
the ANC, the legal impasse in the South African armed conflict
would be at least partly resolved. At ~resent, however, the
Government is not legally obliged to grant such status.
The justification for looking at the personal fields of Article 3




for combatants, necessitates only a brief
general humanitarian protections afforded
75 Bond op cit 114.
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ART ICLE 3'S PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION AND THE6.2 COHMO[ _
GENERAL PROTECTIONS CONFERRED
6 2 1 PERSONAL FIELD
.Article 3's personal field includes:
(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds detention or
any other cause ...
Once they have ceased to participate in the conflict and have
fallen into the hands of the enemy, "members of armed forces" are
covered by Article 3 and no further conditions are imposed for
its application. Thus the South African Government's armed forces
are covered by Article 3. But what about ANC guerrillas? Draper
sets out three possible interpretations of this sent~nce.76
(i) Article 3 confers the same protection upon insurgent
guerrillas, such as ANC members, as it purports to do for armed
forces fighting against the armed forces of the government.
"Armed forces" in the text must be taken to include not only
rebel members of the armed forces of the government who turn on
the government, but also armed forces independently raised by
organisations like the ANC, even if these armed forces are
irregular guerrillas.
(ii) The alternative view is that the words used in Article 3 do
not embrace irregular guerrillas reduced to captivity in that
they are neither "persons taking no active part in hostilities"
76 Gp cit 1971 210-211.
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nor are they "members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms" within the meaning of Article 3(1). This view is consistent
with the concept of organised armed forces participating on both
sides. But ANC guerrillas are not per se unorganised and there is
no reason why they cannot be classed as armed forces.
(iii) The ambiguity of the text is resolved when one considers
that the intention of its drafters was to create a microcosm of
the remainder of the 1849 Conventions. The dichotomy of "persons
taking no active part in hostilities" and "members of armed
forces" is insufficient to expel irregular combatants from
Article 3's protection as it is neither firm nor exhaustive. It
must be overridden by the intention of the drafters, as evidenced
at the Conference, to make Article 3's application as broad as
possible. Considering the general nature of Article 3's
protections, the alternative interpretation IS untenable. Article
3 must cover all combatant members of the ANC, no matter how
irregular they are.
6 2 2 THE GENERAL PROTECTIONS OFFERED COMBATANTS 8Y ARTICLE 3
It must be reemphasised that in spite of Article 3's probable
application In the $outh African armed conflict, the Government
can still try ANC members under its domestic criminal law for
participation in combat. The Official Commentary on the Geneva
Conventions makes it clear that Article 3 does not prohibit
prosecution of insurgents even if they have committed no crime
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other than the carrying of arms illegally.?? The Commentary
continues:
In such a case, however, once the fighting reaches a certain
magnitude and the insurgent armed forces meet the criteria
specified in Article 4A(2) the spirit of Article 3 certainly
requires that members of insurgent forces should not be
treated as common criminals.?8
This sentiment is given no further concretisation. The French
response to Article 3 in the Algerian conflict is a good example
of how states treat rebel combatants in practice in large scale
internal armed conflicts. France, although it acknowledged the
applicability of Article 3 in the Algerian conflict, legally
executed FLN guerrill&s until threats of reprisals by the FLN and
although the French then set up camps for captured guerrillas,
they still insisted that their captives had no formal legal
status. 78 Nevertheless, although not strictly required by Article
3, it is submitted that in the South African context the most
pragmatic course for the Government to follow would be to grant
ANC combatants lawful status ensuring that they are dealt with
outside of the jurisdiction of the criminal law.
What protections are offered by Article 3?
(1) Persons shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith sex birth or wealth, or any other
77 Commentary 3 40.
78 Ibid.
79 T J Farer "Humanitarian
the Definition of International
(1971) 53-54.
Law and Armed Conflict: Toward
Armed Conflict" 37 Columbia LR
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similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
Ca) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
Cb) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgement pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the Judicial
guarantees recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
A number of points can be made about the application of these
rules to the South African armed conflict.
Ca) Assuming Article 3 binds the South African Government and the
ANC, neith~r organisation may summarily execute their prisoners.
Article .3 forbids the passing and carrying out of sentence
without due process. It may be asked what J.S a "regularly
constituted court"? The Government will probably assume that its
criminal courts meet the criteria of a regularly constituted
court. Although within Article 3's framework, looking at past
precedents, the South African courts do appear to meet Article
3's criteria, it is submitted that special military tribunals
would be more suitable. Any tribunal which the ANC institutes to
try captured Government personnel may be ad hoc, but it will meet
Article 3's standards if it is authoritative, i. e. , the ANC,
acting within its powers, creates the court according to
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recognised standards. 8o It may then be asked what "judicial
guarantees" are "recognised as indispensable by all civilised
peoples"? Bond notes that
... there is a consensus today that certain specific rights
are fundamental to trial in any such court. Among these are
prompt notice of charges, adequate time and facilities to
prepare defense, right to counsel, and the assistance of an
interpreter. 81
The right to an open trial and appeal are also important, but are
less universally recognised. The ANC will find even these minimum
standards very difficult to comply with in its activities within
South Africa, but in base areas in the Frontline states
compliance should be easy. With regard to sentence Bond notes:
Article 3 is silent on the scope of permissible punishments,
though it implicitly sanctions executions, only conditioning
their imposition on a prior judicial determination of
guilt. 82
There is· nothing in Article 3 to prevent the execution of ANC
guerrillas simply for having taken up arms against the
Government. Either deferment of the death sentence for the
duration of the conflict or its total abandonment would be
preferable. At present, however, the Government, by sentencing
ANC members to fixed terms of imprisonment or to execution, does
not violate Article 3. Nor would the ANC if it did likewise.




(b) Article 3 does not lay down any specific conditions of
detention.83 It does not explicitly require a trial before
detention nor does it prohibit solitary confinement, censorship
or other similar practices. It just imposes a general requirement
of humane treatment amplified by prohibitions on "cruel treatment
and torture", outrages upon personal dignity and humiliating and
degrading treatment. Article 3 does not forbid "interrogation"
for the purpose of gleaning information, but its prohibition of
"torture" would include all forcible and many passive methods of
interrogation. Bond, using Geneva Convention 3 as a guideline,
argues that adequate medical care, housing, food and
communications should' be available to prisoners. He notes that
the Conventions require similar treatment for captives to aDP's
own forces in Articles 49/51. But he recognises that:
Given the often disparate conditions in which guerrillas
operate and the poverty that afflicts most third world
countries, the similar treatment standard will not ensure
anything like ideal treatment. The ideal is seldom a viable
alt~rnative however, and so long as the participants feed,
house and care for their prisoners no less well than they do
for their own forces, they may have conceded as much to the
demands of humanity as the necessity of their circumstances
permits. 84
In South Africa, the spectre of racial discrimination overshadows
the question of the treatment of prisoners. It is clear that in
order to comply with Article 3, the Government would have to
83 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the Norwegian
delegation proposed that treatment similar to P.O.W. status
should be applied to combatants in non-international armed
conflicts. The reaction to this proposal was negative and it was
withdrawn - Final Record 28 49.
84 Bond op cit 126.
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desegregate its detention facilities so as not to impose an
"adverse distinction" based on racial grounds.
(c) Article 3 does not oblige the parties to the South African
armed conflict to accept or permit supervision by a third party,
although it does permit an impartial humanitarian body such as
the ICRC to offer its serVlces to the parties to the conflict.
The ICRC has intervened
permission.
in South Africa with Government
(d) Article 3 establishes the principle of the protection of the
civilian population. Article 3 leaves no doubt that acts against
persons not taking part in hostilities - such as acts of terror
di"rected at the civilian population are absolutely
prohibited. SS Article (3)2 prohibits " ... violence to life,
torture and the taking of hostages ... ". As Article 3 does not
apply to combatants who have not laid down their arms, combatants
appear to be legitimate objects of attack. But what of
assassination - the practice of killing another combatant when he
poses no threat to the killer's life. Are all Government or ANC
officials fair game? It depends on how widely the net of members
of the armed forces is cast. Plainly assassination of political
appointees or civil service members who are civilians is a
violation of Article 3. In addition, althoug~ the rules against
8S H P Gasser "Prohibition of Terrorist
International Law" 36 l.RRC. (1986) 200 at 207.
Acts in
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assassination of combatants were eroded in World War 2, the
practice is inherently foreign to the idea that combatants
involved in an armed conflict should be in a position to take
each other's lives. ss
6.2 3 THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 3
The question of the enforcement of Article 3 in the South African
armed conflict is controversial, not only in itself, but also
because South Africa has never acknowledged Article 3's
application. In one view, Article 3 is an isolated Article
because of the exclusive definition of international armed
conflict in Article 2 and thus the general enforcement measures
of the Geneva Conventions do not operate to enforce Article 3's
application by the South African Government. A literal reading,
however, of the provision in common Article 49/30/129/146 of the
Conventions that" ... each HCP shall take all measures for the
supervision of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present
conventions ... ", makes it clear that this provision covers all
breaches including breaches of Article 3. 87 Thus~ enquiries into
alleged violations of Article 3 by the Government can be made
under common Article 52/53/132/149 and individual violations can
be punished as grave breaches under common Article 49/30/129/146.
As far as the ANC is concerned, if it seeks the application of
86 Bond op cit 88.
87 See C Lysaght "The Scope of Protocol 2 and its relation
to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other
Human Rights Instruments" 33 American ULR (1983/4) 12.
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general humanitarian protections such as those contained in
Article 3, it must comply with Article 3's obligations, including
the obligations of specific enforcement measures.
6,2.4 CONCLUSION
Article 3 provides only basic humanitarian protections for
combatants. ss Indeed, Article 3's protections are so general that
it can be argued that the South African Government already abides
by Article 3 in its ordinary domestic law. However, in order to
clarifY the situation, it is important that the Government should
implement Article 3's specific protections explicitly. A response
from the ANC affirming,its respect for these protections is also
desirable.
88 R R Baxter "Ius in bello interno: The Present and Future
Law" in J N Moore Law and Civil War in the Modern World (1974)
518 at 528 notes its deficiencies.
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6,3 GENEYA PROTOCOL 2'S PERSONAL FIELD OF APPLICATION AND GENERAL
PROTECTIONS
6,3,1 PERSONAL FIELD
Were Protocol 2 to apply in the South African armed conflict, its
personal field of application would be defined by Article 2.
Article 2 - Personal Field of Application
1. This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion
or belief, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar
criteria (hereafter referred to as 'adverse distinction') to
all persons affected by an armed conflict as defined in
Article 1.
2, At the end of an armed conflict, all the persons who have
been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been
restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as
those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is
restricted after the conflict " for the same reasons, shall
enjoy the protections of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of
such deprivation or restriction of liberty.
Article 2(1) consists of two elements, The first defines the
personal field of application of Protocol 2 by directing that it
applies to all persons affected by an armed conflict as defined
in Article 1, wherever they may be, in the combat zone or
elsewhere,89 Thus combatants of both parties who participate in a
conflict falling within the material scope of Article 1 are
covered by Protocol 2 through Article 2. It follows that
combatants in the South African armed conflict would not fall
into Protocol 2's personal field of application even if South
Africa were a party to the Protocol, unless the conflict fell
89 M Bathe K Partsch and W Solf New Rules for Victims Q[
Armed Conflict (1982) 630.
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within the parameters defined by Article 1. The second element
prohibits any adverse distinction based on certain criteria taken
from the prohibition of discrimination in common Article 2 of the
two 1966 Human Rights Covenants. so Article 2(2) says nothing
about when Protocol 2 begins to apply, but stipulates when it
ends. It is safe to assume that Protocol 2 applies when the
objective conditions of Article 1(1) are met and both parties
agree to apply it.
6 3 2 PROTOCOL 2'S GENERAL PROTECTIONS
6.3 2.1 NO LAWFUL COMBATANT STATUS
In 1871, the IeRe proposed a measure that woul~ preclude the
punishment of a fighter " ... solely for having belonged to armed
forces, unless imperative security arrangements made this
necessary. "81 In 1972, the ICRC proposed that a treatment similar
to P.O.W. status should be applied to combatants in non-
international armed conflicts who observed the four Hague
conditions of distinction from civilians. These pro"posals did not
meet with much support from the government experts or from the
delegates to the Diplomatic Conference. In 1976, Committee 1 took
up these ideas in a much less extensive form. It adopted ICRC
90 Bothe et al. ibid.
Si Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict
Document LE/58 (1971). They also proposed the deferment of the
death penalty until the termination of hostilities, unless
imperative security arrangements made it necessary.
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draft Article 10(5),
... which instructed a Court, when sentencing a person for no
other crime than having taken part in hostilities, to take
into consideration, to the greatest possible extent, the
fact that the accused respected the provisions of the
present Protocol. 82
The ICRC draft Protocol attempted to establish immunity of
combatants from the death penalty in Article 10(3). It read:
The death penalty pronounced on any person found guilty of
an offence in relation to the armed conflict shall not be
carried out until the hostilities have ceased.
Both of these provisions were attached in committee to draft
Article 10(5). But the Hussein draft, on a majority vote,
scotched paragraph 5 from draft Article 10. 83 Thus there is no
provision in Protocol 2 for suspension of the death penalty or
even for considering compliance with the Protocol as a mitigating
circumstance. Committee draft Article 10(6), which provided that
anyone sentenced should have the right to seek pardon or
commutation of the death sentence, was also deleted in the
Hussein draft. 84
These provisions would in no way have affected the power of the
state to punish rebels for their participation in combat.
Although, as Kalshoven points out,
construed as the beginning of the
they could not have been
introduction of lawful
combatant or P.G.W. status into the law of non-international
82 CDDH/1/SR63.
93 CDDH/SR50 - vote 26/12/49.
94 On a vote of 16/17/49.
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armed conflict,S5 that was not the way they were viewed by the
majority of delegates at the Conference. The explanatory comments
attached to the Hussein draft demanded that
... nothing in this Protocol should suggest that dissidents
must be treated legally other than as rebels. To move in the
direction of legitimising their military activities as
having some degree of legitimacy is to invite the
expectation or even demand of P.O.W. status on capture. ss
Third World states used their sovereignty as a general
justification to limit the development of these and other
normative restraints in non-international armed conflicts. In
reality, the denial of lawful combatant and P.O.W. status was
essential because of the unstable fragmentary nature of new
states plagued with ,ideological and ethnic rivalries. s7 These
states feared that conferment of protected status would encourage
dissidents to revolt by reducing their personal risk because of
their immunity from domestic law. In reply to the assertion that
protection of combatants was necessary to protect civilians
because it was the only incentive for rebels to comply with the
rules protecting civilians, Third World delegates argued that
protection of civilians tends to have the undesirable consequence
S5 F Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The
Diplomatic Conference 1974-1877" 8 N.Yl.1. (1977) 107 at 144.
96 CDDH/427 and CDDH/427 Corr. 1.
87 W A Solf "Problems with the Application of Norms
Governing Interstate Armed Conflict to Non-international Armed
Conflict" 13 G..eorgia Journal of International and Comparative Law
(1983) 291 at 282.
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of legitimising attacks on security personnel and objectives. ss
But the blame for removal of protections for combatants cannot be
laid entirely at the Third World's door. Many Western nations
were also strongly opposed to the introduction of combatant law
into the Protocol for very similar reasons. ss
- Unfortunately, Protocol 2 is no improvement on Article 3 of the
Conventions in respect of lawful combatant status and other than
political motivation and the fear of reprisals, there is little
incentive for the ANC to apply the rest of the Protocol, even if
the Protocol applied in the South African armed conflict.
G 3 2.2 QUARTER
ICRC draft Article 7, and Committee draft Article 22 bis, both
provided that persons hors de combat should not be made the
object of attack. 100 Surprisingly, even this provision was
eliminated in the Hussein draft. Thus in Protocol 2 there is no
specific protection for enemy combatants hors de combat. The
protections in Articles 4-6 do not prevent combatants from being
the object of attack at the moment of surrender. However, Article
4(1) does prohibit the order that there shall be no survivors.
88 Solf ibid.
99 A Eide "The New Humanitarian Law of Non-International
Armed Conflict" in A Cassese (ed) The New Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict (1879) val 1 277 at 304.
lOO Eide op cit 288.
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6 3 2 3 DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS
Committee draft Article 24 was identical to Article 48 of
Protocol 1, which enforces the principle of distinction between
civilians and combatants. In plenary, however, the two thirds
majority required to enact the draft provision was not achieved
and the Conference adopted Articles 7 and 14-18 instead. These
Articles constitute as a whole an implicit, watered-down version
of the original draft Article.~o~
6 3 2 4 ARTICLE 4 - FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES
Article 4(1), which is rooted in Article 3 of the Conventions,
sets out the fundamental protections of the person, honour,
convictions and religious practice for " ... all persons who do not
take a direct part in hostilities." Combatants only acquire th~se
protections once they cease to fight or when they fall into the
hands of the enemy. Article 4(2) prohibits partic~lar acts, for
example, murder, torture etc. Article 4(2)(d) prohibits
terrorism. Article 4(3) provides special protections for
children. including, importantly,
provision that no children under the
in subparagraph
age of 15 years
(c), the
shall be
recruited in the armed force's groups or be allowed to take part
in hostilities. Nevertheless, under subparagraph (d), if they are
recruited they retain the special protections.
101 CDDH/50 Rep of Committee 2.
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6,3 2 5 ARTICLE 6 - PENAL PROSECUTION
Article 6(1) provides basic guarantees for persons prosecuted and
punished for criminal offenses related to the armed conflict,
Article 6~2) allows that no sentence will be passed and no
penalty carried out "" ,except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of
independence and judicial impartiality," It sets out certain
procedural rights necessary to guarantee this impartiality, It
lays down procedures for trial on the basis of individual, rather
than group, responsibility, It provides for the accused to be
informed of the charge against him without delay and for his
right to a defence;,102 individual penal responsibility; 103 no
retroactivity of offenses;104 and that no heavier sentence is
imposed than that applicable when the offence was committed, but
allows the accused to benefit from a lighter sentence;105
presumption of innocence;106 accused's right to be present at his
trial;107 and his right against self-incrimination,l08 Article
6(3) provides that the accused must be notified of his remedies
and any time limits thereon. Article 6(4) forbids,
~02 Subparagraph (a) .
103 Subparagraph (b) .
104 Subparagraph Cc).
105 Subparagraph Cc).





does, execution of juveniles under 18, pregnant women, and
mothers of young children. ICRC draft Article 10(6), to the
effect that authorities ~hould endeavour to grant amnesty to as
many participants in the armed conflict as possible, was adopted
at committee level as Article 10(7) and although its deletion was
proposed in the Hussein draft, it was retained in Article 6(5).
Were Protocol 2 to apply in the South African armed conflict,
Article 6 establishes penal provisions that would conflict with
the working of the criminal law in practice in those areas where
it no longer meets international standards.




Article 5 sets out
status, also
treatment of allfor the
recognising lawful combatant
for p.a.w. status. Captured











those individuals who have been deprived of their liberty for
reasons related to the armed conflict.
Article 5(1)(a) establishes that wounded and sick prisoners will
be cared for in terms of Article 7; (l)(b) establishes a similar
standard of treatment to the local population for prisoners;
(l)(c) establishes a right to relief; (l)(d) a right to religion;
(l)(e) establishes a similar working conditions standard to that
of the local population for prisoners required to work. Article
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5(2) urges the adoptidn of further provisions in respect of
prisoners if they are within their captor's capabilities, viz.:
(2)(a) division of the sexes, (2)(b) communication, (2)(c) camps
away from the combat zone, (2)(d) medical examinations, (2)(e) no
unnecessary medical procedures.
6.3 2 7 THE PROHIBITION OF TERRORISM
Article 4(2)(d) explicitly prohibits
terrorism. loe Article 13(2)110 rules that
acts or threats of
... the civilian population shall not be the object of
attack. Acts or threats of violence the' primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population ate
prohibited.
It is unclear exactly what an act or threat of terror is other
than an act or threat of violence. Kalshoven, in an exhaustive
study, concludes that international humanitarian law makes no
real distinction between terrorism and guerilla warfare. 111
Humanitarian law only emphasises that civilians need protection
from acts which intensify fear, anxiety or despair. Nevertheless,
Protocol 2's use of the term terrorism is informed by the
prohibition on the taking of hostages in Article 42(c) and the
prohibition on pillage in Article 42(g). Protocol 2 does prohibit
acts of violence against the civilian population, but it is
unclear whether it protects combatants not directly involved in
1U9 Article 4(2)(h).
110 Identical to Article 51 of Protocol 1.
111 F Kalshoven "Guerilla or Terrorism 1n Internal Armed
Conflict" 33 American ULR (1983/4) 67 at 80.
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combat situations from acts of violence such as assassination
attempts.
6,3 3 THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL 2
The Protocol's enforcement measures are inadequate. Although
Article 18 allows relief organisations located within the
territory of an HCP to offer their services, it does not grant a
right of humanitarian intervention to the ICRC. Local relief
societies are usually reluctant to offer their services because
they are likely to be the object of attack. Other than Article
18, there are no provisions for the supervision or enforcement of
Protocol 2 at all! Although it is arguable that the provisions
for enforcement in the 1949 Conventions also apply to Protocol 2
because Protocol 2 is intended to supplement Article 3,~12 the
lack of explicit enforcement procedures is a major lacuna in the
Protocol.~13
~3 4 CONCLUSION
The analysis of Protocol 2's protections reveals that even should
it apply in the South African armed conflict, it does little more
than explain and expand upon the personal protections of common
Article 3 of the 1349 Geneva Conventions.
~12 C Lysaght "The Scope of Protocol 2 and its relation to
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other
Human Rights Instruments" 33 American ULR (1983/4) 25.
113 See generally G I A 0 Draper "The Implementation of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1978"




DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
Common Article 3 and Protocol 2 suffer from common defects that
makes them unsuitable for the humanitarian regulation of the
South African armed conflict, viz.: a paucity of protections
coupled to an inappropriate application threshold. Protocol l's
extensive protections, especially the granting of lawful status
to combatants, coupled with its rejection of any geo-military
threshold for application, obviously provides a far more
attractive option to the ANC than either Article 3 or Protocol 2.
In contrast to Protocol 1, these instruments do not regulate very
low intensity conflicts, a fact that clearly prevents Protocol
2's application in the South African armed conflict and which
throws some doubt on Article 3's application. Nevertheless,
recent initiatives to develop in.ternational regulation at these
low levels may make it possible to close this gap in the law of
non-international armed conflict.
stated:
In 1884 the ICRC President
A major area that falls outside the effective scope of
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts
is internal strife that falls below the thresholds of
applicability of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 for the Protection of Victims of War and of the
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
relating to the protections of Victims'of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 2).114
114 238 lRRC Jan/Feb (1984) 3,9. See generally T Heron
"Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal Strife" 78
American Jl.L.. (1984) 859; T Fleiner-Gerster and M A Meyer "New
Directions in Humanitarian Law - A Challenge to the Concept of
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He said that the ICRC would hold consultations with experts on
the elaboration of a new declaration focussing on internal
strife. Heron, responding to the ICRC statement, notes: (i) The
declaration should apply to internal strife only; (ii) it should
cover situations involving collective violence, including low
intensity violence, ranging from " ... simple internal tensions to
more serious internal disturbances"; (iii) it should cover
situations not already covered by the law of armed conflict;
(iv) it should be non-derogable and not subject to any
limitations or restrictions whatsoever.~~5
Such a declaration WQu'1d fill a dangerous lacuna in the law of
non-international armed conflict. It is submitted that it should
be made and South Africa should become party to it. All possible
gaps in the protections offered by the law of non-international
armed conflict to victims of the South African armed conflict
would then, at least theoretically, be closed. The conflict in
South Africa is taking place in diverse theatres and at varying
levels of violence. A low-thresholded declaration of elementary
protections could be used in response to specific situations such
as the unclassifiable conflicts within the South African
townships and could play a positive role in regulating what has
become anarchy.
Sovereignty" 34 LCL.Q. (1985) 207 at 280.





The division in South African society that resulted in the armed
conflict between the ANC and the Government influences the
analysis of those who comment on or determine the legal position
of the combatants involved in the conflict. Although this study
has approached the position of combatants from a legal viewpoint,
it is not, and probably could never be, free from political bias.
It has, however, tried to avoid becoming inextricably trapped in
polemics, by de-emphasising the moral debate about the ·legitimacy
of the present Government's use of violence to maintain its hold
on political power in South Africa and the legitimacy of the
ANC's use of violence to attempt to break that hold.
Nevertheless, the way in which this moral debate results in
sharply differing attitudes to the combatants involved in the
conflict provides a powerful motivation for the international
regulation of the conflict. The criminalisation of those who
engage in armed struggle to end agartheid, undermines the
normative content of the South African criminal law because of
the moral repugnancy of agartheid to the majority of South
Africans and the tendency to regard the" struggle against the
Government as just. The danger to the domestic law is that its
use to punish ANC combatants will eventually result in the
complete rejection of the normative value of law and the whole
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legal system wil·l dissolve in the resulting anarchy. The use of
the criminal law to justify the execution of ANC combatants has
already brought.South African law into disrepute internationally.
In addition to this pressing domestic issue, the humanitarian
imperative, the need to alleviate the suffering of all the
victims of the conflict, also compels lawyers to look for ways to
apply humanitarian law in the conflict. To what extent does
international law provide a viable means for the humanitarian
regulation of the South African armed conflict?
7 2 THE INADEQUACY OF THE APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Arguab 1y, two d iff'eren t in terna t iona 1 legal regimes are
applicable to the South African armed conflict. It can be classed
as either an international or a non-international armed conflict.
Adjudged on whether they successfully meld together technical and
moral considerations into effective law, neither classification
is entirely satisfactory.
Although refined theoretically since its introduction more than
twenty years ago, the concept of the international nature of the
South African armed conflict has yet to be transformed into
effective law binding the parties to the South African armed
conflict. The internationalisation of the conflict was part of
the radical change brought about in international law under the
new international legal order'. As in other areas of
international law, the new majority of mostly Third World states
moved into the humanitarian arena in
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pursuit of specific
political goals and, from the outset, showed a willingness to
discard the received legal structures that could not be adapted
to achieve these goals. Fot most partisans of the national
liberation movement's cause, the theoretical legal justification
for the internationalisation of wars of national liberation was
inchoate and its political necessity was the only real issue.
Their disregard for strict legalism shocked the concept's Western
detractors. In an effort to placate these objectors, the concept
has been explained in terms of the existing definition of
international armed conflict.
It has been argued that wars of national liberation, like all
international armed conflicts, can be characterised as a conflict
between different subjects of international law, in this case a
state and a people struggling for self-determination. 1 The South
African situation is complicated by the fact that South Africa
achieved independence
unlike other colonies
before political emancipation took place,
where emancipation was concurrent with
independence. But this failure to achieve emancipation means that
the South African people retain the right to internal self-
determination, which is exactly the same in legal effect as the
classical right of external self-determination. Only when self-
determination is fully achieved will the sovereign integrity of
the South African state be fully established. It follows from
1 A Rosas The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 292.
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this analysis that the ANC, deemed the legitimate representative
of the South African people by the majority in the international
community, has a legal right to go to war against the South
African Government and the ensuing armed conflict must be
governed by the law of' international armed conflict. Because this
argument defines the armed conflict in terms of the objective
nature of the parties, it conforms to the accepted legal
definition of international armed conflict. Nevertheless, the
granting of international status to the ANC is informed by the
subjective judgement of international society that the ANC has a
morally valid reason for attempting to overthrow the South
African Government. This judgement also informs the claim of
lawful combatant. status for ANC combatants. Lawful combatant
status was first granted in interstate armed conflicts because it
was recognised that a state's combatants cannot be held morally
responsible for taking up arms on their Government's behalf.
Transferred to the South African armed conflict, the concept
means that ANC combatants cannot be held morally responsible for
their actions because they take up arms on behalf of the ANC,
which has been legitimated by the international community. Norms
of justice, such as these, are not foreign to humanitarian law.
However, while it is acceptable to imbue the law with such norms,
it is an exercise in futility if the terminology in which they
are couched completely undermines the only means for enforcing
their application as law.
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The liberal "interpretation of Article 2 paragraph 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Article 1(4) of Protocol 1 were the tools that
"the new order's' proponents used to try to apply the law of
international armed conflict in the South African armed conflict,
in order to secure lawful status for ANC combatants. The liberal
interpretation of Article 2 paragraph 3 stands accused of
st retchin'g the Conventions too far. It remains extremely
controversial and is not widely supported. The concrete form
given to that interpretation in Article 1(4), with its specific
reference to the South African Government as a "racist regime",
is too polemical. The Third World used its voting power at the
1974-77 Diplomatic Conference to implement valid ideas in too
provocative a manner. The problem arose when, to paraphrase Bond,
the new majority said that this is the new law, take it or leave
it, and many Western states, as well as South Africa, chose to
leave it. 2 Despite the weighty arguments in favour of the
application of international law, the South African Government
continues to view the conflict as a purely internal question
beyond international reach. In a system that only regulates those
who participate, Article 1(4)'s loaded terminology allowed the
Government to avoid Protocol l's application in South Africa as
treaty law, Commenting on the value of Protocol 1, Conradie J in
S y Petane 3 concedes that it
2 J E Bond "Amended Article 1 of draft
1949 Geneva Conventions: The Coming of Age of
Washington & Lee LR (1975) 65 at 67.
3 1988 (3) SA 51 (CPD) at 63.
Protocol 1 of the
the Guerilla" 32
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... may be described as an enlightened humanitarian
document ... [and] ... we may one day find it a cause for
regret that the ideologically provocative tones of s 1(4)
has made it impossible for the Government to accept its
terms.
The packaging of Article 1(4) leads one to speculate whether the
new majority in the international community really desired the
international regulation of the South African armed conflict or
whether it was an instrument designed to punish the South African
Government by isolating and condemning it in an international
treaty, which at the same time conveniently furnished little
general precedent for the granting of substantial rights to
rebels in other internal armed conflicts. Whatever their true
motive, clearly, to 'enable the majority in the international
community to impose its morality on 'rogue' states like South
Africa through the medium of international law, the law has to
have a prescriptive nature. Third World States may believe that
General Assembly resolutions already provide the means to bind
recalcitrant states through international law, but while these
resolutions do carry some legal weight, they are not a separate
source of positive law. International custom is often used to try
to bind a state against its will, but it requires almost
universal acceptance and even then states can opt out of the
formation of the new rule. Article 1(4) was an instrument that
required some form of international legislation imposing majority
opinion on recalcitrant states to be immediately effective. No
such legislation yet exists and, as Protocol l's case
illustrates, without strong international support, international
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custom is a poor substitute. The requisite support for Protocol 1
may be forthcoming in the future, but it is not yet available.
The alternative classification of the South African armed
conflict as a non-international armed conflict, appears at first
blush to provide a more viable option for the application of
international law in South Africa. But it also suffers from
problems of difficulty of application as well as a paucity of
protection for combatants. Common Article 3 of the Conventions is
the only provision which from a positivistic point of view is
arguably applicable in South Africa. Article 3 also has a number
of other advantages.' It is free of ideological baggage. The
rationale for its application is the recognition of the need~for
basic humanitarian restraint rather than the legitimacy of the
ANC's aims. It leaves intact the Government's right to prosecute
its internal opponents for participation in combat. It is part of
a treaty to which South Africa is party. Nevertheless, Article 3
is not a solution to the problem of regulating the South African
armed conflict. Firstly, its implicit threshold casts some doubt
on whether the South African armed 80nflict falls into its
material field of application and thus its application is not
entirely unproblematic. More importantly, Article 3 does not
provide adequate protections for combatants, The major omission
is some form of special status for combatants. Protocol 2, the
attem~t to beef up Article 3's protections, was a victim of the
1974-77 Diplomatic Conference's obsession with Article 1(4) of
379
Protocol 1 and the unwillingness of newly independent states to
allow any international interference in their domestic affairs.
Emptied of its most valuable additions to protections for
combatants in non-international armed conflict and predicated at
an impossibly high geo-military threshold, Protocol 2 is
inapplicable to the South African armed conflict at present
because South Africa is not party to it and its future
application seems unlikely.
Despite obvious drawbacks, the application of the law of non-
international armed conflict in South Africa is more easily
reconciled with the traditional legal structures than the
internationalisation of the conflict and will probably become
more attractive to the South African Government over time because
it allows international regulation at little cost to South
Africa's sovereignty. But because it takes no account of the
special nature of the South African armed conflict it is, and
will probably remain, unattractive to the ANC and its supporters
as a suitable solution to the problem of regulating the South
African armed conflict. Moreover, because the law of non-
international armed conflict permits ANC combatants to fall
within the jurisdiction of the South African criminal law, it
allows the undermining of that law in the eyes of the majority of
the population to continue, a process which must be arrested if
the South African criminal law is to survive the present crisis.
Although the ANC's 1880 Declaration indicated a commitment to
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basic humanitarian restraints such as those contained in Article
3, something more is required if humanitarian law is to have any
real impact on the South African armed conflict. The situation
has progressed too far for the law of non-international armed
conflict to provide an adequate solution. The emphasis is now
firmly on the award of lawful status to combatants as the ~
pro guo for the application of humanitarian law.
In the final analysis, the internationalisation of the South
African armed conflict provides too much law at too high a price
for the Government, while the non-internationalisation of the
conflict provides insufficient law at an inordinate price to the
ANC. Neither option satisfies the overriding humanitarian concern
for the regulation of the conflict. Before looking for ways to
adapt the existing law to solve the humanitarian impasse in the
conflict, it is interesting to speculate on the kind of legal
instrument that could have been developed in the 1970's to
furnish an ideal solution to the problem of providing effective
international law in situat'ions like that in South Africa.
7 3 A MORE SUITABLE SOLUTION
If, as has been argued, Protocol 1 failed to provide effective
international regulation of the South African armed conflict only
because the means used to apply it as effective law - Article
1(4) with .its reference to "racist regimes" - was unacceptable to
the Government, it seems to follow that had Article 1(4) been
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altered to make it more palatable to the Western"and target
states, Protocol 1 would have been the best solution for the
international regulation o~ the South African armed conflict.
However, other valid objections were made to the
internationalisation of wars of national liberation in Article
1(4). Firstly, wars of national liberation were too narrowly
defined. Secondly, the theory that these conflicts took place
between international subjects was regarded as artificial.
Thirdly, it was considered impractical to apply the full corpus
of the law of international armed conflict in situations where
the liberation movement's ability to apply this law was doubtful.
The limited capability- of the national liberation movements was
borne out by the fact that the ANC, in its 1980 Declaration, only
agreed to respect international humanitarian law where possible.
A Protocol with a wider scope and sounder theory than Protocol 1,
taking into account the claim of lawful status for the combatants
of national liberation movements, but not bringing into operation
the mass of rules dependant for their operation on the existence
of so~histicated state bureaucratic structures, would have gained
stronger support from Western and affected states than Protocol
1. It 1S submitted that a Protocol according lawful combatant
status in any internal conflict that reached a certain geo-
military threshold or where an internationally recognised
organisation confronted the incumbent for legitimate political
reasons, such as 10 a war of national liberation, would have
combined both ~olitical and legal imperatives to provide a
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positive development of the law. Such a Protocol could have
linked the gradation of protections to the gradation of violence
in general cases of internal insurrection, while recognising the
legitimacy of wars of national liberation through the recognition
of the lawful status of liberation movement combatants, without
reference to the geo-military scale of these conflicts.
The arguments made during the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference in
support of the granting of lawful combatant status in wars of
national liberation, illustrate the practicability of making the
same grant in internal situations. The personal conditions for
lawful combatant status could have been adapted to the conditions
of internal armed conflict, in much the same way as they were
adapted in Article's 43 and 44 of Protocol 1 to wars of national
liberation. A Protocol embodying these provisions, but with a
more general application in internal situations than Protocol 1,
would have generated legal precedents in other jurisdictions that
could have been of enormous significance when the issue of
combatant status is actually taken up in South African courts. It
would also have pointed to a future for the law - the argument
for the granting of special status to internal opponents would
not have expired with the end of the South African armed
conflict.
In retrospect, had Protocol 2 been predicated at a low threshold
with a content that amounted to something worthwhile, it could
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have been the appropriate vehicle for such a solution. However,
it must be conceded that had Protocol 2 contained such an ideal
legal solution, it would probably have been politically
unacceptable to many states. It would have had as politically
high a profile and therefore ha~ as much political appeal to the
Third World as Article 1(4) and Protocol 1. Moreover, it would
have intruded on the sovereignty of states in other internal
conflicts and thus would have required a greater willingness to
surrender sovereignty than was evident in the 1970's.
7.4 WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH THE EXISTING LAW?
Despite the fact that,we are left floundering in a legal morass,
it would be incorrect to regard international law as useless.
Humanitarianism compels us to use the existing law as a basis for
the international regulation of the South African armed conflict.
At present, comm9n Article 3's fundamental rules probably protect
all combatants. Protocol 2, Protocol 1 and the corpus of the i949
Conventions do not apply. Of course, the situation could alter to
the extent where their material conditions of application are
present and they do apply. But at this juncture they can only
serve as a framework for the extension of humanitarian principles
in the South African armed conflict. What kind of framework do
they provide?
The promise that the corpus of the law of international armed
conflict holds out is the applicability of lawful combatant
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status to participants and the denial of domestic criminal
prosecution for the taking up of arms against the South African
Government. The Conventions and Protocol 1 offer lawful combatant
status and P.O.W. status to ANC combatants. These or similar
protections were the most serious omissions from Protocol 2.
Article 3 urges the parties to internal armed conflicts to agree
to bring into force all or part of the other provisions of the
1949 Conventions, thus pointing the way to the operation of
lawful combatant status and P.O.W. status in the South African
Armed conflict by agreement between the Government and ANC. In
the current political climate such agreement is unlikely,
although paradoxically' it may become possible when the situation
worsens. The ex gratia award of status by the Government to ANC
combatants is the only hope for the operation of humanitarian law
in the conflict at present.
It is submitted that in South Africa, distinction should be made
between those guerrillas who meet the requirements for lawful
combatant status and those who do not. For the purposes of neat
classification this study has followed the orthodox taxonomy;
viz. international armed conflict - special status and general
protections; non-international armed conflict general
protections only. But as we have seen, the recent practice of
states tends to contradict this approach. Combatants in many non-
international armed conflicts, such as Lebanon, Chad and Northern
Ireland, have been granted what could be described as a quasi-
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combatant status, based on the pragmatic responses of states
faced with burgeoning conflicts. This status is ex gratia and has
no normative content. Given the existing legal impa~se, such an
arrangement in the South African armed conflict is highly
desirable. Because of the magnitude of the concession the South
African Government would have to make in order to concede such
status of its own free will to ANC combatants, it may appear to
be wishful thinking that the Government will accord such status
on an ad hoc basis when the opportunity to do so through
contractual obligation has arisen and has not been taken up. But
the highly politicised nature of the South African situation
demands increasing f}exibility from the Government. Its attitude
to the operation of humanitarian law in South Africa 1S
determined by both the international and internal political
climates, and against the background of
isolation and internal rejection of
increasing international
the criminal law, the
application of humanitarian law, without the loss of face
attendant to becoming party to Protocol 1, will steadily become a
more attractive option. Other factors influencing such a decision
include the increasing geo-military profile of the conflict, the
positive attitude of the ANC to humanitarian law and the
possibility of reprisals.
It may seem contradictory to expend so much energy looking for
legally binding ways in which to apply humanitarian law in the
South African armed conflict and then submit that the best chance
for the present application of the law lies
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within the
Government's prerogative. However, we must not allow in
Forsythe's words, " ... an instrumental view of international law
to become a pursuit of international law itself."4 The corpus of
the law is instrumental in nature - it is constructed to achieve
humanitarian goals. If it cannot be used rigidly with its
integrity complete, then it should be modified, interpreted, and
applied in a flexible manner in order to achieve those goals. In
the South African context, one of those goals is the legal
emancipation of combatants and the resultant beneficial impact on
the conduct of the conflict itself. ANC combatants must be
emancipated. In the future, convincing arguments may be found to
bind the South African Government to grant ANC combatants lawful
combatant status, but at this stage it can only be granted
voluntarily by the Government. If it is granted, the ANC will be
compelled to follow suit.
ANC combatants can be granted lawful status quite comfortably.
Chapter four's evaluation of the personal conditions for
protected status and general protections for combatants set out
in the Conventions and Protocol 1, indicates that international
law 1S well adapted to the kind of warfare prevailing in the
South African armed conflict. It provides an integrated legal
4 0 P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics (1977) 242. He was
referring to the ICRC's attachment to strict legalism at the
1974-77 Diplomatic Conference, an attachment that was ultimately
to its detriment and which has strongly influenced its present
more informal app~oach to the law.
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regime tailored specifically to the reality of unconventional
warfare. Its first step is to ensure the granting of quarter. It
then sets out the conditions for lawful combatant status and
P.O.W. status. In the South African armed conflict these
conditions can be lifted directly from Convention 3's Article 4
or Protocol l's Articles 43 and 44, an option that has the
advantage of capitalising on their interpretation and operation
in other jurisdictions. Protocol l's provisions are more viable
in South Africa than Article 4 of Convention 3's onerous
conditions because they represent the most up-to-date formulation
of the personal conditions for protected status and they are well
adapted to the type of' poor mans war being fought in South
Africa. Alternatively, the existing law can be modified and
adapted to the specific conditions of the South African armed
conflict. This flexible approach would give lawmakers the
opportunity to adapt the existing law to deal creatively with the
different groups of combatants peculiar to the South African
conflict, such as township combatants and fully trained
nationalist guerrillas." They could take a lead in the development
of the law by enforcing membership of an organised group, under
responsible command, with a link to a party to the conflict, as
the criteria for qualification for protected status and finally
and conclusively divorcing the principle of visible distinction
from the combatants' right to participate, enforcing it rather as
a separate provision with attached penal sanctions. Whatever
system is chosen to delineate the personal conditions for
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protected status, combatants who meet the conditions must fall
under international jurisdiction, with a right to participate,
but also subject to the various prohibitions extant under
international law. These prohibitions would do much to restrain
excessive behaviour in the conflict, including attacks on
civilians. Attention would have to be paid to the proced~re for
evaluating status provided by international law. The provisions
in Convention 3 and Protocol 1 setting out this procedure could
provide the guide for the setting up of tribunal system for the
evaluation of status, with a suitable appeal/review procedure,
offering all the procedural guarantees and enforcing the
substantive protections granted combatants under international
law. In addition, this system could serve the important function
of trial of combatants for violations of the law of war. for
instance perfidy and other grave breaches. International law
could also' serve as the basis for the special legal ~egimes
relating to spies and mercenaries, but the more controversial
provisions in Protocol 1 such as the grave breach of apartheid
should be ignored. As for the treatment of captured prisoners,
special detention facilities removed from the civilian prison
system, conforming to the basic standards of the Geneva P.O.W.
Convention without paying attention to inappropriate detail,
would be sufficient to meet the demands of humanitarian law.
7.5 THE COSTS Of GRANTING ANC COMBATANTS PROTECTED STATUS
What are the potential costs to the Government of granting
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protected status to ANC combatants?
(1) It would increase the international status of the ANC.
However, the' ANC's international status is increasing daily in
spite of the legal defences available to the Government because
of the Government's intransigence.
(2) It would encourage greater participation and result in an
escalation of the armed conflict. But the armed conflict is
already escalating, the number of participants is growing and the
consequence of a steadily increasing stream of combatants
remaining unregulated by the law is potentially disastrous.
(3) It would focus ANC attacks on the military. The military is,
however, capable of defending itself and the emphasis on military
targets would result in immense benefits to civilians.
(4) There would be an increased possibility of random criminals
being protected. But the personal conditions of lawful combatant
status - essentially a command link with the ANC - negatives this
possibility entirely.
(5) It would apply lawful combatant status to an armed conflict
that has not reached the geo-military threshold necessary for its
application. But the conferral of protected status requires no
great infrastructure. The South African Government is quite
capable of doing all that is necessary for captured ANC P.O.W's.




in dealing with Cuban
the highest humanitarian
P.O.W. 's, yet denies these
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rights to its own nationals engaged in subversion. 5 Although its
capacity for implementation is limited, the ANC also has the
capability of applying elementary P.O.W.
within the Frontline states.
treatment, especially
(6) It would increase the domestic status.of the ANC. This is a
fundamental hurdle for the incumbent and one that only an act of
political will can surmount. But the incumbent already
acknowledges that it is at war with the ANC and the polarisation
of the South African population in relation to the conflict is
almost complete. The domestic legitimation of the ANC will not
have that great an effect on support for the ANC.
Set off against the obvious advantages that the granting of
lawful combatant status would have the salvaging of the
criminal law and the general humanitarian impact on the conduct
of the conflict - it is submitted that the disadvantages of such
a grant constitute acceptable damage.
7 6 FORCES FOR COMPLIANCE
What forces for compliance are available to enforce international
regulation of the South African armed conflict? The spirit of
Article 1 of the 1949 Conventions, whereby HCP's are bound to
ensure the other parties' respect for the law, points to the role
of the international community in enforcing the law in terms of
--------------
5 "Panel Discussion on Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in
and the International Red Cross" 1979 Acta Juridica 200 at 220.
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the influence it can exert on the South African Government and
the ANC. That the international community is aware of this role
is evidenced by its increasing concern with the fate of ANC
guerrillas when they fall into the Government's hands. It can
only be urged that they do all within their power to modify the
South African Government's view on the issue. Third party
protection and 'intervention is a role which the ICRC can play in
an unofficial capacity, The instruction of both SADF and Umkhonto
members in the personal conditions for lawful combatant status
will go a long way to ensure compliance. 6 Both parties can
incorporate the main provisions of protected status into their
military penal systems. Nevertheless, reciprocity and reprisals
will probably constitute the c en t r a 1 m,.e an s for en for c ing
international protection for bombatants in South Africa.
7.7 THE FUTURE OF'HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
The compromise solution proposed above is an attempt to
institute at an informal level in the South African armed
conflict, the kind of protections that could have been made
available at a formal level by a Protocol built on consensus
rather than confrontation. That we have to suggest regulation at
~n informal level is a great pity. Formal regulation by the law
would be invaluable. But it is unlikely to come~ at least not in
the foreseeable future. Of course, international support for
6 Geneva Convention Article 47/ 48/ 127/ 144
military instruction in the Conventions mandatory




Protocol 1 may one day reach the level necessary for its
transformation into custom and it will become legally binding on
South Africa. But in the meantime, it can only be urged that
those who have it within their power to impose international
regulation of the conflict do so, even if only in the form of an
'out of court' settlement. The key to the actual application of
the law is the South African Government. The law's application
requlres an act of good will on the Government's part. If it
adopts international regulation of the conflict, especially the
granting of protected status for ANC combatants, the ANC is sure
to reaffirm its commitment to the law. If the ANC does not, the
Government will no longer be in the position of spoiler. Because
the ANC will gain a certain amount of legitimacy through the
application of international law in the conflict, it is probable
that the Government's application of international law will only
be forthcoming when the situation within South Africa
deteriorates to the extent that it becomes a viable option. At
that point, the conflict will definitely require a humanitarian
injection. The tacit acknowledgement of the ANC through the'
application of international law in the conflict may also show
the way to the eventual resolution of the conflict. Once the
legitimacy of an enemy is acknowledged,
negotiated end to the conflict.
the road is open for a
Humanitarian law is at the crossroads in South Africa. Bearing in
mind the dismal failure of the law in other wars of national
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liberation, it is distinctly possible that the law will fail
entirely in South Africa as well. If it does fail, there will be
no restraint in a situation that is degenerating rapidly and
which has the potential for dissolving into a conflagration
engulfing the whole sub-continent.
7 8 THE GENERAL FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
In its future development, humanitarian law will have to confront
the spectre of state sovereignty more directly. Sovereignty is
the legal basis for the protective cloak preventing international
regulation of the many armed conflicts within states that deny
social justice to their own nationals. Penetrating this cloak in
the attempt to increase the international ~egulation of internal
conflicts, promises to be no easy task. The development of the
law to regulate internal conflicts will require the development
of mechanisms for the forcing down of the domain reserve barrier.
In this regard, the most obvious area for legal innovation is the
articulation and expansion of the legal nature of the right to
internal self-determination. If this right can be firmly
established, it will provide the key to the extensive application
of humanitarian law in situations beyond the South African case.
The further movement of humanitarian law into internal affairs is
the only logical direction for the law to develop in a world
where classical interstate conflicts are becoming increasingly
rare and where the major international legal concern is for the
universal enforcement of basic human rights.
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APPENDIX A: A SHORT APPRAISAL OF THE QEO-MILITARY SITUATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA
(a) QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS
(i) The Goyernment Forces
The SADF has an operational force of about 200 000,1 broken down
as follows:- Permanent Force 25,52%; National Service Men 42,06%;
Voluntary 2,24%; Civilians 27,09%; Auxiliaries 3,09%. The total
defence expenditure in the 1984/5 financial year was R3 754 667
000, about 4% of the budget. 2 The SADF is well equipped with
standard and advanced weapons and has bases throughout South
Africa and Namibia. It has a fixed disciplinary code and an
hierarchical command.
The SAP has about 35 000 members stationed throughout South
Africa. They either wear the standard blue uniform or camouflage
when operating as a paramilitary force. They ~se light
weapons/riot control gear and vehicles.
In addition there are Civil Defence units, metropolitan police
forces and the police and armed forces of the national states and
the bantustans.
eii) The ANC's Military Wing - UmkhontQ We Sizwe
Reports on the numerical strength of Umkhonto differ widely. The
SAP estimates that there are between 1500 and 2000 trained men,
mostly in camps in Angola, plus a further 3000 members who have
undergone military training but are no longer active. The Police
assert that no more than between 10 and 30 were in the country at
one time. 3 These figures are dated. At least 31 members were
arrested in early October 1987 alone. 4 Oliver Tambo has spoken of
50 guerilla infiltrations a month. Lodge estimates that Umkhonto
has abuut 10000 members, 400 of whom are operational in the
country at anyone time. s The ANC is reported to have allocated
1. H Evans "Restructuring the Role of the Military" 1 South
A£.ricao Reyiew 42. General Magous Malan refuses to give the total
strength of the SADF.
2 L8~4 Survey SAIRR 738/745.
3 1984 Survey op cit 93.
4 Natal Witness 5/10/1887.
5 Talk given at the University of Durban-Westville - Natal
~ercury 14/8/1887.
395
$50 million p.a., about half of its budget, to its military
wing. 6 ANC combatants are armed with light weapons and
explosives. Uniforms are abandoned at the South African border.
(b) CHRONOLOGY OF VIOLENCE
(i) 1976 - end of 1983
159 incidents of insurgency. 1976-4; 1977-20; 1978-13; 1979-12;
1980-19; 1981-55; 1882-39; 1983-55. 7
January 1981 SADF raid on Haputo - 12 ANC members killed. 8
20 August 1982 - 3 SA soldiers killed in Zimbabwe. 9
20 Hay 1883 - Pretoria car bomb attack in Church Street; 20
killed arid 217 injured; ANC claims responsibility.~o
SADF raid on Maputo in retaliation 3 days later; 5 die but
apparently not ANC members.~l
Brigadier Herman Stadler (Security Police) said that between 1976
and the end of 1883 the security police captured 516kg of plastic
explosives, 2500 blocks of TNT, 50 demolition mines, 9 limpet
mines, 172 AK47 rifles, 50 other assault rifles, 150 pistols, 636
hand grenades, 2000 detonators, 50000 rounds of AK47 ammunition
and 7000 rounds of other ammunition. Bomb explosions and threats
had increased by 70% since 1979. Damage caused by acts of
insurgency and sabotage was conservatively estimated at R600
million since 1976. 12
(ii) .l...9.1H..
58 incidents of insurgency occured. 13 32 explosions - targets
included. state departments, petrol depots, power installations,
railway lines, an SADF" building. 26 Armed attacks were made on
SAP members, Police Stations and members of the public.~4 The
Institute of Strategic Studies (UP) said that 42 ANC attacks
occurred in 1984 and more than 100 ANC members were either killed
6 1984 Survey op cit 1.
7 1984 Survey op cit 92.
8 J Friederikse South Africa: A llii'ferent kind of War (1986)
137.
9 8 SAYIL (1982).
10 9 SAYIL (1983).
11 Friederikse op cit 139.
~2 1984 Survey op cit 9'--'£...
13 1984 Survey op cit 92.
14 1.884 Survey ibid.
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or captured.~5 SAIRR data indicated that 27 people died in 42
acts of insurgency; 11 civilians in 2 car bombs and an attack on
an oil refinery in Durban; 1 policeman in Soweto in an attack on
his vehicle and 1 in an assassination; 14 alleged insurgents
died; 61 people were injured.
16 March 1984 Nkomati Accord signed between SA and
Mocambique.~6
3 April 1984 - ANC car bomb in Durban kills 3 and injures five.~7
3 September 1984 - Major unrest in the Vaal triangle; 31 killed.
23 October 1984 7000 troops invade Vaal townships, the
beginning of large scale use of the SADF throughout the nation in
'the putting down of unrest.
(iii) .La8.5.
217 incidents of sabotage/explosives use or armed attack occurred
in 1885; 41 'on police members, 19 on police homes, 8 on police
stations, 26 on private houses.~8 The first six months saw a rise
in the frequency of attacks with 40 incidents reported and a
shift of targets from black townships to CBD's and industrial
areas.~e Rioting in 1985 killed 16 police and injured 330. 1153
state and private buildings were destroyed or damaged. 562 adults
were killed and 2000 wounded by the police. 2o 1966 were arrested
- 54 per day. 2,4 died,per day; 6,1 were wounded per day.
Early 1985 - Cross border raids into Gaberone, Botswana.
August 1985 - Partial State of Emergency declared.
(iv) l.9..fiQ.
An 800% ~ncrease 1n armed revolutionary violence took place since
1884. 21 Attacks increased from a weekly average in April
1884/April 1985 of 3,71 to April 1985jApril 1986's average of
6,25. 22 ANC attacks rose by 322% in two years since April 1984.
Attacks on policeman had risen from 11,95% of all 'terrorist'
l5 1984 Survey ibid.
16 10 SAYIL (1884):
17 10 SAYIL (1984).
18 ~LMercury 9/12/1986 quoting from UCT"s Institute of
Criminology"s statistics.
19 T Lodge "Hayihlane: Let us go to Warl From Nkomati to
Kabwe - The ANC Jan 1~184 - June 1985" 3 SQuth African Review
(1888) 226 at 228.
20 t1..at.al Mercury ibid.
21 tia..t.a 1 Mercury ibid.
22 Natal Mercury ibid.
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attacks to 27,84%. 1986 witnessed a considerable increase in the
use of AK47 rifles. More than 55 arms caches were discovered in
the 14 months to December 1986, with a value of R793 387. Since
1976 428 alleged 'terrorists' had been killed or captured, but of
those 42,28% had been killed/captured since 1984. 23 191 people
were killed by the police in unrest during the first half 1986.
379 people were kill~d by other persons. 15 police had died. 2223
people died in unrest between February 1984 and June 1986 -879 in
1985 and 969 in the first half of 1986.
June 1886 - 2nd nation wide State of Emergency proclaimed. Over
10000 people were detained, and the level of violence dropped
markedly.
(v) 1987-1988
Although information has been restricted since 1986, it appears
that 446 ANC members were arrested in 1987 and 44 members were
killed. 24 38 PAC members were arrested and 4 were killed. 25
The number of ANC attacks abated, but incidents such as the
Grenade attack which killed 2 policeman at Mpumulanga Township
near Pietermaritzburg, were fairly common. 26 The level of
township violence rose slightly at the beginning of 1987, which
also saw the reproclamation of the State of Emergency in June. In
the first two months of 1988 112 ANC members were either captured
or killed, a drop of one third from the number captured or killed
during the same period in 1987. 27 Unusual events included the
suspected operation of South African death squads in Europe,
culminating in the assasination of the ANC representative in
Paris, Dulcie September;28 and the capture of an all white ANC
cadre armed with an anti-aircraft missile near Pretoria in Hay.29
(c) TACTICS AND EVALUATION
The SAP/SADF has been remarkably effective in combating the ANC.
The ANC resorted to armed struggle in 1960, but has yet to make a
major inroad on the Government's military control of South
Africa. The Government has relied on the SAP as its first line of
defence, using the SADF only when a stronger response has been
necessary. The SADF has been heavily involved in punitive cross





28 Natal Mercury 4/411988.
29 Natal Witness 16/5/1988.
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border raids mostly in retaliation for or in anticipation of ANC
attacks and offensives. The Government's forces have also been in
action against the ANC in the Rhodesian Bush War in which both
sides participated on a small scale, and on a larger scale in the
conflict in Angola. Government responses involve conventional
police action, covert penetration' of the ANC, assassination,
covert military action in neighbouring states and conventional
military responses. One result of the ANC's efforts has been the
full scale militarisation of South Africa.
ANC targets include military installations, police stations and
personnel, courts and administration offices, people working
within the system, 'traitors' (i.e. individuals who give evidence
for the state), railway installations, electrical substations and
oil companies. 3o The police consider ANC activity in South Africa
as low compared to the activities of insurgents elsewhere,
labelling the ANC the "least successful" insurgency organisation
in operation. 31 It asserts that it has thwarted attempts by the
ANC to establish bases in the townships, and move from the use of
terror to a guerrilla war. 32 Michael Morris of the 'Terrorism
Research Unit' in Cape Town said that much of the ANC's violence
was the work of a few ,individuals or small teams rather than
large organised groups. He said that the debate about whether the
ANC was switching strategy from 'hard' to 'soft' targets was
futile. The ANC attacked less guarded targets when and where it
could because of the lack of sufficient manpower or funds to
attack specific targets on orders from headquarters. 33 But the
debate about whether the ANC officially sanctions attacks on soft
targets continues. The Pretoria bombing of the SADF's Poynton
House HQ in 1881 was a tactical innovation - timed at afternoon
rush hour - located in a busy street in a commercial centre - and
in the scale of casualties inflicted. The initial ANC response
was supportive of the idea that this was the opening phase of a
new campaign but later responses expressed regret at the extent
of the killing. 34 Sources in Zimbabwe reported that Oliver Tambo
was highly critical of the Durban car bombing of 12 July 1984 in
which 5 people died and 27 were injured. It was reported that the
explosion was generally treated as a serious deviation from ANC
policy, which was that casualties among civilians should be as
30 1984 Survey op cit 83.
31 Ibid.
32 Citizen 11/3/1987.
33 1884 Survey op cit 94.
34 T Lodge "The ANC" 2 South African Review (1984) 21 at 22.
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low as possible. 35 The May 1987 bombing of the Johannesburg
Magistrates Court showed increasingly sophisticated techniques
and hardware. In August 1988 an ANC spokesman was reported to
have said that if cadre members hit soft targets in violation of
the offical policy of avoiding these targets, they could be
disciplined. 36 ANC policy is to internalise the war - the idea
being that the decisive struggle will take place within the
country and not in the surrounding states. 37 Tactics of sabotage
and limpet mine use with occasional car bombs suggest the methods
of ANC operation the use of part time guerrillas/temporary
training bases giving week long courses within the country.38 In
1985 the ANC appealed to township youths to form small bands
armed with home made weapons and to place themselves at the
forefront of township struggles. The SAP claims that such
localised groups armed and trained by the ANC operate
independently so the ANC can dissociate itself from their more
controversial activities, eg .. , the 'Western Cape Suicide Squad's'
grenade attacks on coloured HP'S.38 However, guerilla activity
has been sparsely associated with township unrest. The military
decisions of the ANC's Kabwe Conference (16/6-26/6 1985) were
(i) to strike soft or civilian targets (not civilians
specifically); (ii) to intensify 'peoples' war (popular
insurrection as opposed to secretive sabotage); (iii) to elect a
war council; (iv) all ANC members must undergo military training. 40
35 l.9.a4 Survey op cit 95.
36 Natal Mercury 19/8/1988.
37 1984 Survey op cit 3.
38 Lodge op cit 1986 229-300.
39 Lodge ib id.
40 Lodge op cit 1986 239.
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